1 Where no time is specified, and the contract may be performed within a year, it is not within the statute. McPherson v. Cox, 96 U. S. 404; Van Woert v. Albany, Ac. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 538; Marley v. Noblett, 42 Ind. 85; Blair, etc. Co. v Walker, 39 la. 406; Blackburn v Mann, 85 111. 222; Duff v. Snider, 54 Miss. 245; Hedges v. Strong, 3 Oreg. 18; Thomas v Hammond, 47 Tex. 42; Gault v. Brown, 48 N. H. 183. Equally so, where the contract may be substantially performed within the year. Walker v. Johnson, 96 U. S. 424; Brown v. Throop, 59 Conn. 596, Southwell v. Beezley, 5 Oreg. 143; Hodges p. Richmond Mfg. Co., 9 R. I. 482; Paris v. Strong, 51 Ind. 339. The following cases have been held not to be within the statute, on the ground that performance may be had or an event happen within the year: A contract which by its terms is to be performed at the death of one of the parties, Frost v. Tarr, 53 Ind. 390; a promise to reward past services in the promisor's will, Jilson v. Gilbert, 26 Wis. 637; an agreement to support a person for the remainder of his life, Heath v. Heath, 31 Wis. 223; a promise to pay on a third person's death, Sword v. Keith, 31 Mich. 247; Frost v. Tarr, 53 Ind. 390; Riddle v. Backus, 38 la. 81, to work for another during his life, Kent v. Kent, 62 N. Y. 560; to act for an indefinite time, terminable at the pleasure of either party, Knowlman v. Bluett, L. R. 9 Ex. 1, Greene r. Harris, 9 R. I 401; or to allow the other contracting party to cultivate wheat on land during the owner's life, McCormick v. Drummett, 9 Neb 384; to reconvey on request, Haussman v. Burnham, 59 Conn. 117, to marry when restored to health, McConahey v. Griffey, 82 la. 564; to adopt and care for a child during its minority, Taylor v. Deseve, 81 Tex. 246. Nor is an agreement which by its terms is to extend over more than one year within the statute if there is an option reserved to terminate the contract within the year. Blake v. Voight, 31 N. £. Rep. 256 (N. Y ). Blakeney v. Goode, 30 Ohio St. 350, held, that an agreement by B. to exercise his skill as a machinist in reducing an invention of L. to working capability, and after the issue of the patent to aid in making it as salable and profitable as possible, in consideration that L. should hold the patent in trust for the equal benefit of B. and himself, need not be in writing, as it might be performed within a year. An agreement to allow the monthly rent of an old piano to be reckoned in part payment of a new, when the lessee should announce his desire to purchase a new piano, is not an agreement not to be performed within a year. Duffy v. Patten, 74 Me 396. A contract that, in consideration that A. would procure the admittance of B. as partner in certain business with one-fourth interest, B. would at the end of three years pay what the business then showed the one-fourth was worth when the contract was entered into, is within the statute of frauds; but if executed, an action may be maintained on the quantum meruit for a benefit conferred. Whipple v. Parker, 29 Mich. 369. But a contract made in October for the cultivation of lands during the remainder of that year and the whole of the next is within the statute, as being a contract not to be performed within a year. Treadway v. Smith, 56 Ala. 345. In Iowa, by statute, a lease for one year to commence at a future day need not be in writing. Jones v. Marcy, 49 la. 188. Contra, Wolf v. Dozer, 22 Kans. 436.

