The court, in the case just cited, intimates that under such a charter the association might be exceeding its powers in doing a general banking business. Courts, generally, in construing charters, construe them strictly as against the state, and more liberally where the objection comes in a collateral way. A corporation engaged in loaning its own money upon notes and mortgage security was held not to be a banking corporation.1 A company investing its profits in loans secured by mortgages would not be engaging in the banking business.2 In another case the president of a trust company was being prosecuted as the officer of a bank receiving a deposit knowing his bank to be insolvent. The trust company had been in the habit of receiving deposits of money subject to check. Its charter gave it the power of receiving money in trust and of accumulating the same, and to loan money on real estate and collateral, and to execute and issue notes and debentures, and to buy and sell all kinds of negotiable and non-negotiable paper, stocks and other investment securities. Yet the court held that the president was not criminally liable as the officer of a bank.3 But it is well known that many corporations called trust companies have banking powers, and carry on a general banking business thereunder. Such corporations from any standpoint would necessarily be considered simply as banks, so far as their character as banks was in question. But in quo warranto proceedings it was held that a corporation which was given the right to grant evidences of debt to be issued payable on demand would violate its charter by the issuance of evidences of debt payable on demand to circulate as money, where the violation charged was the illegal exercise of banking powers.4

4 Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co., 23 Fed. R 469, per Deady, Dist. Judge. The case was mandamus to compel the defendant railroad to furnish express facilities. The court apparently lost sight of the statute altogether and held that it made no difference that Wells, Fargo & Co. were doing a banking business elsewhere; the test would be whether they were doing such a business in Washington. The statute, however, made the test to consist of the powers granted to the corporation by its charter, not what business it was actually doing. The case refers to an earlier unreported case of the territorial court.

1 Oregon, etc. Investment Co. v. Rathburn, 5 Sawy. 32. The court went so far as to assume that the corporation was loaning its own capital. But there was no proof whatever to show that fact. The question arose collaterally.

2 Life Ass'n v. Levy, 33 La. Ann. 1203. This case is apparently one of construction of a charter.