Sec 508

We have already considered numerous cases in which agreements have been held inoperative as illegal or against the policy of the law.2 Wherever a promise is of this type, it is not a valid consideration for another promise.3 A promise, for instance, to suppress matters defamatory of another, is not a valid consideration, because (1) such matters should be disclosed to the proper public officer, or not disclosed at all, and (2) to permit such agreements would be to sanction blackmailing.4

Sec 509

For the same reason an illegal consideration vitiates a contract.5 The engagement of one side being void, the engagement of the other side based on it falls.6 And where the contract is indivisible, and a part of the consideration is illegal, this vitiates the whole transaction.7 It is otherwise, as we will presently see, with divisible considerations.8

Sec 510

When a consideration, after an agreement has been made bona fide, becomes impossible of performance, without the fault of the party agreeing to supply it, there being no guaranty against such impossibility on his part, the contract, as we have already seen, falls.1 How-far impossibility at the time of the agreement affects the contract has been distinctively considered.2

A promise against the policy of the law not a valid consideration.

Illegal consideration vitiates.

So of impossible consideration.

1 Ellis v. Clark, 110 Mass. 389.

2 Supra, sec 325 et seq.

3 See also Ham v. Smith, 87 Penn. St. 63.

4 Brown v. Brine, L. R. 1 Ex. D. 5.

5 Supra, sec 335 et seq.

6 Supra, sec 338-9; Benj. on Sales, 3d Am. ed. sec 505; Ladd v. Dillingham, 34 Me. 316.

7 Supra, sec 339; Chater v. Beckett, 7 T. R. 201; Waite v. Jones, 1 Bing. N. C. 656; Hopkins v. Prescott, 4 C. B. 578; Howden v. Simpson, 10 Ad. & El. 793; Taylor v. Chester, L. R. 4 Q. B. 309; Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258; Ladd v. Dillingham, 34 Me. 316; Roby v. West, 4 N. H. 285; Carleton v.

Witcher, 5 N. H. 196; Prescott v. Nor-ris, 32 N. H. 101; Woodruff v. Hinman, 11 Vt. 592; Crawford v. Morell, 8 Johns. 253; Thayer v. Rock, 13 Wend. 53; Barton v. Plank Road, 17 Barb. 397; Baldwin v. Palmer, 6 Selden, 232; Filson v. Himes, 5 Barr, 452; Bly v. Bank, 79 Penn. St. 453; Ives v. Bos-ley, 35 Md. 262; Stoutenburg v. Ly-brand, 13 Oh. St. 228; Collins v. Mer-rell, 2 Met. (Ky.) 163; Chandler v. Johnson, 39 Ga. 85; Pettit v. Pettit, 32 Ala. 288; Porter v. Jones, 52 Mo. 399; Tucker v. West, 29 Ark. 286; Cummings v. Saux, 30 La. An. Part I. 207.

8 Infra, sec 511.

Sec 511

The fact that one of several considerations is invalid or nugatory or impossible does not vitiate an agreement if there remains any one valuable consideration to support the promise. In such case all the invalid and ineffective considerations may be rejected as surplusage.3 Thus, where a promissory note and a bill of exchange had been given at the same time in payment of a sailor's bill to his landlord, part of which bill included an illegal charge for spirituous liquors, and it appeared that the whole charge for liquors was not equal to one of these securities, it was held by Lord Tenterden that the plaintiff was entitled to recover on the other security.4 When, also, part of a divisible consideration falls as contravening the statute of frauds, the rest will support a promise.5 And, as a general rule, where one consideration is nugatory or inoperative, it does not impair liability if a valid consideration remains;6 and so where there is a divisible agreement to do two things, one legal and the other illegal.7 It is otherwise, however, when the consideration is entire, and wholly illegal or inoperative.8