The new currency resembles that of the old State banks, in that it is a mixed currency, and in all essential respects as to its nature and effects, of the same character.

(a)  It will expand and contract from the same causes, and, so far as can be seen, with the same violence and to an equal extent, and consequently will be as fluctuating as the currency it is designed to supersede, except in so far as a larger proportion of specie shall be held for its redemption.

(b)  It will be an equally delusive and false standard of value, having in itself but a small proportion of value.

(c)  It will raise prices and cause speculation when in the process of expansion, and depress prices and produce bankruptcies when contracting.

(d)  It will create an unnatural extension of credits at one time, and a corresponding contraction at another, producing great vibrations in the rate of interest.

(e)   It will derange the natural current of trade from time to time, causing an increase of imports and a decrease of exports, and thus forcing an export of specie to meet an unnatural balance.

(f) It will counteract the influence of both natural and artificial protection, and retard the normal growth of home manufactures.

Lastly, it will create panics, and cause frequent suspensions of all the banks in the country.

It may be thought that the fact that the government guarantees the national-bank notes will prevent a run upon the banks; but that will be found an entire mistake. Panics are created because money is wanted to pay notes and discharge immediate obligations, not because the people fear that the banks are insolvent; and, whenever it is out of the power of the banks to supply the currency immediately wanted, the panic must take place, with all its sad consequences.

Such are essentially the points of difference and agreement between the two systems. The national government may change the character of the new currency, and make it approximate a value currency. It will have the power to do this; and, as it is certain that the effects of this currency will inevitably be disastrous, and give rise to grave periodical disturbances in the monetary affairs of the country (notwithstanding its superiority in certain respects over the State-bank system), it seems highly probable that this will eventually be done; the more so, because a large and growing section of the Union is already averse to any other than a value currency. California and all the gold-bearing States are now, and, if they understand their true interests, always will be, hostile to any system which depreciates the value of their great staple.