It has been held, that when a contract was to be performed by years, in consideration of receiving an annual payment for the use of it, was . within the statute. And see Lower v. Winters, 7 Cowen, 263; Derby v. Phelps, 2 N. H. 515; Hinckley v. Southgate, 11 Vt. 428; Squire v. Whipple, 1 id. 69; Foote v. Emerson, 10 id. 338; Pitcher v Wilson, 5 Mo. 46; Drummond v. Burrell, 13 Wend. 307; Shute v. Dorr, 5 id. 204; Lock wood v. Barnes, 3 Hill, 130; Hill v Hooper l Gray, 131; Sweet v. Lee, 4-Scott,N. R. 77; Giraud v. Richmond, 2 C: B. 835; Lapham v. Whipple, 8 Met. 59; Tattle v. Swett, 31 Me. 555; Wilson v. Martin, 1 Denio, 602; Pitkin v. The Long Island R. R. Company, 2 Barb. Ch. 221. And such a contract will not be taken out of the statute by the mere fact that it may be put an end to within a year by one of the parties, or a third person. Thus in Harris v. Porter, 2 Harring. (Del.) 27, where the defendant, a mail-contractor, made a sub-contract, with the plaintiff to carry the mail for more than a year, it was contended that the contract was not within the statute, because the contract between the defendant and the postmaster-general reserved to the latter the power to alter the route, and thus put an end to the contract at any time; it might, therefore, be terminated within a year, and did not necessarily reach beyond it. But the court said: " This was a contract which could not possibly be performed within one year; by its terms it was to continue four years. And though it might be annulled or put an end to by the postmaster-general within the year, it still falls within the act as an agreement which, according to its terms, is not to be performed within the space of one year." Birch v. The Earl of Liverpool, 9 B. & C. 392, is to the same effect. But if it is merely optional with one of the parties whether he shall perform the contract within a year or take a longer time, the contract is not within the statute. Therefore, it has been held, that an agreement that one party may cut certain trees on the land of the other, at any time within ten years, is not within the statute. Kent v. Kent, 18 Pick. 569. So, where the plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract by which the plaintiff agreed to labor for the defendant for one year, but without fixing any definite time for the labor to commence, it was held that the contract was not within the statute, for the plaintiff had a right to commence immediately. Russell v. Slade, 12 Conn. 455. And see Linscott v. Mclntire, 15 Me. 201; Plimpton v. Curtiss, 15 Wend. 336. In regard to the second class of cases, namely, those where it is evident, from the subject-matter of the contract, that the parties had in contemplation a longer period than one year as the time for its performance, although there is no express agreement to that effect, there has been more doubt, but it is now settled that they are within the statute. The leading case of this class is Boydell p. Drummond, 11 East, 142. In this case the plaintiff had proposed to publish by subscription a series of large prints from some of the scenes in Shakspeare'a plays, after pictures to be painted for that purpose, under the following conditions, among others: namely, that seventy-two scenes were to be painted, at the rate of two to each play, and the whole were to be published in numbers, each containing four large prints; and that one number at least should be annually published after the delivery of the first. The defendant became a subscriber. And the court held, that the contract was within the statute. The same point is well illustrated by the case of Herrin v. Butters, 20 Me. 119. For the facts of that case, see ante, vol. ii. p. * 45, n. {t). Whitman, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: " It is urged, that the defendant might have cleared up the land, and seeded it down in one year, and thereby have performed his contract. This may have been within the range of possibility; but whether so or not must depend upon a number of facts, of which the court are uninformed. This, however, is not a legitimate inquiry under this contract. We are not to inquire what, by possibility, the defendant might have done by way of fulfilling his contract. We must look to the contract itself, and see what he was bound to do; and what, according to the terms of the contract, it was the understanding that he should do. Was it the understanding and intention of the parties that the contract might be performed within one year ? If not, the case is clearly with the defendant. But the contract is an entirety, and all parts of it must be taken into view together, in order to a perfect understanding of its extent and meaning. We must not only look at what the defendant had undertaken to do, but also to the consideration inducing him to enter into the agreement. The one is as necessary a part of the contract as the other; and if either, in a contract wholly executor}', were not to be performed in one year, it would be within the statute of frauds. Here the defendant one party within a year, but not by the other, it would be valid was not to avail himself