If the creditor and debtor agree upon an extension of the debt for a fixed time at a specified rate of interest, and such agreement does not reserve to the debtor the right to pay such debt whenever he may please and thus to stop the interest thereon, the debtor gives up a right which he otherwise possessed, that is, the right to pay such debt at maturity with interest thereon to the date of payment, and thus to terminate his liability. While such right is not a right of great value to a debtor who does not have the means of payment, it may be a right of great value to him if he acquires the means of payment; and his giving up of such right should be regarded as sufficient consideration for the creditor's promise to extend the time of payment.1 A promise by which the maker of a note agrees to pay interest thereon after maturity during the life of the payee, was held to be sufficient consideration for the payee's promise to release the principal debt upon her death.2 A promise to delay enforcing a debt until the debtor's death, in consideration of being "well paid," has been held to be upon consideration.3 If the debtor's forbearance of his right to pay the debt and to stop his liability is a sufficient consideration, it would seem to be immaterial whether the rate of interest, during the time for which payment was thus extended, was higher than the former rate of interest, or was the same as the former rate of interest, or was lower than the former rate of interest. If the rate of interest for the period during which payment has been extended is higher than the original rate of interest, and higher than the rate which such debt would bear in the absence of any express agreement fixing a rate of interest, the authorities are unanimous in holding that the promise to pay such higher rate of interest is consideration for the promise to extend the time of payment,4 even if such rate is lower than that agreed upon for a prior extension, provided it is higher than that fixed by the contract.5 If the rate of interest during the period for which payment has been extended is the same as the original rate of interest, and if it is the rate which such debt would bear in the absence of an express contract, the weight of authority is that a promise to pay interest for such definite period is a sufficient consideration, since if it were not for such express promise, the debtor could pay the debt at any time with interest down to the date of payment, and thus discharge his liability; while under such express promise, the debtor can not pay the debt until the end of the period for which payment was extended, and he is then obliged to pay it with interest for such period.6 In some jurisdictions, however, the courts have overlooked the fact that the debtor has really given up a right which may be of considerable value, and they have assumed that the debtor will always be unable to pay the debt, and that, accordingly, the extension of time is solely for his benefit and gives to the creditor nothing which he would not have had in the absence of such contract. Where this view is entertained, the debtor's promise to pay the same rate of interest for a fixed time, is held not to be consideration for the creditor's promise to extend payment for such period of time.7 Although the rate of interest which is to be paid during

668, 56 Am. St. Rep. 382, 34 S. W. 13; Tudor v. Security Trust Co., 163 Ky. 514, 173 S. W. 1118.

Massachusetts. Wilson v. Powers, 130 Mass. 127.

Michigan. Trombly. v. Klersy, 141 Mich. 73, 104 N. W. 419.

Texas. Andrews v. Hagadon, 54 Tex. 571.

2 Trombly v. Klersy, 141 Mich. 73, 104 N. W. 419.

3 Georgia. Bunn v. Bank, 98 6a. 647, 26 S. E. 63; Tatum v. Morgan, 108 Ga. 336, 33 S. E. 940.

Illinois. English v. Landon, 181 111. 614, 54 N. E. 911.

Michigan. Shayler v. Giddins, 122 Mich. 659, 81 N. W. 552.

Minnesota. First State Bank v. Schatz, 104 Minn. 425, 116 N. W. 917.

South Dakota. Whiffen v. Hollister, 12 S. D. 68, 80 N. W. 156.

Texas. Austin Real Estate and Abstract Co. v. Bahn, 87 Tex. 582, 29 S. W. 646, 30 S. W. 430; Webb v. Pahde (Tex. Civ. App.), 43 S. W. 19.

4 Stickler v. Giles, 9 Wash. 147, 37 Pac. 293.

1Illinois. Julin v. Bauer, 82 111. App. 157.

Iowa. Lahn v. Koep, 139 la. 349, 52 L. R. A. (N.S.) 327, 115 N. W. 877; Diehl v. McKinnon, 173 la. 32, L. R. A. 1916C, 384, 155 N. W. 259.

Kansas. Eaton v. Whitmore, 3 Kan. App. 760, 45 Pac. 450.

Kentucky. Robinson v. Miller, 65 Ky. (2 Bush.) 179; Alley v. Hopkins, 98 Ky. 668, 56 Am. St. Rep. 382, 34 S. W. 13, 43 S. W. 168.

Maine. Chute v. Pattee, 37 Me. 102.

Michigan. Vereycken v. Vanden Brooks, 102 Mich. 199, 60 N. W. 687; Shayler v. Giddins, 122 Mich. 659, 81 N. W. 552.

Mississippi. Moore v. Redding, 69 Miss. 841, 13 So. 849.

New Hampshire. Fowler v. Brooks, 13 N. H. 240.

Ohio. McComb v. Kittridge, 14 Ohio 348; Fawoett v. Freshwater, 31 O. S. 637.

Oklahoma. Adams v. Ferguson (Okla.), 147 Pac. 772.

Texas. Benson v. Phipps, 87 Tex. 578, 47 Am. St. Rep. 128, 29 S. W. 1061; Woodall v. Streeter (Tex. Civ. App.), 39 S. W. 169; Angel v. Miller, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 679, 39 S. W. 1092; Robson v. Brown (Tex. Civ. App.), 57 S. W. 83, 686.

Washington. Nelson v. Flagg, 18 Wash. 39, 50 Pac. 571. "In case of a debt which bears interest either by convention or by operation of law, when an extension for a definite period is agreed upon by the parties thereto, the contract is that the creditor will forbear suit during the time of the extension, and the debtor foregoes his right to pay the debt before the end of that time. The latter secures the benefit of the forbearance, the former secures an interest-bearing investment for a definite period of time; one gives up his right to sue for a period in consideration of a promise to pay interest during the whole of the time; the former secures an interest-bearing investment for a definite period of time; one gives up his right to sue for a period in consideration of a promise to pay interest during the whole of the time, the other relinquishes his right to pay during the same period in consideration of a promise of forbearance. To the question why this is not a contract, we think no satisfactory answer can be given." Benson v. Phipps, 87 Tex. 578, 47 Am. St. Rep. 128, 29 S. W. 1061 [citing, Stallings v. Johnson, 27 Ga. 564; Crossman v. Wohlleben, 90 111. 537; Reynolds v. Barnard, 36 111. App. 218; Robinson v. Miller, 65 Ky. (2 Bush.) 179; Chute v. Pattee, 37 Me. 102; Fowler v. Brooks, 13 N. H. 240; McComb v. Kittridge, 14 Ohio 348; Wood v. Newkirk, 15 O. S. 295]. "It is a valuable right to have money placed at interest, and it is a valuable right to have the privilege, at any time, of getting rid of the payment of interest, by discharging the principal. By this contract, the right to interest is secured for a given period, and the right to pay off the principal and get rid of paying the interest is also relinquished for such period. Here are all the elements of a binding contract." McComb v. Kittridge, 14 Ohio 348 [quoted in Bugh v. Crum, 26 Ind. App. 465, 84 Am. St. Rep. 307, 59 N. E. 1076].

2 Diehl v. McKinnon, 173 la. 32, L. R. A. 1916C, 384, 155 N. W. 259.

3 Davis v. Teachout, 126 Mich. 135, 86 Am. St. Rep. 531, 85 N. W. 475.

4 California. Smith v. Pearson, 52 Cal. 339.

Indiana. Huff v. Cole, 45 Ind. 300.

Kansas. Royal v. Lindsay, 15 Kan. 445.

Washington. First National Bank v. Harris, 7 Wash. 139, 34 Pac. 466. Wyoming. Lawrence v. Thom, 9 Wyom. 414, 64 Pac. 339.

5 Kearby v. Hopkins, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 166, 36 S. W. 506.

6lowa. Lahn v. Koep, 139 la. 349, 52 L. R. A. (N.S.) 327, 115 N. W. 877; Conkling v. Young, 141 la. 676, 120 N. W. 353.

Kentucky. Alley v. Hopkins, 98 Ky. 668, 56 Am. St. Rep. 382, 34 S. W. 13, 43 S. W. 168.

Minnesota. Trudeau v. Germann, 101 Minn. 387, 112 N. W. 281.

Ohio. Fawcett v. Freshwater, 31 O. S. 637.

Texas. Benson v. Phipps, 87 Tex. 578, 47 Am. St. Rep. 128, 29 S. W. 106L be paid on demand, is valid,13 since the right forborne is the right to pay the debt with interest under the old contract to the date of payment

Washington. Nelson v. Flagg, 19 Wash. 39, 50 Pac. 571.

7 Indiana. Abel v. Alexander, 45 Ind. 523, 15 Am. Rep. 270 [overruling, Pierce v. GoldSberry, 31 Ind. 52]; Christman v. Tuttle, 59 Ind. 155; Starrett v. Burkthe time for which payment is extended, is lower than the rate of interest which such debt would bear in the absence of such express contract, the debtor has, nevertheless, given up his right to pay such debt with interest down to the time of payment; and such right may be one of great value. Accordingly, in some jurisdictions it is held that the promise of debtor to pay interest for a fixed period of time at a reduced rate, is a consideration for the creditor's promise to extend payment for such period.8 In other jurisdictions, however, it is held that the creditor will receive less under such contract than he would have received in the absence of an express contract, and that, accordingly, the debtor's promise to pay interest at a reduced rate is not a consideration for the creditor's promise to an extension of time.9 The courts which entertain this view assume that the debtor will not pay the debt, and they ignore the fact that he has a right to pay the debt after maturity in the absence of an express contract on his part. In jurisdictions in which an extension of time at the same rate as that which the debt bore originally is held to be without consideration, it is, of course, held that an extension of time at a lower rate of interest is without consideration.10 A contract to reduce the rate of interest on an overdue note from maturity, until the date of such contract, and to extend the time of payment for a definite period at a still lower rate of interest, was held to be without consideration, even though the total amount to be paid as interest under the new contract exceeded the amount due when such contract was made.11

As far as the contract for an extension of time at a lower rate of interest has been performed, the terms of the contract control.12 An agreement to reduce the rate of interest on an overdue debt, to halter, 70 Ind. 285; Dare v. Hall, 70 Ind. 545; Hume v. Mazelin, 84 Ind. 574; Bugh v. Crum, 26 Ind. App. 465, 84 Am. St. Rep. 307, 59 N. E. 1076.

Missouri. Harburg v. Kumpf, 151 Mo. 16, 52 S. W. 19.

New York. Olmstead v. Latimer, 158 N. Y. 313, 43 L. R. A. 685, 53 N. E. 5.

Pennsylvania. Rumberger v. Golden, 99 Pa. St. 34.

Wisconsin. Fanning v. Murphy, 126 Wis. 538, 110 Am. St. Rep. 946, 4 L. R. A. (N.S.) 666, 5 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 435, 105 N. W. 1056.

8 Lorimer v. Fairchild, 68 Kan. 328, 75 Pac. 124; Tousey v. Moore, 79 Mich. 564, 44 N. W. 958.

9Wilson v. Powers, 130 Mass. 127; Harburg v. Kumpf, 151 Mo. 16, 52 S. W. 19.

10 Harburg v. Kumpf, 151 Mo. 16, 52 S. W. 19.

11 Price v. Mitchell, 23 Wash. 742, 63 Pac. 514.

12 Tousey v. Moore, 79 Mich. 564, 44 N. W. 958.