1 A servant whose contract of hiring provides that if he intends to leave his master's employ he will give notice of such intention and work ten full working days thereafter, ana in default thereof forfeit all money that may be due him, cannot recover from the master wages previously earned, if without sufficient cause he leaves his work without giving the required notice, and remains away so long as to warrant the master in regarding his absence as an abandonment of his work, and in procuring another person to supply his place, although the servant's intention is to be absent only temporarily. Naylor v Fall River Iron Works, 118 Mass. 317.

♦been held in England, that a hiring "for at least three years at the option of the hirer," at a certain rate by the year, permitted the hirer to end the hiring only at the end of a year. (c)

Where the contract is for a certain time, if the master discharge the servant before the time, he is still liable, unless the servant has given cause, by showing himself unable or unwilling to do what he has undertaken to do. (d)1 And it is held in * England, that after the refusal of the master to employ, without affecting the right of the party. Such contracts for hire, for definite periods of time, are reasonable and convenient, are founded in practical wisdom, and have long received the sanction of the law. It is our duty to sustain them when clearly proved." See also Eldridge v. Rowe, 2 Oilman, 91. So in Nichols v. Coolahan, 10 Met. 449, where a contract was made by N. and C. that N. should have eleven dollars per month and board, so long as he should work for C.; C. informing N. that he (C.) might not have two days' work for him. N. worked for C. several months, and brought an action for his wages, and annexed to his writ a bill of particulars, in which he charged the price agreed on per month, and gave C. credit for a certain sum on account of three weeks' sickness of N., during which time he was unable to work. C. filed in set-off an account against N. for board during his sickness. Held, that the contract was a hiring by the month; that C. was not entitled to payment for N.'s board during bis sickness; but that N. could not recover wages during any part of the time of his detention from work by sickness. -And wherever the contract shows that the hiring was intended for a longer term, as for a year, the mere reservation of wages for a shorter term, as so much per week, or per month, will not control the hiring. Thus, where a farm servant was hired for a year, at three shillings a week, with liberty to go at a fortnight's notice, the contract was held to be a hiring for a year, the fortnight's notice plainly showing that it was not a weekly hiring. Rex v. Bird-brooke, 4 T. R. 245. In England, in the hiring of domestic servants for a year, there is generally an implied condition arising from general custom, that the contract may be determined by a month's notice to quit, and if the servant leave without such notice, and without the fault of his master, he can recover nothing for his services. See Hartley v. Cummings, 5 C. B. 247; Pilkington v. Scott, 15 M. & W. 657; Archard v. Hornor, 3 C. & P. 349; Johnson v. Blenkensop, 5 Jur. 870; Nowlan c. Ablett, 2 C. M. & R. 54; De-briar v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450. But it has been held in this country, that where one enters into the service of employers, under no express agreement to continue in their service for any definite time, but with a knowledge of a regulation adopted by them requiring that all persons employed by them shall give them four weeks' notice of an intention to quit their service, he does not forfeit his wages by quitting their service without giving such notice; but he is liable to them for all damages caused by his not giving the notice; and in a suit against them for his wages, the amount of such damages may be deducted therefrom. Hunt v. The Otis Company, 4 Met. 464.

(c) Down v. Pinto, 9 Exch. 327. See also Taylor v. Laird, 1 H. & N. 266.

(d) It seems that where a servant is hired for a year, or other fixed period, at an entire sum, and is discharged by his employer, without cause, during the term, he may at the end of the time recover for the whole time, according to the contract. Gandell v. Pontigny, 4 Camp. 375; Costi-gan v. Mohawk & Hudson Railroad Co.

2 Denio, 609; Cox v. Adams, I Nott & McC. 284; Clancey v. Robertson, 2 Rep. Com. Ct. 404; Byrd v. Boyd, 4 McCord, 246; Sherman v. Champlain Trans. Co. 31 Vt. 162. It seems, however, that the action in such case should be special, and not for work and labor done. Fewings v. Tisdal, 1 Exch. 295; Archard v. Hornor,

3 C. & P. 349; Smith v. Hayward, 7 A. & E. 544; Broxham v. Wagstaffe, 5 Jur. 845; Hartley v. Harman, 11 A. & E. 798. But if the servant obtains work elsewhere, during the continuance of the term for which he was originally employed by the defendant, this ought, and probably would, the servant is entitled to bring an action immediately, and is not bound to wait until after the day agreed upon for commencement of performance has arrived. (e) A promise by the servant to obey the lawful and reasonable orders of his master, within the scope of his contract, is implied by law; and a breach of this promise, in a material matter, justifies the master in discharging him. (f) reduce the damages to which the servant would otherwise be entitled by such wrongful dismissal. Stewart v. Walker, 14 Penn. St. 293. And see Costigan v. Mohawk & Hudson R. R. Co. 2 Denio, 617, Beardsley, J.; Hoyt v. Wildfire, 3 Johns. 518; Emerson v. Howland, 1 Mason, 51; Sherman v. Champlain Trans. Co. 31 Vt. 162. In Goodman v. Pocock, 15 Q. B. 576, a clerk dismissed in the middle of a quarter brought an action for a wrongful dismissal, the declaration containing a special count for such dismissal. The jury were directed not to take into account the services actually rendered during the broken quarter, as they were not recoverable except under an indebitatus count, and they gave damages accordingly. The plaintiff then brought a second action to recover under an indebitatus count for his services during the broken quarter. It was held, that the action was not maintainable, because the plaintiff by his former action on the special contract had treated it as an open contract, and he could not afterwards recover under the indebitatus count as for services under a rescinded contract. It was also held, that in the former action the jury ought to have been directed to take the services rendered during the broken quarter into account, in awarding damages under the special count for the wrongful dismissal. And semble, per Patteson, J., and Erle, J., that under an indebitatus count, the servant wrongfully dismissed before the termination of the period for which he was hired, cannot recover his whole wages up to such termination, as for a constructive service, but can recover only in respect to his service up to the time of his dismissal. See Lilley v. Elwin, 11 Q. B. 755; Green v. Hulett, 22 Vt. 188.