A public agent,2 as for example, a collector, has been held liable for the acts of his deputy in exacting illegal compensation, notwithstanding he believed the compensation authorized by law and accounted for it to the treasury. (a)

{y) Prickett v. Badger, 1 C. B. (n. s.) 296; Vinton v. Baldwin, 88 Ind. 104.

(z) McMahan v. Franklin, 38 Mo. 548.

Fletcher v. Bartlett, 31 N. E. Rep. 760 (Mass. 1892). See for further illustrations of the rule that an agent cannot profit by his agency beyond the agreed compensation, De Bussche v. Alt, 8 Ch. D. 286; Greenfield Savings Bank v. Simons, 133 Mass. 415; Dodd v. Wakeman, 11 C. E. Green, 484; Dutton v. Willner, 52 N. Y. 312; Price v. Keyes, 62 N. Y. 378; Savage v. Savage, 12 Oregon, 459; Coursin's Appeal, 79 Pa. 220.

1 The agent further may claim reimbursement from the principal for all expenses properly incurred by him in the course of his agency. Beach v. Branch, 57 Ga. 362; Searing v. Butler, 69 Ill. 575; Maitland v. Martin, 86 Pa. 120; Ruffner v. Hewitt, 7 W. Va. 585.

But not for expenses which were unnecessary or only made necessary by the agent's improper conduct or neglect. Godman v. Meixsel, 65 Ind. 32; Maitland v. Martin, 86 Pa. 120.

The agent is also entitled to be indemnified from claims of third persons arising from the execution of the agency. Betts v. Gibbins, 2 A. & E. 57; Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66, 72; Moore v. Appleton, 26 Ala. 633; s. c. 34 Ala. 147; Stocking v. Sage, 1 Conn. 519,522; Beach v. Branch, 57 Ga. 362; Drummond v. Humphreys, 39 Me. 347; Greene v. Goddard, 9 Met. 212; Guirney v. St. Paul, etc. Ry. Co. 43 Minn. 496; Howe v. Buffalo, etc. R. R. Co. 37 N. Y. 297; Maitland v. Martin, 86 Pa. 120; Clark v. Jones, 16 Lea, 351; Saveland v. Green, 36 Wis. 612.

But if the act of the agent, though authorized by the principal, is in itself necessarily and obviously illegal, the agent being in pari delicto cannot recover from his principal. Coventry v. Barton, 17 Johns. 142.

2 The government is not bound by the act or declaration of its agent, unless it manifestly appears that he acted within the scope of his authority, or was employed in his capacity as a public agent to do the act or make the declaration for the government. Clifford, J., in Whiteside v. United States, 93 U. S. 247, 257. A purchasing agent cannot bind the government before actual delivery of the goods. Noble v. United States, 11 Ct. of Cl. 608. - K.

If he gives a promissory note purporting to bind a public body, as a school district, which he has no authority to bind, he is liable on it himself. (b) 1

He cannot act for the body whom he represents in lending money to himself. (c)

Public agents are not liable for injury sustained by an innocent but mistaken exercise of their discretion, unless it amounts to their own personal negligence. (d) Nor for the negligence of workmen properly employed by them. (e) But a public body, although acting gratuitously for the public, is responsible for their own personal negligence, and for wanton or malicious injury. (f) Although a private agent, acting within the scope of a general authority, but violating private instructions, unknown to the party with whom he acts, binds his principal, the rule is held otherwise as to a public agent; because his authority is matter of record in the books of a corporation, or of some puldic record, and maybe inquired into and ascertained.(g) And municipal corporations are to be regarded rather as agents than as principals, and as responsible to their constituents. (h)

A public agent acting for the government is not personally responsible; and this has been held, although the contract was under his seal. But if the credit given him were not within the line of his duty, and covered by his authority, he is personally liable. (i) 2 And the presumption derived from his office or employment, may be overcome by evidence of the intention of the parties to make the contract on his personal responsibility. (j)

Public agents, where they stand in the relation of trustees, are treated of in the subsequent chapter on Trustees.

(a) Ogden v. Marshall, 3 Blatchford, 319. See ante, p. * 79, note.

(b) Weave v. Gove, 44 N. H. 196.

(c) Holderness v. Baker, 44 N. H. 414.

(d) Yealy v. Fink, 43 Penn. 212.

(e) Holliday v. St. Leonard, 11 C. B. (N. s.) 192; Richmond v. Long, 17 Gratt. 375.

(f) Clothier v. Webster, 12 C.B. (n. s.) 790.'

(g) Baltimore v. Reynolds, 20 Md. 1. (h) Idem.

(i) Yulee v. Canora, 11 Fla. 9.

(j) Lapsley v. McKinstry, 38 Mo. 245.

1 But on non-negotiable contracts a public agent is not personally bound unless he clearly intended to be. Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch, 345; Knight v, Clark, 48 N. J. L. 22."

2 An agent of a foreign government is not liable personally, nor can a creditor indirectly sue such a government by bringing an action against the agent, Twycross v. Dreyfus, 5 Ch. D. 605; nor will a promise by a public agent to pay a debt when he receives money from his principal make him personally liable. Brazelton v. Colyar, 2 Baxter, 234. A State may, however, by statute ratify an agent's act in selling its property in excess of his authority and receiving a note in payment, and may then enforce payment the same as an individual. State v. Torinus, 26 Minn. 1. - K.