(d) Mortimer v. Mortimer, 2 Hagg. Cons. 318. In this case Sir William Scott, in commenting upon a plea in bar to a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights, observed: " The seventh and eighth articles plead the circumstance which led to the deed of separation, and the deed is exhibited. The objection taken against these articles is, that deeds of separation are not pleadable in the ecclesiastical court, and most certainly they are not, if pleaded as a bar to its further proceedings; for this court considers a private separation as an illegal contract, implying a renunciation of stipulated duties - a dereliction of those mutual offices which the parties are not at liberty to desert - an assumption of a false character in both parties contrary to the real status personal, and to the obligations which both of them have contracted in the sight of God and man, to live together, 'till death them do part,' and on which the solemnities both of civil society and of religion have stamped a binding authority, from which the parties cannot release themselves by any private act of their own, or for causes which the law itself has not pronounced to be sufficient, and sufficiently proved." See also Sullivan v. Sullivan, 2 Adams Eccl. 303; Smith v. Smith, 2 Hagg. Eccl. (supp.) n. (a). - Although a deed of separation upon mutual agreement, on account of unhappy differences, contain a covenant not to bring a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, yet it is no bar to such a suit. Westmeath v. Westmeath, 2 Hagg. Eccl. (supp.) 115. - That deeds of separation between husband and wife amount to nothing more than a mere permission to one party to live separate from the other, and confer no release of the marriage contract on either party, and that neither can violate them, see Warrender v. Warren-der, 2 Cl. & F. 561; Lord St. John v. Lady St. John, 11 Ves. 526, 532; Wilkes v. Wilkes, 2 Dickens, 791; Marquis of Westmeath v. Marchioness of Westmeath, 1 Dow & C. 519. Guth v. Guth, 3 Bro. Ch. 614, seems contra, but this case is not of good authority.

(e) Rex v. Mary Mead, 1 Burr. 542. This case was a writ of habeas corpus, at the instance of a husband to bring up the body of his wife, who had separated from him, and who was then living with her mother. The mother brought her daughter into court, and the substance of the return on the writ of habeas corpus was " that her husband, having used her very ill, in consideration of a great sum which she gave him out of her separate estate, consented to her living alone, executed articles of separation, and covenanted (under a large penalty) ' never to disturb her or any person with whom she should live;' that she lived with her mother at her own earnest desire; and that this writ of habeas corpus was taken out with a view of seizing her by force, or some other bad purpose." The court held this agreement to be a formal renunciation by the husband of his marital right to seize her, or force her back to live with him. And they said that any attempt of the husband to seize her by force and violence would be a breach of the peace. They also declared, that any attempt made by the husband to molest her, in her present return from Westminster Hall, would be a contempt of court. And they told the lady she was at full liberty to go where and to whom she pleased. And where the wife voluntarily lived apart from her husband, without coercion on the part of any one, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus should not be granted to her husband, but that the remedy, if there was no good cause for her remaining apart, was solely in the Ecclesiastical Courts. Ex parte Sandiland, 12 E. L. & E. 463. See also The Queen v. Jackson [1891], 1 Q. B. 671.

(f) Jee v. Thurlow. 2 B. & C. 547; s. C. 4 Dow. & R. 11; Wilson v. Mushett, 3 B. & Ad. 743. In this case the defendant gave a bond to A & B, conditioned for the payment of an annuity to his wife, unless she should at any time molest him on account of her debts, or for living apart from her. By indenture of the same date between the above parties and the wife, reciting that defendant and his wife had agreed to live separate, during their lives, and that, for the wife's maintenance, defendant had agreed to assign certain premises, etc, to A and B, and had given them an annuity bond as above mentioned; it was witnessed that defendant assigned the premises, etc, to them, in trust for the wife, and he covenanted with A and B to live separate from her, and not molest her or interfere with her property; and power was given her to dispose of the same by will, and to sell the assigned premises, etc, and bin-estates or annuities with the proceeds. The wife covenanted with the defendant to maintain herself during her life out of the above property, unless she and the defendant should afterwards agree to live together again; and that he should be indemnified from her debts. The in-denture (except as to the assignment), and also the bond, were to become void if the wife should sue the defendant for alimony, or to enforce cohabitation. And it was provided that if the defendant and his wife should thereafter agree to live together again, such cohabitation should in no way alter the trusts created by the indenture. There was no express covenant on the part of the trustees. The defendant and his wife separated, and afterwards lived together again for a time, and this fact was pleaded, to an action by the trustees upon the annuity bond, as avoiding that security. Held, on demurrer to the plea, that the reconciliation was no bar to an action on this bond, since it did not appear that the bond, and the indenture of even date with it, were not really executed with a view to immediate separa tion; and although there might be parts of the indenture which a court of equity would not enforce under the circumstances, yet there was nothing, on a view of the whole instrument, to prevent this court from giving effect to the clause which provided for a continuance of the trusts notwithstanding a reconciliation. See also Logan v. Birkett, 1 Myl. & K. 225.