(u) Turner v. Rookes, 10 A. & E. 47. This was an action of assumpsit to recover for services rendered by the plaintiff, as solicitor, to the defendant's wife, in exhibiting articles of the peace against the defendant. It appeared that the defendant and his wife had been separated for seven years, she living upon a maintenance of .£112 per annum, which the defendant had secured to her by deed. The cause of separation did not appear. It further appeared that the defendant had used such threats and violence against his wife as authorized her to expose. (r)l But he has been held not liable to pay * the * 3G3 bill of an attorney, whom she employs to procure an indictment of him.(w)

In this country if questions of this kind come before the court on a petition by the wife for a divorce, it is not uncommon for the court if satisfied of the wife's destitution, and in view of all the circumstances they deem it just and expedient, to require the husband to provide for the expenses of the proceedings against him.

A liability, very similar to that which falls upon one who is legally a husband, rests also upon him who lives with a woman as his wife, who is not so. If he holds her out to the public as his wife, then he promises the public that he will be as responsible hibit articles of the peace against him. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover.

(v) Shepherd v. Mackoul, 3 Camp. 326. But this was on the ground that in that particular case the step was actually necessary on the part of the wife. See Brown v. Ackroyd, 5 E. & B. 819; and also preceding note. In Shelton v. Pendleton, 18 Conn. 417, where A, the wife of

B, without his assent in fact, employed

C, an attorney and counsellor at law, to prosecute on A's behalf, a petition to the superior court against B. for a divorce from him, for a legal and sufficient cause, with a prayer for alimony, and the custody of the minor children, and C performed services and made disbursements, in the prosecution of such petition, which was fully granted, and thereupon brought his action against B for a reasonable remuneration; it was held, 1st, that the facts in the case showed that C looked for payment and gave credit to A alone; 2d, that the services and disbursements in question were not necessaries, for which B as the husband of A was liable; 3d, that C's claim derived no strength from the fact that to the petition for a divorce was appended a prayer for alimony and the custody of the minor children; 4th, that consequently C was not entitled to recover. Church, C. J., commenting on the case of Shepherd v. Mackoul, said: " The common law defines necessaries to consist only of necessary food, drink, clothing, washing, physic, instruction, and a competent place of residence. And we know of no case which* has professed to extend the catalogue of necessaries, unless it be Shepherd v. Mackoul 3 Camp. 326. That was an action by an attorney to recover of a husband a bill for assisting his wife to exhibit articles of the peace against him. And Lord Ellenborough said, that the defendant's liability would depend upon the necessity of the measure; and if that existed, she might charge her husband for the necessary expense as much as for necessary food or raiment. It is manifest that the court considered that case as falling literally within the established doctrine of the common law on this subject, - the necessity of preserving the life and health of the wife. The duty of providing necessaries for the wife is strictly marital, and is imposed by the common law, in reference only to a state of coverture and not of divorce. By that law, a valid contract of marriage was and is indissoluble, and therefore by it the husband could never have been placed under obligation to provide for the expenses of its dissolution. Such an event was a legal impossibility. Necessaries are to be provided by a husband for his wife, to sustain her as his wife, and not to provide for her future condition as a single woman, or perhaps as the wife of another man. It was on this principle that the aforesaid case of Shepherd v. Mackoul was decided; and the latter case of Ladd v. Lynn, 2 M. & W. 265, in which it was holden that a hus-band was not liable for expenses incurred by the wife in procuring a deed of separation, proceeded upon the same principle."

(w) Because that is not necessary. Grindell v. Godmond, 5 A. & E. 755. Nor for her as if she were so. (x) Hence he is liable, as for his wife, to a tradesman who knew that they were not married. (y) The ground of his liability is not that he deceived persons into an erroneous belief that she was his wife, but that after voluntarily treating her as such, and so inducing persons to believe that he would continue to treat her as such, he cannot recede from the liabilities which he thus assumes. But this liability ceases with cohabitation; he is not responsible for necessaries supplied to her afterwards, even where they had lived together a long time, and she had left him because of his ill conduct. (z) Proof of cohabitation seems to be sufficient prima facie evidence in an action against husband and wife for her debt before marriage. (a) for the counterpart of the deed of separation, procured by the wife's trustee, unless he expressly promise to pay. Ladd v. Lynn, 2 M. & W. 265; Coffin v. Dunham, 8 Cush. 404. Nor is a husband liable to an attorney for professional services rendered to the wife in defending against his petition for a divorce for her fault, nor on her petition against him for his. Wing v. Hurlburt, 15 Vt. 607; Dor-sey v. Goodenow, Wright, 120. See supra, p. *348, note 3. And see Shelton v. Pendleton, cited in the preceding note. Nor is the woman herself liable, unless she expressly promise to pay them, after the divorce. Wilson v. Burr, 25 Wend. 386. If there is evidence of an express agreement to pay such bills, the husband may then be liable. Williams v. Fowler, 1 McCleL & Y. 269.