We have already considered the excuse of ignorance of the address of the person to whom presentment for payment is to be made as a defense, when due diligence has been used in searching for the address;1 and the excuse of a prior presentment for acceptance and the refusal of acceptance;2 and the excuse of no injury done to the drawer of the check3 or of a non-negotiable order4 by the failure to make a demand; and the excusing of demand as to a guarantor or a party who stands in relation to the paper as a guarantor,5 and the excusing of demand as to forged paper;8 paper that has been fraudulently transferred to the holder will be considered in this section; and the cases already considered where no demand is necessary7 may be considered in the light of excuses for failure to make demand. There are other matters which have been urged as excusing a demand, such as the insolvency of the drawee or maker, the want of funds of the drawer in the hands of the drawee, a change of residence on the part of the drawee or maker, an absconding of the drawee or maker, the existence of a pestilence or the prevalence of a malignant disease, and the interruption of commercial intercourse by a state of war. These various conditions of fact will be considered in the succeeding sections. There are certain miscellaneous excuses which will be grouped together here. In some instances a demand has been dispensed with by statute.8 "Where the indorser has discharged the maker of the note no demand is necessary upon the maker9 for reasons that are obvious. In another case showing a peculiar situation, the distance, the inclemency of the season and the lateness of the hour were held to be an excuse for not demanding payment.10 But the infancy of the maker is no excuse for failure to demand payment from him.11 The fact that suit was pending on the note at maturity or at the date of its transfer is no excuse for want of demand,12 but the ruling as to a suit pending at maturity will not bear scrutiny; it is certainly a wrong decision. In another case the depreciation of mone7 was considered to justify a failure to make demand;13 and where an injunction had been served upon a bank suspending its business, the fact was necessarily an excuse for a failure to present a check upon the bank for payment.14 The intimation is that if due diligence were not used in presenting the check before the injunction was granted, the drawer would have been released if he had funds in the bank. It should be remembered that in no case can a suit be brought against the drawer upon the check, unless a demand of payment has been made, or unless the demand is excused.15 Fraud in the indorser or usury in the note indorsed may under some circumstances dispense with notice as to the indorser. Thus where, by reason of the fraud of the indorser, no consideration passed to the indorsee,16 or where fraudulent representations were made as to the note which was indorsed in payment,17 or where the note was paid,8 when indorsed, no demand as to the indorser is necessary. If the notes of a suspended bank are passed with a promise to take them back, or where they are passed fraudulently, no demand is needed as to the transferrer.19 The rule is the same where the indorser has prevented the necessary steps being taken to charge him; he is of course estopped to insist upon demand or notice.20 But if the fraud is immaterial as to the maker as against a bonafide indorsee, demand and notice are said not to be excused.21

16 Bank of Alexandria v. Deneale, 2 Cranch, C. C. 488 (no longer authority ; Moore v. Waitt, 13 N. H. 415.

17 Bridgeport Bank v. Dyer, 19 Conn. 136; Marrett v. Brackett, 60 Ma 524

18 Citizens' Bank v. Graffin,-31 Md. 507. See also Bank of U. S. v. Norwood, 1 Har. & J. 423; Jones v.

Fales, 4 Mass. 245; North Bank v. Abbott, 13 Pick. 465.

1 See Sec. 260, ante.

2 See Sec. 233, ante.

3See Sec. 237, ante.

4 See Sec. 242, ante.

5 See Sec. 241, ante.

6 See Sec. 244, ante.

7 See Sec. 260, ante, notes 8 to 18.

8 Upon notes, except those payable at a bank. Hoadley v. Bliss, 9 Ga. 303; Cothran v. Cunningham, 28 Ga. 177. The statute applied to paper payable at private banks. Banks v. Bessler, 56 Ga. 199. See Falk v. Rothschild, 61 Ga. 595, as to national banks. See also a private charter, Central Bank v. Whitfield, 1 Ga. 593; a general statute, Pococke v. Blount, 6 Ma 338; Snyder v. Gascoigne, 11 Tex. 449.

9 Burke v. McKay, 2 How. 66.

10 Farley v. Hewson, 10 La. Ann. 783.

11 Wyman v. Adams, 12 Cush. 210.

12 Grant v. Strutzel, 53 Iowa, 712; Bishop v. Dexter, 2 Conn. 419. The second case is right because the indorsement was after suit brought. But the first case is wrong because the note was in suit to the knowledge of the indorser when the note matured.

13 Fowl v. Todd, 1 Bay, 176. The absurdity of a currency that is worthless never received a more vivid commentary than in this case. The worthless currency was a legal tender. If the bills had been presented they would have been paid in worthless legal tenders. Hence the court achieved the unique distinction of holding that the holder need not present the bills, but should sue the drawer.

14 Lovett v. Cromwell, 6 Wend. 369.