of the consideration for his engagement, except by a receipt of the annual profits of the land, as they might accrue, for the term of three years. But whether this be so or not, it is impossible to doubt that the parties to this contract perfectly well understood and contemplated, that it was to extend into the third year fur its performance, both on the part of the plaintiff and defendant. Its terms most clearly indicate as much; and by them it must be interpreted." In the case of Moore v. Fox, 10 onus. 244, the court say, to bring the case within the statute, it must appear to be an express and specific agreement that the contract is not to be performed within one year, and cite the case of Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burr. 1278, where the same language is used by the court. But in the case of Boydell v. Drummond, 11 East, 142, in which there was no express and specific agreement, that the contract should not be performed within a year, the court say, that the whole scope of the undertaking shows that it was not to be performed within a year, and was therefore within the statute. This seems to show, very clearly, what is to be understood by an express or specific agreement, that a contract is not to be performed within a year. In the case of Peters v. Westborough. 19 Pick. 364, Mr. Justice Wilde, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "It must have been expressly stipulated by the parties, or it must appear to have been so understood by them, that the agreement was not to be performed within a year. But who can doubt what the express and specific understanding of the parties in the case at bar was ? and that it was not to be performed within one year ? Or at any rate, that it appears to have been so understood by them. In regard to the third class of cases, namely, where the time for the performance of the contract is made to depend upon some contingency, which may or may not happen within a year, it is settled that they do not come within the statute. This was decided against the opinion of Holt, C. J., in the case of Peter r. Comp-ton, Skin. 353. There the defendant promised for one guinea to give the plaintiff so many guineas on the day of his marriage. And it was held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, although the agreement was not in writing. So, in Fenton v. Emblem, 3 Burr. 1278, where the defendant's testator undertook, by his last will and testament, to bequeath the plaintiff a legacy, it was held, that the undertaking was not within the statute, because the time for its the testator, which might be terminated within a year. Again, in Wells v. Hor-ton, 4 Bing. 40, where A, being indebted to the plaintiff, promised him that in consideration of his forbearing to sue, A's executor should pay him £10,000; it was held, that this was not a promise required by the statute of frauds to be in writing. And this doctrine has been carried so far as to include a case where one undertakes to abstain from doing a certain thing, without limitation as to time, on the ground that such a contract is in its nature binding only during the life of the party. Thus, in Lyon v. King, 11 Met. 411, the defendant, for a good consideration, promised the plaintiff that he would not thereafter engage in the staging or the livery-stable business in Southbridge. And the court held,' that the contract was not within the statute. Dewey, J., said: " The contract might have been wholly performed within a year. It was a personal engagement to forbear doing certain acts. It stipulated nothing beyond the defendant's life. It imposed no duties upon his legal representatives, as might have been the case under a contract to perform certain positive duties. The mere fact of abstaining from pursuing the staging and livery-stable business, and the happening of his death, during the year, would be a full performance of this contract. Any stipulations in the contract, looking beyond the year, depended entirely upon the contingency of the defendants life; and, this being so, the case falls within the class of cases in which it has been held that the statute does not apply." See Worthy ,. Jones, 11 Gray. 168; Rich-ardson v. Pierce, 7 R. I. 330; Bell v. Hewitt, 24 Ind. 280. So, in Foster v. Mc-O'Blenis, 18 Mo. 88, it was held, that a verbal agreement not thereafter to run carriages on a particular route, was not within the statute. But see Roberts v. Tucker, 3 Exch. 632; Holloway v. Hampton, 4 B. Mon. 415. For other cases depending upon a contingency, see Gilbert v. Sykes, 16 East, 150; Sonch v. Straw-bridge, 2 C. B. 808; Dobson v Coll is, 1 H. & N. 81; M'Lees v. Hale, 10 Wend. 426; Blake v. Cole, 22 Pick. 97; Peters v. Westborough, 19 Pick. 364; Roberts v. The Rockbottom Co. 7 Met. 46; Elli-cott v. Peterson, 4 Md. 476; dark r. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 495; Howard v. Bur-gen, 4 Dana, 137; Sherman v. Cham-plain Trans. Co. 31 Vt. 162. In the case without writing, if an action upon it were brought against him who should execute the contract within the year, but would require a writing if brought against the other, (gg)