All persons are denominated infants, by the common law, until the age of twenty-one. But in some parts of this country in Maine,(e) in Missouri, (f) in Texas, (g) and, perhaps, in some others of our States. A person is of full age at the beginning of the last day of his twenty-first year, or the day before his tewenty-first birthday. This rule is founded upon an ancient authority, and upon the principle that the law recognizes no parts of a day, and therefore when the last day of the last year begins, it is considered as ending. (h) A similar rule as to infancy prevailed in the Roman civil law. (i) An infant, using the word in its common meaning, that of a child who has not left its mother's arms, cannot make a contract in fact; but most children who are a few years old are capable of making a contract. And when the law says that they are not capable until the age of twenty-one, it is for their sake, and by way of protection to them. If we keep this principle distinctly in mind, it will guide us through the intricacies of the law in relation to this subject.

females reach majority, at least for some purposes, at eighteen, as in Vermont, (b) in Maryland, (c) in Ohio, (d)

(a) Jeune v. Ward, 2 Stark. 326; Leader v. Barry, 1 Esp. 353; Henderson v. Clark, 27 Miss. 436. Not only is a defendant, who sets up his infancy as a defence to his contract, bound in the first instance to prove his non-age affirmatively, but if to such a plea the plaintiff reply a new promise, after the defendant became of age, he may show a new promise at any time (before the suit was commenced), and the defendant must prove that he was still a minor at the time of such ratification. Bay v. Gunn, 1 Denio, 108; Borth-wick v. Carruthers, 1 T. R, 648; Hartley v. Wharton, 11 A. & E. 934. - If the infant leave the point in doubt, the defence is not sustained. Harrison v. Clifton, 17 Law Jour. Ex. 283.

(b) Sparhawk v. Buell, 9 Vt. 42, 79.

(c) Davis v. Jacquin, 5 Har. & J. 100.

(d) Ohio Statutes, ch. 59.

Thus as a general rule, the contract of an infant is said to be not void, but voidable. That is, he may, either during his minority, or within a reasonable time after he becomes of age, (j) avoid the contract if he will; or when he reaches the age of twenty-one, if he sees it to be for his benefit, and chooses so to do, he may confirm and enforce the contract. It has been said that whatever contract the court can see and declare to be to his prejudice, that will be pronounced void; and whatever contracts are not clearly to his prejudice, but may be useful, * these will be held voidable. And in reliance on this principle as a safe and sufficient rule, an infant's warrant of attorney authorizing a conveyance of his land, (k) a confession of a judg(e) Maine, Acts of 1852, ch. 291.

(f) Laws of Missouri. 1S49, p. G7.

(g) Hartley's Dig. of Texas Laws, art. 2420.

(h) There seems to have been but one case, on this question, in England, reported, under the name of Herbert v. Turball, in 1 Keb. 589, and in Sid. 162, and without names in 1 Salk. 44. and referred to as good law in 2 Salk. 625, in Ld. Raym. 480, and in Com. Dig. Enfant, A; and the rule is repeated in all the text-hooks. The reason is analogous to that which made the old law writers speak of a year and a day, when they mean a whole year. The same rule is asserted in Hamlin v. Stevenson, 4 Dana, 597, and in State v. Clarke, 3 liar-ring. (Del.) 557.

(i) Savigny, Dr. Rom. 182,383,384.

(j) It was settled by the case of Zouch v. Parsons. 3 Burr. 1794, that an infant cannot avoid his conveyances of land until he becomes of age. McCarthy v. Nicrosi,

72 Ala. 332; Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195; Welch v. Bunce, 83 Ind. 382; Irvine v. Irvine. 5 Minn. 61; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Lamb, 81 Mo. 221. In Roof v.

Stafford. 7 Cowen, 179, it was held that the same rule applied to a sale of chattels; but in the same case, on error, 9 Cowen, 626, the distinction was maintained that while he could not avoid a conveyance of lands until be was of age, he might a sale of chattels. So also in Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend 119; Shipman v Horton, 17 Conn. 481; Carr v. Clough, 26 N. H. 280; Shirk v. Shultz, 113 Ind. 571; MeCarthy v. Nicrosi, 72 Ala. 332. [In Matthewson v. Johnson, 1 Hoff. Ch. 560 and Harrod v. Myers, 21 Ark. 592, it was held that though an infant's conveyance of real estate could not be avoided till maturity, he might enter and take the profits during minority.] ment against him, (l)1 and his cognovit for the same purpose, although the action was wholly for necessaries, (m) or his appointment of an agent of any kind, (n) his bond with a penalty, or for the payment of interest, (o) a release by a female infant to her guardian, (p) an infant's contract of suretyship, (q) his release of his legacy or distributive share in an estate, (r) and a mortgage by an infant wife of her reversionary interest, for the purpose of securing the debts of a partnership in which her husband was a partner, (s) have each been declared to be absolutely void. (t) The better opinion, however, as may be gathered from the later cases, cited in our notes, seems to be that an infant's contracts are, none of them, or nearly none, absolutely void, that is, so far void that he cannot ratify them after he arrives at the age of legal majority. Such, at least, is the strong tendency of modern decisions. (u)

(k) Lawrence v, McArter, 10 Ohio, 37; Pyle v. Cravens, 4 Litt. 17.

(l) Saunderson v. Marr, 1 H. Bl. 75; Bennett v. Davis, 6 Cowen, 393; Waples v. Hastings, 3 Harring. (Del.) 403; Knox v. Flack, 22 Penn. St. 337.

(m) Oliver v. Woodroffe, 4 M. & W. 650.

(n) Doe d. Thomas v. Roberts, 16 M. & W. 778.

(o) Baylis v. Dinely, 3 M. & Sel. 477; Hunter v. Agnew, 1 Fox & S. 15; Colcock v Ferguson, 3 Desaus. 482.

(p) Fridge v. The State, 3 G. & J. 104.

(q) Wheaton v. East, 5 Yerg. 41, 61; Alien v. Minor, 2 Call, 70; Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195, 209; West v. Penny, 16 Ala. 187. But see contra Hinely v. Margaritz, 3 Penn. St. 428; Fetrow v. Wiseman, 40 Ind. 148. And see Owen v. Long, 112 Mass. 403; Reed v. Lane, 61 Vt. 481.