Some of the instances mentioned in the former section may be considered as cases where the indorser or drawer has changed his residence, and no further reference needs be made to them here. It is needless to say at this point that if the maker of the note or the drawee or acceptor of the bill of exchange has changed his residence so that for any reason a demand of payment cannot be made after due diligence, or is excused, notice to the drawer or indorser is not thereby excused, but notice should be given just as well as where a demand is made and payment actually refused.1 The instances which are now being considered are those where the indorser or the drawer has changed his residence so as to interfere with the service of notice. This change of residence may be known or not known to the holder. If known to the holder it may not be known to the agent serving the notices. Whether the holder will be chargeable with negligence for not giving the agent all his knowledge as to the indorser's residence has been already discussed.2 Considering now the person serving the notice, whether it be the holder or his agent, if the person serving knows of a change of residence on the part of the indorser or drawer and knows the new residence, notice must be sent to the new place of residence,3 wherever it may be, except if the removal be into another state;4 and this rule is not changed by the place where the instrument is dated5 nor where it is made payable.6 If the change of residence is known, and it is said if it be not known but ought to have been known in the exercise of due diligence,7 the person serving the notice proceeds to serve as if the person to be charged had resided at his new residence when the bill was drawn or note was indorsed.8 But in case the fact of the change of residence is known, but the new residence is not known to the person serving, the whole matter of proper service is resolved simply into a question of due diligence to ascertain the new address, a matter which will be examined in the next section. But even if the change of apparent address be known, there are instances such as those mentioned in the former section, where the change may be treated merely as an absence from the residence.9 An example of such a case is found where the indorser had left the house in Washington where he lived at the time he indorsed and had removed to New York, where he was living with his wife, although his residence in Washington remained in the occupancy of his daughter and his former servants; the notice served at the house in Washington was considered good.10 The facts in this case were not plain, but it seems reasonably certain that the server must have been able to ascertain and did ascertain the change of residence on the part of the indorser; therefore the above statement is correct.

1 Taylor v. Snyder, 8 Denio, 145; Michaud v. Legarde, 4 Minn. 43; Williams v. Matthews, 3 Cow. 252; Haber v. Brown, 101 CaL 445. 2 See Sec. 277, ante, note 24

3 Taylor v. Snyder, 3 Denio, 145.

4 See Grafton Bank v. Cox, 13

Gray, 503; Hilborn v. Artus, 4 111. 344

5 Taylor v. Snyder, 8 Denio, 145; Lowery v. Scott, 24 Wend. 858.

6 See cases cited in preceding notes, and Baker v. Clark, 20 Me. 156.

Where the change of residence is not known certain presumptions may be indulged, subject to the limitation as to the manner of service suggested below, and those presumptions are that the maker of the note lives where the note is dated,11 and the drawer of the bill, provided diligent inquiry gives no information, lives where the bill is drawn;12 but this same presumption does not necessarily exist in the case of an indorser,™ yet it has been upheld. Therefore in serving by mail, in the absence of other knowledge, the notice to the drawer 14 or the indorser,15 by some authority (certainly as to the indorser or drawer after diligent inquiry),16 may be directed to the place of dating. Again, the server has the right to assume in the absence of other knowledge that the drawer and the indorser have continued to reside or to have a place of business where the residence or place of business was at the time of the indorsement or drawing of the bill.17 It is beyond doubt that if the server has notice of the change of residence, ne must direct his notice to the new residence if he knows it,18 and if he does not his duty is confined to exercising due diligence as will appear in the next section. This question of presumption is not as likely to arise where the service being made is personal. If the service is being made at the former residence, if it is found closed and unoccupied, diligence will require further inquiry. If it is occupied, inquiry will necessarily be made for the person to be charged, and the fact of non-residence at the place will be ascertained, or the reason of absence. But a person may change his residence and still maintain a place of business at his former place. Service by mail to the place of business so retained will necessarily be good, as will personal service at that place under the rules hereinbefore stated,19 wherever the residence may be. Or if the sign is retained at the place of business the server may act upon the apparent fact of occupation,20 unless he has other knowledge. And the service upon an agent retained in the place of former residence will be equally good if he have the requisite authority.21 The above rules are of importance only when the person to be charged with notice has not actually received the notice in due time. If he does receive in proper time the notice sent, however wrongly it may have been directed, and however irregular the means, he will none the less be charged with notice.22

7 Baker v. Clark, 20 Me. 156; Harris v. Memphis Bank, 4 Humph. 519.

8 See notes 3 and 4, supra.

9 See preceding section.

10 Murray v. Armes, 3 Mac A. 60.

11 White v. Wilkinson, 10 La. Ann. 394; Smith v. Philbrick, 10 Gray, 252. But see Gal pin v. Hard, 3 Mc-Cord, 394; Mason v. Pritchard, 9

Heisk. 793. If the address is on the note the place of dating is secondary. Nicholson v. Barnes, 11 Neb. 452.

12 Robinson v. Hamilton, 4 Stew. & P. 91; Tyson v. Oliver, 43 Ala. 455; Lowery v. Scott. 24 Wend. 358; Hill v. Varrel, 3 Ma 233; Barnwell v. Mitchell, 3 Conn. 101.

13 Runyon v. Montfort, 44 N. C. 371.

14 Robinson v. Hamilton, 4 Stew. & P. 91, semble.

15 Page v. Prentice, 5 B. Mon. 7, serrible.

16 Dickens v. BeaL 10 Pet 574 See cases in note 12 as to drawer. Runyon v. Montfort, 44 N. C. 371, and Carrol v. Upton, 3 N. Y. 272, as to indorser.

17Ward v. Perrin, 54 Barb. 89; Menzies v. Fanners' Bank, 3 Ky. Law R. 822; Union Bank v. Govan, 10 Smedes & M. 333; Rowland v.

Howe, 48 Conn. 432; Bank of Utica v. Phillips, 3 Wend. 408; Importers' Nat. Bank v. Shaw, 144 Mass. 421.

18 Wilcox v. Mitchell, 4 How. (Miss.) 272. If he does not know, must inquire with due diligence. Barker v. Clark, 20 Ma 156. It is needless to say that personal notice may be given to the indorser at the place of demand whether it is his residence or not. Austin v. Latham, 19 La 88.

19 See preceding section.