If the parties to the contract have agreed in express or implied terms that the risk of loss shall fall upon one or the other of the parties, full effect is given to such provision.1 If a contract for the transportation of goods provides that the freight earned is to be retained, whether the vessel is lost or not, the fact that the vessel is detained by the government because of the existence of war, discharges the contract, but the shipper can not recover payments which he has made.2 If a building contract provides for payment in instalments, but it also provides that the risk of loss is upon the contractor, the owner is entitled to recover instalments paid by him under the contract in case the building is destroyed by fire.3 The contractor is ordinarily held to assume liability for defects of the soil which make the construction of the building more difficult than he had anticipated.4 The contractor can not, accordingly, recover for extra expense incurred by reason of such defects.5 A contractor may assume the risk of plans under which he is to work, although such plans are prepared by another; and if he assumes such risk he can not avoid liability by showing that performance of the contract in accordance with such plans was impossible.6 One who advances money for the education of another, to be repaid out of the earnings of such other in the profession for which he is thus educated, is held to impose the risk of the death of the debtor upon the creditor,7 and if the debtor dies before he has engaged in such occupation, the creditor can not recover against his estate for money advanced.8 If A renders services for B under a contract by which A is to render services for B during B's life, for which he is to receive certain of B's property upon B's death, it is held that A takes the risk of his outliving B so that A can perform such services for the whole of B's life.9 If A dies before B, A's estate can not recover the value of such services.10 One who takes fidelity insurance assumes the risk of the death of the person whose fidelity is insured during the period of insurance,11 and if such person dies during such period, the insurer can not be compelled to return the unearned premium on the bond.12 One who pays for liquor licenses takes the risk of his death during the period for which such license was granted,13 and his personal representatives can not recover a part of such license fee on account of his death during such period.14

5 Homan v. Redick, 97 Neb. 209, L. R. A. 1915C, 601, 149 N. W. 782.

1 United States.- Dermott v. Jones, 69 U. S. (2 Wall.) 1, 17 L. ed. 762; Simpson v. United States, 172 U. S. 372, 43 L. ed. 482; United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. 512, 59 L. ed. 696; Allanwilde Transport Corp. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 248 U. S. 377, 63 L. ed. 183; International Paper Co. v. "Gracie D. Chambers," 248 U. S. 387, 63 L. ed. - [citing, Allanwilde Transport Corp. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 248 U. S. 377. 63 L. ed. 183; and affirming, 253 Fed. 1821; Standard Varnish Works v. "Bris," 248 U. S. 302, 63 L. ed. - [citing, Allanwilde Transport Corp. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 248 U. S. 377, 63 L. ed. 183, and International Paper Co. v. "Gracie D. Chambers," 248 U. S. 387, 63 L. ed. -1.

Louisiana. Lapleau v. Succession of Lapleau, 144 La. 988, 81 So. 597.

Michigan. More v. Luther, 153 Mich. 206, 18 L. R. A. (N.S.) 149, 116 N. W. 986.

Minnesota. Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 448.

Nebraska. Wood v. School Diet. No. 32, 80 Neb. 722, 15 L. R. A. (N.S.) 478, 115 N. W. 308.

Tennessee. Crouch v. Southern Surety Co., 131 Tenn. 260, L. R. A. 1915D, 966, 174 S. W. 1116.

Texas. Lonergan v. San Antonio Loan & T. Co., 101 Tex. 63, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.) 364, 104 S. W. 1061.

Vermont. Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. Russell, 84 Vt. 80, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 135, 78 Atl. 718.

2 Allanwilde Transport Corporation v. Vacuum Oil Co., 248 U. S. 377, 63 L. ed. 183; International Paper Co. v. "Gracie D. Chambers," 248 U. S. 387, 63 L. ed. - [citing, Allanwilde Transport Corp. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 248 U. S. 377, 63 L. ed. 183; and affirming, 253 Fed. 182]; Standard Varnish Works v. "Bris," 248 U. S. 302, 63 L. ed. - [citing, Allanwilde Transport Corp. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 248 U. S. 377, 63 L. ed. 183, and International Paper Co. v. "Gracie D. Chambers," 248 U. S. 387, 63 L. ed. -].

3 United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. 512, 50 L. ed. 696.

4 Dermott v. Jones, 69 U. S. (2 Wall.) 1, 17 L. ed. 762; Simpson v. United States, 172 U. S. 372, 43 L. ed. 482; Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 448; Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. Russell, 84 Vt. 80, 32 L. R. A (N.S.) 136, 78 Atl. 718.

5 Simpson v. United States, 172 U. S. 372, 43 L. ed. 482; Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. Russell, 84 Vt. 80, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 135, 78 Atl. 718.

6 Lonergan v. San Antonio Loan & T. Co., 101 Tex. 63, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.) 364, 104 S. W. 1061.

7 Lapleau v. Succession of Lapleau, 144 La. 988, 81 So. 597.

8 Lapleau v. Succession of Lapleau, 144 La. 988, 81 So. 597.

9 More v. Luther, 153 Mich. 206, 18 L. R. A. (N.S.) 149, 116 N. W. 986.

"No obligation rests upon the estate of Reuben to pay the reasonable worth of the services of Andrew, unless that obligation arises from their agreement, for outside of that agreement there is no such obligation. From that agreement, may it be inferred that Reuben was under obligation to pay the reasonable worth of Andrew's services in the event of his surviving Andrew? The agreement, as already stated, is that Reuben will give Andrew his farm at the death of himself and wife, if Andrew will work for him until that event occurs. According to this agreement, the compensation of Andrew is not based upon the reasonable worth of his services. Reuben and his wife might die in a few days. In that event Andrew would receive much more than the value of his services. They might live for many years, and in that event Andrew would receive less than the value of his services. For the contingency which actually occurred, viz., Andrew's death before Reuben's, no provision whatever was made. May it be inferred that it was the intention of the parties that in such a contingency Reuben should pay Andrew's estate what his services were reasonably worth? In that event, though payment might be postponed until his death, Reuben would hold his property burdened with the obligation to pay this claim. To the extent of this claim, he would be prevented from using that property for the maintenance of himself and wife during their remaining years. This would prevent his making the agreement he did make, viz., to convey the farm to his other children in consideration of their supporting and maintaining himself the remainder of his life. This would lead to very serious consequences, as shown by this case, for, as heretofore indicated, the testimony offered by contestants and excluded by the trial-court would have shown that all this property was necessary for the maintenance of Reuben and his wife during their remaining years. It is scarcely necessary to say that neither Reuben nor Andrew intended that their agreement should apply in such a contingency, for the terms of that agreement clearly indicate that the right of Andrew in the farm should be subordinate to its use for the maintenance of his father and mother. I think it may also be stated flint from their agreement it may not be inferred that either Reuben or Andrew intended, in the contingency of the former outliving the latter, the estate of the former should be fettered or burdened in any way by the claim of the latter. If they had had any such intention, it is to be presumed that they would have expressed it in some way and made some equitable provision for a mutual protection of their rights. In the absence of an agreement, Andrew was entitled to no compensation for his services. The agreement provided for compensation in a certain contingency and in that contingency only. That contingency did not occur, but another and an altogether different one occurred. No principle of law or equity will permit the agreement to be applied to such a contingency, and it may not be presumed that the parties intended it to apply. It follows from this reasoning that there was no testimony in the case tending to show an obligation on the part of the estate to compensate Andrew for his services." More v. Luther, 153 Mich. 206, 18 L. R. A. (N.S.) 140, 116 N. W. 986.