How strange, then, and provoking to think, that during the years these bankruptcies were taking place, Committees upon Banking were sitting in the House of Commons, mooting all sorts of opinions, but taking no notice of facts. There were the Banks breaking almost daily before their eyes, and yet not a single inquiry was instituted, nor an allusion made, to the causes, attendant circumstances, or consequences of a long series of misfortunes so deplorable, and I fear so irremediable. One would have thought that the amount of the benefit, and he therefore might possibly, after all, not be damnified. Each party must pay their own costs; the assignees taking theirs out of the estate, and the petitioner his out of his own fund.

Mischief done might at least have been ascertained; but it was not even asked for. Accordingly, we neither learn from the Banking Committees of 1840 or 1841, the number of Banks that failed during those years, nor the amount of their debts, nor the dividends, if any, by them paid. I am not, therefore, either surprised or sorry that Sir R. Peel will have no more of them; for any practical purpose, they have proved greater farces than county meetings appeared to the Duke of Wellington some time ago.

The list, it will be observed, does not contain more than four joint-stock Banks. I shall give their cases briefly, as they will not take up much room.

The Bank of Walsall commenced business Aug. 1, 1835. It had one branch; a nominal capital of 200,000l., in 8000 shares of 25l. each; 6115 shares had been issued in 1836, when its paid up capital was 30,575l., and its declared dividend six per cent.; 156 persons signed the deed of settlement; its promissory notes, and bank post bills were made payable at Walsall, Penkridge, and London; from two per cent, to three and a-half per cent, interest was allowed upon deposits and balances of accounts8.

8 App. Commons' Rep. 1837, pp. 94, 95.

No unfavourable opinion seems to have been entertained of the solvency or management of the Bank until 1840, when a further call was rather unexpectedly and urgently pressed upon the shareholders. It was not met, and the Bank stopped in the following year. On that occasion the amount of overdrawn accounts appeared to be 57,000l. The shareholders are understood to have met all the engagements of the concern.

The case of the Commercial Bank of England presents some peculiar features. Its projectors aimed at a distinction which they thought would give it superior strength. Perceiving the great difference that existed between the nominal and real capitals of the majority of joint-stock Banks, they resolved that no share of theirs should appear in the market, purporting or representing to be more than it really was. In other words, they resolved that the full amount of each share issued should be paid up. To make this, which has generally been found a heavy task, a light one, they fixed the amount of their shares as low as 51. each. In this way, taking power to issue 100,000 shares, they began business at Manchester, August 12, 1834, and in 1836 had issued 52,497 shares, which at 5l. each, made the capital 262,485l. In 1836 this Bank had eighteen branches, in 1837, fifteen, which it was found necessary to reduce to ten. The deed of settlement was signed by 571 persons, and in 1837 the number of proprietors was 680. There had then been two dividends, the first at the rate of six, and the second at the rate of five per cent. Both were said to have come out of profits. Interest was allowed on deposits at the rate of three per cent.4 It is hardly necessary to remark that a Bank of this kind could not last. The principle was quite a mistaken one, and left nothing to fall back upon in the hour of trial. It is further manifest that, at the outset, the directors launched into extremes, and were immediately afterwards obliged to pull in. The conclusion of their career is soon told. In Sept. 1841, they informed the proprietors that the company's losses had absorbed the whole of the surplus fund, and one-fourth of the paid up capital. It was accordingly resolved, with great propriety, that the debts and obligations of the company should be discharged, and the Bank dissolved, a consummation, however, which does not as yet appear to have been accomplished.

The Imperial Bank of England seems to have been a very unfortunate speculation, badly got up, badly conducted when established, and still worse managed after its affairs became deranged. It opened at Manchester, Dec. 26, 1836, and in 1837 had five branches in Cheshire, a nominal capital of 1,000,000l., in 50,000 shares of 20l. each, of which 18,395 had been issued, and produced a paid up capital of 73,580l., in two calls of 21. each per share. No deed of settlement had been executed in 1837; but already the Bank held 100 shares of its own, as security for dishonoured bills. Promissory notes and bank post bills were made payable at Macclesfield, Congleton, and Knutsford, and in some cases four per cent. was allowed on deposits5. This Bank must have tottered as soon as it was founded. Its difficulties became apparent as early as 1838, and then a spirit of litigation sprang up, which has never ceased to vex and disgrace its proceedings. These have done more damage to the character of joint-stcck Banking generally, than any other incident I am acquainted with in their history. Mistakes, errors, and even wrongs, will be overlooked in Banking; but it is not easy to forgive an obstinate determination to act in conformity with neither good sense nor justice. In the case of the Imperial Bank it has been found necessary to bring a bill into Parliament authorizing the court of Chancery to appoint a public officer, in whom the estate and effects of the company shall vest, and who shall manage it, paying and compounding with the creditors, and also with the copartners for their liabilities subsequently to January 1st, 1842. It is to be hoped that this case will remain as it stands - a solitary one. We derive, however, one advantage from its proceedings. We see that the state of the law is defective in an essential respect, and we calculate upon its early correction in consequence of the lesson taught by the Imperial Bank. It is obvious, that if the jurisdiction of the Court of Bankruptcy is not extended to the case of a broken joint-stock Bank, perverse directors and an unprincipled company may succeed for a time in doing serious mischief with impunity.

4 App. Commons' Report, 1837, pp. 30, 31.

5 Commons' Report, 1837, App. p. 100. N 2