A note dated in one State, and made in another, is presumed to be payable where dated, and is governed by the laws of that State. (hi) 2 And if a loan is made where the parties reside, and is payable there, and is secured by mortgage of land in another State, the loan as to all questions of usury is governed by the laws of the State where it is made. (hj) If the contract be made in a foreign country, and is sued here, the judgment must be for that amount in the legal tender of this country which would equal the value in the metal which is the legal currency where the contract was made. (hk) examined by Judge Martin, in the case of Depau v. Humphreys, in the Supreme Court of Louisiana (20 Martin, 1), and that court came to the conclusion, in which decision I fully concur, that in a note given at New Orleans, upon a loan of money made there, the creditor might stipulate for the highest legal rate of conventional interest allowed by the laws of Louisiana, although the rate of interest thus agreed to be paid was higher than that which could be taken, upon a loan, by the laws of the State where such note was made payable." In Hosford v. Nichols, 1 Paige, 220, where a contract for the sale of land situated in New York was made between two citizens of New York, one of whom removed to Pennsylvania, where the contract was afterwards executed, by giving a deed, and taking a mortgage of the premises to secure the payment of the purchase-money, in which mortgage the New York rate of interest was reserved, which was greater than that of Pennsylvania, it was held, that the giving the deed and taking the mortgage was only a consummation of the original contract made in New York, and that the mortgage was not void for usury. It is true that in this case the court also say: "Again, there is no evidence in this case to show that the bond and mortgage were not both valid by the law of the State where they were originally executed. E. Kane testifies, that at the time of their date, and for some years previous, six per cent, was the legal rate of interest in Pennsylvania. But it does not appear that any law existed in that State which prohibited the parties from agreeing upon a higher rate of interest, or declaring securities void in which a higher rate of interest was reserved. And courts of this State cannot take notice of the laws of other States, unless they are proved in the same manner as other facts." But there is little doubt that the decision would have been the same, independently of this last ground. See further upon this question, Champant v. Ranelagh, Prec. in Ch. 128; Connor v. Bellamont, 2 Atk. 382; Stapleton v. Conway, 1 Ves. 427. 3 Atk. 727; Phipps v. Anglesea, 6 Vin. Abr. 200, pl. 8; 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. ch. 36, tit. Interest, Money (E); Ekins v. East India Co. 1 P. Wms. 396; Anonymous, 3 Bing. 108 ; Fergusson v. Fyffe, 8 Clark & F. 121; Harvey v. Archbold, Ryan & M. 184; Boyce v. Edwards, 2 Pet 111; Fanning v. Consequa, 17 Johns. 611; Winthrop v. Carleton, 12 Mass. 4; Foden v. Sharp, 4 Johns. 183; Dewar v. Span, 3 T. R. 425; Bank of Georgia v. Lewin, 46 Barb. 840.

(hh) Hunt v. Hall, 87 Ala. 702.

(hi) Tillotson v. Tillotson, 34 Conn. 886.

(hj) Cope v. Alden, 68 Barb. 860; Chase v. Dow, 47 N. H. 406.

(hk) Benners v. Clemens, 68 Penn. St 24.

1 Where interest is recoverable as damages, none being stipulated for, it is to be computed at the rate established by the law of the place of performance. Kavanaugh v. Day, 10 R. I. 393.

2 A note made in Illinois, sent to the payee in Louisiana, there indorsed and returned by mail to the makers to be negotiated for their accommodation, and negotiated and delivered in Illinois, is an Illinois note. Gay v. Rainey, 89 Ill. 221.

* If a merchant in New York comes to Boston to buy goods, and there receives them, and gives his note for them, which specifies either Boston or no place for payment, it is a Boston transaction. When the note is due, it may be demanded of the maker wherever he is, but wherever demanded would be construed by the law of Massachusetts. If the note were made payable in New York, it could be demanded nowhere else, and would be construed by the law of New York. If he did not come to Boston, but sent his orders from New York, and the goods were sent to him from Boston, either by a carrier whom he pointed out, or in the usual course of trade, this would be a completion, a making of the contract, and it would be a Boston contract, whether he gave no note, or a note payable in Boston, or one without express place of payment. (i) But if, as before, he gave his note payable in New York, it would * be a New York note. And if, by the terms of the orders or the bargain, the property in the goods were not to pass to the purchaser until their arrival in New York, they being previously at the risk of the seller, and then a note was given by the buyer in New York, this would be a New York transaction and a New York note, unless the note was made expressly payable in Boston. Such would be the inferences which we should draw from the reasons of the cases, and from what seem to be the stronger authorities; but many of these questions are not yet distinctly determined by adjudication. It is quite certain that the Roman civil law considered the place of payment or performance as the place of the contract. And this law has much title to respect on a question of this kind, both as the basis of a widely extended system of law now in force, and as the embodiment, in its commercial law, of sound sense and accurate justice.

It is to be noticed, that the payment is to be measured or regulated by the law of the place where the note is by the terms of the contract to be performed, and not by that where it happens to be performed. A note made in Boston may be demanded and sued in England, or vice versa; because a note without a specified place of payment has no controlling place, but may be demanded of the maker wherever he is. But such a note would still be a Boston note or an English note, according to the place of its signature. In fact, all debts are payable everywhere, unless there be some special limitation or provision in respect to the payment; the rule being that debts, as such, have no locus or situs, but accompany the creditor everywhere, and authorize a demand upon the debtor everywhere. (j)

(i) Whiston v. Stodder, 8 Mart (La.) 96.

A discharge of a contract under the law of a country which is not that where the contract was made or to be performed, will not discharge the contract in the country where it was made or to be performed. (k)

We have spoken here only of contracts; but the place of a tort may have a bearing on the remedy. In a recent English case it was held, that a British subject may maintain, in the courts of that country, an action against another British subject for an assault committed in another country, although proceedings are pending in that other country relating to the same assault; and even if, by the law of that country, no damages were recoverable for that assault. (kk)