The paper may be made payable at a particular place by being expressly made so payable either in the paper or by parol agreement, and by naming a particular place, in the case of a bill of exchange, for presentment and payment, and by an acceptance payable at a particular place. To fall within the description of a particular place the place designated must be some particular counting room, place of business, office, or business house.1 The mere designation of some town or city is not a designation of a particular place. It is possible, through inadvertence or ignorance, that the place designated might be one of the large modern office buildings. Such buildings-contain frequently as many business places as ordinary small towns. What construction would be put upon such a stipulation is not easy to determine. The reasonable construction would be that if the person to whom presentment was to be made had an office or place of business in the building, the stipulation would be construed to mean that office, on account of the ease with which the office could be ascertained; but if he had not at the time of making the paper, then the stipulation would mean no more than if the city generally were designated. Again, it has sometimes happened or has been a custom that paper should be made payable at any bank or at more than one particular place in a city. Such a stipulation justifies, it seems, a presentment at any bank in the city, if the stipulation is for any bank, or at either of the places-named, if more than one place be named.2 The holder is not required to give the party any notice that he has selected either of the places for payment;3 but if he does give such

12 Huff v. Ashcroft, 1 Disn. 277. Stover, J. (see his decision at 1 Disn. 60), seems to have had the decency of feeling which the other judges lacked.

13 Chase v. Evoy, 49 CaL 467. This decision is a curious one. If the demand be made on the personal representative, it can only be to allow the claim; he has no authority to do anything else. Payment is incidental to the allowance of the claim. See Pickler v. Harlan, 75 Mo. 678.

14 Davis v. Francisco, 11 Mo. 572. See Pickler v. Harlan, 75 Mo. 678.

15Magruder v. Union Bank, 2 Cranch, C. C. 687 (reversed, 3 Pet. 87). See Groth v. Gyger, 31 Pa. 271, and Alton v. Robinson, 2 Humph. 341.

16 But Schumacher v. Quaritius, 5 Red. Sur. 251, is contra as to demand, where the holder was executor of the indorser. A demand was necessary. See the last note.

1 Montross v. Doak, 7 Rob. (La.) 170. The designation of the house of the drawee is nothing more than surplusage. It means nothing as to demand. Frost v. Stoke, 55 N. Y. Super. Ct 76. But it seems that in one state the practice of the parties to the paper can control the written stipulation as to the place of payment. Thus where the paper designated a particular place of payment, but payments of interest were received at another place continuously for some length of time before payment could be demanded at the place designated, it was held that notice of the change to the place designated in the paper should be given. Rounsavell v. Crofott, 4

Bradw. 671. The decision is a misguided but well-meant attempt to do substantial justica

2Langley v. Palmer, 30 Me. 467; Allen v. Avery, 47 Ma 287; Brickett v. Spaulding, 33 Vt. 107; Maiden Bank v. Baldwin, 13 Gray, 154; Boit v. Corr, 54 Ala. 112. Contra, North Bank v. Abbott, 13 Pick. 465, overruled.

3 See cases cited, and Page v. Webster, 15 Me. 249. Compare Cecil Nat. Bank v. Holt, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 485. A private banker is not a banker, it seems, under the rule (Way v. Butterworth, 106 Mass. 75), nor a trust company (Nash v. Brown, 165 Mass. 384), without evidence of a custom to so treat it under this rula notice he will be bound by his notice,4 and the other parties to the paper will be bound by the notice.5

Where a particular place is designated as the place of payment it negatives all other places, and presentment is not required at any other place.6 And it makes no difference whether the place be an office, counting room or bank, the rule is the same.7 The stipulation obviates the necessity for any personal demand,8 or any demand at the office, business house, or residence9 of the party upon whom demand is to be made. Where the place stipulated for is a bank, it is a sufficient demand for the holder to be at the bank, ready to receive payment, or to leave the paper at the bank for collection prior to the maturity, or so that it be there at the date of maturity.10 But it has been wrongly held that if the or has no deposit there to pay the note, he, of course, is not released. Dockray v. Dunn, 37 Me. 442; Carter v. Smith, 9 Cush. 321; Nichols v. Pool, 47 N. C. 23. But need a sufficient demand be shown as against the indorser ? The authority is that it must. Nichols v. Pool, 47 N. C. 23; Shaw v. Reed, 12 Pick. 132; Magoun v. Walker, 49 Me. 419; Pea-body Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 29 W. "Va. 528; Middleton v. Boston Loco. Works, 26 Pa. 257. In the absence of proof the note will be presumed to be at the bank. Folger v. Chase, 18 Pick. 63.

4 Pearson v. Bank of Metropolis, 1 Pet. 89, in principle; State Bank v. Hurd, 12 Mass. 172; Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Mass. 449, and Meyer v. Hibsher, 47 N. Y. 265, state the general rule as to fixing a place of payment by parol. And see North Bank v. Abbott, 13 Pick. 465.

5 This ought to be the rule under such a provision in the paper, since it is really for the benefit of all parties that the place should be fixed. But a notice upon paper, not payable at a particular place, tlmt it has been left at a certain place for payment, is not a demand. Barnes v. Vaughan, 6 R. I. 259, refusing to follow the Massachusetts rule.

6 Shaw v. Reed, 12 Pick. 132; Ap-person v. Bynum,5 Cold. 341: Bank of State v. Bank of Cape Fear, 13 Ired. 75; Lawrence v. Dobyns, 30 Mo. 196; Moore v. Britton, 22 La. Ann. 64; Wild v. Van Valkenburgh, 7 Cal. 166. But see Herring v. Sanger, 3 Johns. Cas. 71; Rounsavell v. Crofott, 4 Bradw. 671.