It has been said that "those persons who hold themselves or allow themselves to be held out as owners of stock are liable whether they own stock or not," and that the rules applying to ownership of national bank stock are about the same as those which apply to partnerships.1 But the more correct statement is this: One who allows himself to be represented as owner by the books of the corporation, when he has knowledge of facts that put him upon notice that he is so held out, will not be heard to dispute his liability. Certain instances of this rule were noticed in the last section. In accordance with this rule, one who receives checks for dividends upon the stock, even though she merely indorses them without knowledge of their contents, will not be heard to deny her liability.2 One who acts as an officer of a national bank, with constructive knowledge of the fact that to act as officer he must be the owner of at least ten shares, will not be heard to dispute knowledge of the fact that the books represented him to be the owner of fifty shares, even though he were in fact ignorant of the matter.8 One who acts as a stockholder with the knowledge that is imputed to him by the receipt of dividends will be held as a stockholder.4 He is none the less a stockholder, though as officer of the bank he took the stock in order to protect the bank;5 nor is he exonerated by an agreement of the bank officer that if the stock would be taken by the stockholder the bank would buy the shares at any time he wished.6 So a man will not be heard to say that he was a trustee of the stock and thus exempt from liability, if he knowingly permit the books to show him to be the owner;7 but even if the books show him to be a trustee, he will be liable if he be the real owner. "Where there was an over-issue of stock, a party having bought stock of the president of a bank, who issued to the party new certificates, and, having retained the old certificates, hypothecated them, thus over-issuing the stock, it was held that the new stockholder was liable as such.8 As to transfer by descent or by will, see the next section.

12 Davis v. Stevens, 17 Blatch. 259; Horton v. Mercer, 71 Fed. R. 153; Case v. Small, 10 Fed. R. 722; Hub-bell v. Houghton, 86 Fed. R. 547.

13 Foster v. Chase, 75 Fed. R. 797. It was put on the ground that the minors could not consent. See also Kerr v. Urie, 87 Atl R. 789.

1 Pardee, Cir. Judge, in Case v. Small, 10 Fed. R. 722. This case is a very good instance of the recklessness of judges in using language.

The point of holding out was not involved at all, but the case was decided on the point that a man was liable as stockholder, because while the stock was held in the name of another, which other was held out as owner, he was yet the real owner.

2 Keyser v. Hitz, 133 U. S. 138.

3 Finn v. Brown, 142 U. S. 56. 4Stephens v. Follett, 43 Fed. R. 842.