As the liability of the infant is defeated by the law, for his protection, therefore, as we have already seen, when he is of full age, he may, if he pleases, confirm and ratify a contract entered into by him during infancy, and this he may do by parol. (m) But, for this ratification, a mere acknowledgment that the debt existed, or that the contract was made, is not enough. (n) By a well-recognized distinction, while the deed of an infant cannot be avoided except by some act of equal force with the deed, acts insufficient to avoid a deed may suffice to affirm or ratify it. (nn) It need not be a precise and formal promise; but it must be a

(j) See supra, note (h). For a dictum to the contrary, see Boody v. McKenney, 23 Me. 517. See also Farr v. Sumner, 12 Vt. 28.

(k) See cases supra, and Shipman v. Horton, 17 Conn. 481; Carr v. Clough, 6 Foster (N. H.), 280. See also Cummings v. Powell, 8 Tex. 80.

(l) Harrod v. Myers, 21 Ark. 592; Howard v. Simpkins, 70 Ga. 322; Buchanan v. Hubbard, 96 Ind. 1; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 12 Ia. 195, 200; Myers v. Sanders, 7 Dana, 506; Hill v. Anderson, 5 Sm. & M. 216; Vallandingham v. Johnson, 85 Ky. 288; Brantley v. Wolf, 60 Miss. 420; McMorris v. Webb, 17 S. C. 558; Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs, 15 Gratt. 329.

(m) In England, after stat. 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, § 5, it became necessary that the new promise or ratification should be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged thereby. And any written instrument signed by the party, which in an adult would be an adoption or ratification of an act done by one acting as agent, was held sufficient. Harris v. Wall, 1 Exch. 122; Hartley v. Wharton, 11 A. & E. 934. But see Mawson v. Blane, 10 Ex 206; 26 E. L. & E. 560. See also Rowe v. Hopwood, L. R. 4 Q. B. 1; Maccord v. Osborne, 1 C. P. D. 568. [The Infants' Relief Act, 37 &38 Victoria, c. 62, §§ 1,2, now provides that contracts of infants, except for necessaries, and except as specially provided by enabling statutes, shall be void and incapable of ratification.] direct and express confirmation, and substantially (though it need not be in form) a promise to pay the debt or fulfil the con-tract. (o) It must be made with the deliberate * purpose of assuming a liability from which he knows that he is discharged by law, and under no compulsion; (p)1 and to the party himself or his agent. (q) It may be conditional, and in that case the party relying upon it must show that the condition has been fulfilled. (r) But it seems to be now settled that a ratification will not maintain an action brought before such ratification. (s) 1

(n) Robbins v. Eaton, 10 N. H. 561; Thrupp v. Fielder, 2 Esp. 628; Ordinary v. Wherry, 1 Bailey, 28; Benham v Bishop, 9 Conn. 330; Alexander v. Hutcheson, 2 Hawks, 535; Ford v. Phil lips, 1 Pick. 203.

(nn) Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall. 617.

(o) See Goodsell v. Myers, 3 Wend. 479; Rogers v. Hurd, 4 Day, 57; Wilcox v. Roath, 12 Conn. 550; Bennett v. Collins, 52 Conn. 1; Hale v. Gerrish, 8 N. H. 374; Bigelow v. Graunis, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 120; Willard v. Hewlett, 19 Wend. 301; Emmons v. Murray, 16 N. H. 385; Hatch v. Hatch's Est. 60 Vt. 160. The cases are well collected in 18 Am. St. Rep. 709: " No particular words seem necessary to a ratification, and provided they import a recognition and confirmation of his promise, they need not be a direct promise to pay. Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 460, Parker, C. J.; Hale v. Gerrish, 8 N. H. 376; as 'I have not the money now, but when I return from my voyage I will settle with you;' and 'I owe you, and will pay you when I return,' have been held a sufficient ratification. Martin v. Mayo, 10 Mass. 137; also these words, ' I will pay it (the note) as soon as I can make it, but not this year. I understand the holder is about to sue it, but she had better not.' Bobo v. Hansel, 2 Bailey, 114. So a promise to endeavor to procure the money and send it to the creditor is sufficient. Whitney v. Dutch, 15 Mass. 457; and where a minor after coming of age wrote to the plaintiff, ' I am sorry to give you so much trouble in calling, but I am not prepared for you, but will without neglect remit you in a short time,' this was held a sufficient ratification. Hartley v. Wharton, 11 A. & E. 934. See also Harris v. Wall, 1 Exch. 128, where it is said, that any written instrument signed by the infant, which in the case of adults would have amounted to the adoption of the act of a party acting as agent, will, in the case of an infant who has attained his majority, amount to a ratification. A declaration of an intention to pay a note, and authorizing an agent to take it up, has been held a good ratification, although the agent had done nothing about it. Orvis v. Kimball, 3 N. H. 314; see further, Best v. Givens, 3 B. Mon. 72; Taft v. Sergeant, 18 Barb. 320. On the other hand, an admission by an infant that he owed the debt, and that the adult would get his pay, but at the same time refusing to give his note, was considered no ratin-cation of the original promise. Hale v. Gerrish, 8 N. H. 374; and so these words, 'I owe the plaintiff, but am unable to pay him, but will endeavor to get my brother bound with me.' Ford v. Phillips, 1 Pick. 202; likewise the language, '1 consider your claim as worthy my attention, but not my first attention,' adding he would soon give it the attention due it. Wilcox v. Roath, 12 Conn. 550. And see Dunlap v. Hales, 2 Jones (N. C), 381; and where a minor gave his note, a part of which he subsequently paid, and in his will made after attaining majority, directed the payment of his just debts, this was held no ratification as to the residue of the note. Smith v. Mayo, 9 Mass. 62; but see Wright v. Steele, 2 N. H. 51; 20 Am. Jur. 269; Merchants v. Grant, 2 Edw. Ch. 544. And where a minor received money, which he promised in writing to pay to another when requested, and on being applied to, said it was not convenient to pay then, but expressed an intuition to do so on his arrival at Honduras; this was held no ratification of his promise to repay, however otherwise he might have been liable. Jackson v. Mayo, 11 Mass 147. Neither is a submission to arbitration, whether he is liable or not, on his note, a ratification. Benham v. Bishop, 9 Conn. 330; nor is a partial payment any ratification of the remainder, Thrupp v. Fielder, 2 Esp. 628; Robbing v. Eaton, 10 N. H. 561; Hinely v. Margaritz, 3 Barr, 428. If the ratification is conditional, as, to pay when able, the plaintiff must show the happening of the contingency, but not that the defendant could pay without inconvenience. Thompson v. Lav, 4 Pick. 48; Cole v. Saxby, 3 Esp. 159. " See also Davis v. Smith, 4 Esp. 36; Besford v. Saunders, 2 H. Bl. 116; Martin v. Mayo, 10 Mass. 141 n. (c); Everson v. Carpenter, 17 Wend. 419.