This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by Theophilus Parsons. Also available from Amazon: The law of contracts.
It is a general rule that the disability of infancy is the personal privilege of the infant himself, and no one but himself or his legal representatives can take advantage of it. (c) * There- fore other parties who contract with an infant are bound by it, although it be voidable by him. Were it otherwise this disability might be of no advantage to him, but the reverse (d) Thus, an infant may sue an adult for a breach of promise of marriage, although no action can be brought against an infant for that cause. (e) And an infant may bring an action on a mercantile contract, though none can be brought against him (/) So in
(bb) Stern v. Freeman, 4 Met. (Ky.) 309
(c) Parker v. Baker, Clarke, Ch. 136; Gullett v. Lumberton, 1 Eng. (Ark.) 109: Rose v. Daniel, 3 Brevard, 438; Voorhees v. Wait, 3 Green (N. J), 343; Trustees v. Anderson, 63 Ind. 367; Monaghan v. Agriculture Fire Ins. Co. 53 Mich. 238; Bordentown v. Wallace, 50 N. J. L. 13, 14; Beardsley v. Hotchkiss, 96 N. Y. 201. This privilege extends to the infant's personal representatives. Smith v. Mayo, 9 Mass. 62, Jefford v. Ringgold, 6 Ala. 544; Martin v. Mayo, 10 Mass. 137; Hussey v. Jewett, 9 Mass. 100; Jackson v. Mayo, 11 Mass. 147; Parsons v. Hill, 8 Mo. 135; Slocum v. Hooker, 13 Barb, 536, and to his privies in blood, Bac. Abr. Infancy (I.). 6; Austin v. Charlestown Female Seminary, 8 Met. 196; Nelson v. Eaton, 1 Redfield, 498; Bozeman v. Browning, 31 Ark. 364; Illinois, etc. Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 315, Singer Mfg. Co. v. Lamb, 81 Mo. 221; Veal v. Fortson, 57 Tex. 482. But not to his assignees, or privies in estate only. Id.; Whittingham's case, 8 Rep. 43; Breckenridge's Heirs v. Ormsliy, 1 J. J. Marsh. 236; Hoyle v. Stowe, 2 Dev. & B. 323; Mansfield v. Gordon, 144 Mass. 168. Nor to a guardian. Oliver v. Houd-let, 13 Mass. 237; Irving v. Crockett, 4
Bibb, 437. But see Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508. It is on this ground, connected with others, that parties to negotiable paper cannot take advantage of the infancy of any prior party. Jones v. Darch, 4 Price, 300; Grey v. Cooper, 3 Dongl. 65; Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. 272: Taylor v. Croker, 4 Esp. 187; Dulty v. Brownfield, 1 Barr, 497.
(d) Boyden v. Bovden, 9 Met 519, 521, Shaw, C. J.; McGinn v. Shaffer, 7 Watts, 412, 414.
(e) Hunt v. Peake, 5 Cowen, 475; Pool v. Pratt, 1 D. Chip. (Vt.) 252; Willard v. Stone, 7 Cowen, 22; licit v. Ward Claren-cieux, 2 Stra. 937. And the infant may sue for a breach of such promise without averring consent of his or her parent or guardian. Cannon v. Alsbury, I A. K. Marsh. 76.
(f) In Warwick v Bruce, 2 M & Scl. 205, the defendant on the 12th of October, agreed to sell to the plaintiff, a minor, all the potatoes then growing on three acres of land, at so much per acre, to be dug up and carried away by the plaintiff; ana the plaintiff paid £40 to the defendant under the agreement, and dug a part, and carried away a parr of those dug, but was prevented by the defendant from digging and carrying away the residue. It contracts of apprenticeship, or in cases of hiring and service. (g) In none of these cases can the adult discharge himself by alleging that there was no consideration for his promise, on the ground that the promise of the infant did not bind him. The mutuality or reciprocity of the contract or obligation is not complete, but it is sufficient to bind the party of adult age to his part of the contract. But if a person of adult age marry one who is under the age of consent (in males fourteen, and females twelve years), such marriage is binding upon neither party; and it is by the rules of the common law in the power of either to disagree when the infant * comes to the age of consent, though not before. (h)
But we shall speak of this more fully when treating of the Contract of Marriage.
 
Continue to: