24 Colorado. Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 24 L. R. A. (N.S.) 91, 96 Pac. 560.

Kansas. Rice v. Rice, 101 Kan. 20, 165 Pac. 799; Moon v. Moon, 103 Kan. 179, 173 Pac. 9.

Kentucky. Farmers' Bank v. Birk, 179 Ky. 761, 201 S. W. 315.

Michigan. Brown v. Smedley, 136 Mich. 65, 98 N. W. 856.

Minnesota. Northern National Bank v. Douglas, 135 Minn. 81, 160 N. W. 193.

South Dakota. Rosholt v. Woulph, - S. D. - , 167 N. W. 158.

"Why is a person estopped to deny a recital in a contract? The old law was that a contract reduced to writing and sealed was the best evidence of the truth of its recitals. Estoppel was essentially a matter of evidence, and solemnity of form was the controlling consideration. This is no longer true. Estoppel is now a matter of substantive law, and a recital in a contract is not conclusive unless it operated as a representation or warranty inducing the formation of the contract, or was itself of the essence of the contract, or, having been accepted and acted on in good faith, resulted in consequences which it would be inequitable and unjust to disturb * * *. There remains the contract itself, considered as a contract, as an estoppel. If purely voluntary on the part of the persons sought to be held, it lacks engaging quality. Unless there were adjustment, or compromise, or settlement of doubtful or conflicting or unsettled claims respecting title and possession, mutual concessions or promises, or giving on one one side and receiving on the other - unless there were consideration - there was no binding obligation. As a matter of fact, properly interpreted, the contract is a concatenated instrument, the various portions of which are dependent on each other, and consequently subject as an entirety to the defense of want of consideration." Moon v. Moon, 102 Kan. 737, 173 Pac. 9.

25Rosholt v. Woulph, - S. D. - , 167 N. W. 158.

26Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 24 L. R. A. (N.S.) 91, 96 Pac. 560.

27 Farmers' Bank v. Birk, 179 Ky. 761, 201 S. W. 315; Northern National Bank v. Douglas, 135 Minn. 81, 160 N. W. 193.

28Farmers' Bank v. Birk, 179 Ky. 761, 201 S. W. 315.

In other jurisdictions it is held that the recital of a valuable consideration in simple executory contracts can not be contradicted by extrinsic evidence for the purpose of showing that such promise was gratuitous.37 It has been held that this principle applies even where the consideration which is recited is a mere nominal consideration.38 A guarantor has not been permitted to show that a consideration of one dollar was not intended as a consideration, but was inserted as a mere form.39 An offer which by its terms was to remain open for a certain space of time, in consideration of "one dollar and other considerations," has been held to be binding upon the offeror and not to be rendered invalid by reason of the offer of evidence tending to show that the recited consideration was not intended as the real consideration.40 Where an assignment of a patent contains a recital of a valuable consideration, it was said that the parties are "concluded * * * to challenge by parol evidence" the existence of such consideration.41 If A acknowledges in writing that he has received a certain sum of money from B, which A agrees to apply to saving C harmless from liability as surety on B's bond, it is said that A can not deny such consideration as against C, and A can not show that, in fact, he did not receive such money.42

29Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 24 L R. A. (N.S.) 91, 96 Pac. 560.

30 Northern National Bank v. Douglas, 135 Minn. 81, 160 N. W. 193.

31 Georgia. Hawkins v. Collier, 101 6a. 145, 28 S. E. 632.

Iowa. First National Bank v. Felt, 100 Ia. 680, 69 N. W. 1057; Beaty v. Carr, 109 Ia. 183, 80 N. W. 326.

Kansas. Rice v. Rice, 101 Kan. 20, 165 Pac. 799.

Maine. Bigelow v. Bigelow, 93 Me. 439, 45 Atl. 513.

Minnesota. State Bank v. Pangerl, 139 Minn. 19, 165 N. W. 479.

New York. Kramer v. Kramer, 181 N. Y. 477, 74 N. E. 474.

Oklahoma. Holland Banking Co. v. Dicks, - Okla. - , 170 Pac. 253..

South Dakota. Rosholt v. Woulph, - S. D. - , 167 N. W. 158.

32 See Sec. 2346 et seq.

33 Holland Banking Co. v. Dicks, - Okla. - , 170 Pac. 253.

34 State Bank v. Pangerl, 139 Minn. 19, 165 N. W. 479.

35Baird v. Baird, 145 111. 659, 28 L. R. A. 375; Anderson v. Lee, 73 Minn. 397, 76 N. W. 24.

36 Moon v. Moon, 102 Kan. 737, 173 Pac. 9.

37 United States. Lawrence v. Mc-Calmont, 43 U. S. (2 How.) 426, 11 L. ed. 326; United States Light & Heating Co. v. J. B. M. Electric Co., 189 Fed. 382.

Connecticut. Redfield v. Haight, 27 Conn. 31.

Georgia. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Harris, 117 Ga. 1001, 44 S. E. 885.

Illinois. Schneider v. Turner, 130 111. 28, 6 L. R. A. 164, 22 N. E. 497.

Massachusetts. Drury v. Fay, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 326.

Virginia. Watkins v. Robertson, 105 Va. 269, 115 Am. St. Rep. 880, 5 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1194, 54 S. E. 33.

"The argument in support of the eighth amended count admits that such is its effect on its face, but it is insisted it is competent to vary its terms-by allegation and proof that no consideration was in fact paid by appellants, or received by appellee, for the agreement to sell, and thus show the transaction a mere offer on the part of appellee, without consideration, which became an agreement only upon the acceptance and offer to perform on the part of appellants. The general rule excluding parol evidence offered for the purpose of contradicting or varying the terms of a written instrument is not questioned. The validity of this count is based exclusively on the provisions of section 9, chapter 98, Rev. Statutes, entitled 'Negotiable Instruments.' That section provides that a defendant may plead want or failure of consideration to a suit on a note or other contract, for the purpose of defeating a recovery in whole or in part, where the same was given without consideration, or .where the consideration has failed. No authority is found in this section for permitting a plaintiff to prove a want of consideration for the purpose of varying the terms of his contract. This proposition is too clear for argument. The parties must be held bound by the contract as they wrote it. 1 Greenl. Ev., section 275. The right to vary or explain the consideration expressed in a written contract, or to prove that it was never paid, does not authorize the introduction of such testimony to affect the terms or validity of the contract. O'Brien v. Palmer, 49 111. 72; Morris v. Tillson, 81 111. 607." Schneider v. Turner, 130 111. 28, 6 L. R. A. 164, 22 N. E. 497.

38 United States. Lawrence v. Me-Calmont, 43 U. S. (2 How.) 426, 11 L. ed. 326.

Connecticut. Redfield v. Haight, 27 Conn. 31.

Georgia. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Harris. 117 Ga. 1001, 44 S. E. 885.

Illinois. Schneider v. Turner, 130 111. 28, 6 L. R. A. 164, 22 N. E. 497.

Virginia. Watkins v. Robertson, 105 Va. 269, 115 Am. St. Rep. 880, 5 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1194, 54 S. E. 33.

39 Lawrence v. McCalmont, 43 U. S. (2 How.) 426, 11 L. ed. 326. (Possibly in this case there was another consideration which was sufficient to support the contract.)

40 Schneider v. Turner, 130 111. 28, 6 L. R. A. 164, 22 N. E. 497.

41 United States Light & Heating Co. v. J. B. M. Electric Co., 189 Fed. 382.

This principle has been extended so as to prevent the parties to a contract from contradicting other recitals,43 such as the recital that a child was adopted.44 In jurisdictions which deny the right of the promisor to contradict the recital of a consideration for the purpose of showing that his promise was without consideration, the doctrine of consideration has ceased to have any legal significance. The recital alone is all that is necessary. This recital has turned into a meaningless form which of itself is sufficient to make the promise enforceable. This form lacks the artistic beauty of the seal and lacks its historical justification. It practically amounts to discarding the entire doctrine of consideration and to substitute therefor a fictitious recital. Whether we believe in the doctrine of consideration, this result is unquestionably wrong. If a consideration is necessary we should insist upon a consideration and not merely upon the recital of one. If the consideration is to be regarded as unnecessary we should concede that fact frankly and enforce deliberate promises which are intended by the promisor to impose an obligation upon him without regard to the existence of a consideration. We should not, however, refuse to enforce a deliberate promise which contains no recital of a consideration and at the same time regard the recital of a consideration as conclusive for the purpose of rendering enforceable a promise which is really gratuitous.

42Drury v. Fay, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 326 (possibly C's forbearance to sue was the consideration in this case).

"But we think it was not competent to the defendant to offer evidence to contradict the writing on which the action is founded. Lawson Valentine therein acknowledges the receipt of a sum of money, and promises to apply it in a particular manner, for the benefit of the plaintiffs. Whether he had received it or not, they could not know, as the transaction was between him and Henry Valentine, but they might well presume that he had received it, and he could not be permitted to say that he had deceived them." Drury v. Fay, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 326.

43Dawley v. Dawley's Estate, 60 Colo. 73, 152 Par. 1171.

44Dawley v. Dawley's Estate, 60 Colo. 73, 152 Pac. 1171.

Such recital was said to be a "substantive part of the contract." Daw-ley v. Dawley's Estate, 60 Colo. 73, 152 Pac. 1171.