A contract for the purchase or sale of lands for another, not being for the sale of land but for personal services, will not be offensive to the statute of frauds, because not in writing. Ivy Coal Co. v. Long, 139 Ala. 535, 36 S. 722; Stephens v. Bailey, 149 Ala. 256, 42 S. 740; Monroe v. Snow, 131 I11. 126, 23 N. E. 401; Ward v. Lawrence, 79 I11. 295; Fox v. Starr, 106 I11. App. 273; Collins v. Smith, 18 I11. 160, 162; Watson v. Sherman, 84 I11. 263, 267; Fisher v. Bell 91 Ind. 243; Talbot v. Bowen, A. K. Mar. (Ky.) 436; Houston v. Boagni, McGloin (La.), 164; Hamilton v. Frothingham, 59 Mich. 253, 26 N. W. 486; Waterman R. E. Ex. v. Stephens, 71 Mich. 104, 38 N. W. 685; Hancock v. Dodge, 85 Miss. 228, 37 S. 711; Gwinnup v. Sibert, 106 Mo. App. 709, 80 S. W. 589; Riley v. Minor, 29 Mo. App. 439; Worrell v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229; Wilson v. Clark, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 92, 79 S. W. 649; Yearly v. Grigsby, 9 Leigh (Va.), 387.

In some States, by statute, a contract with a broker to purchase or sell land, must be in writing - Arkansas, California, Idaho, Indiana, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, Illinois, Washington. Wysing v. Sills (Ind. App. '09), 88 N. E. 954; Farland v. Boyum (Wash. Sup. '09), 102 P. 34; McCarthy v. Loupe, 62 Cal. 299, 10 P. C. L. J. 562; Pacific Land & Trust Co. v. Blochman, 11 P. C. L. J. 24; Perkins v. Cooper (Cal. Sup. '90), 24 P. 377; Bissell v. Terry, 69 I11. 184; Rothwell v. Gibson, 121 Mo. App. 279, 98 S. W. 801; Kesner v. Miesch, 204 I11. 320, 68 N. E. 405; Milne v. Kleb, 44 N. J. Eq. 378, 14 A. 646, 810; Finley v. Hanley, 121 Mo. App. 358, 98 S. W. 803; Mendles v. Danish, 74 N. J. L. 333, 65 A. 888; Briggs v. Bounds, 48 Wash. 579, 94 P. 101; Danielson v. Goebel, 71 Neb. 300, 98 N. W. 819; McGury v. Satchwell, 129 Cal. 389, 62 P. 58; Dotson v. Toole, 129 Cal. 488, 62 P. 92; Watters v. Dancey (S. D. '09), 122 N. W. 430; Heyman v. Stopper, 91 A. 1069, 86 N. J. Law, 357, aff. judg., 88 A. 946, 85 N. J. Law, 128; Shaw v. Corbett, 185 P. 585, - Or. Sup. - .

Where plaintiff, at defendant's request, procured the title to real estate, taking it in his own name, and afterward conveyed it to defendant, defendant's agreement to pay him for his services one-half of the sum for which the real estate might be sold, is not within the statute of frauds. Huff v. Hardmick, 19 Colo. App. 416, 75 P. 593.

A broker who has made a parol contract of sale of realty can not, after his principal has contracted to sell the land to another purchaser and has so informed the broker, make such a memorandum as will take the case out of the operation of the statute of frauds. Elliott v. Barrett, 144 Mass. 256, 10 N. E. 820.

Under Civil Code, See. 1624, Sub. 6, requiring that a broker's authorization to sell shall be in writing, a memorandum of authority is not fatally defective because it did not recite the terms of sale and amount of payments. Baird v. Loescher, (Cal. App. '08), 98 P. 40.

In an action to recover commissions for selling realty owned by defendant and K., the plaintiff alleged that in offering the property for sale defendant acted as agent for K., and as such agent made an oral agreement to pay plaintiff a reasonable commission for selling the property. Civil Code, Sec. 1624, requires agreements authorizing the sale of realty, or some memorandum thereof, to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged or his agent. Held, that, conceding that the broker could contract orally with another as to the compensation he was to receive from the owner for selling realty, the plaintiff did not allege any written contract by defendant with K., and hence he was entitled to no compensation which could be the subject of an oral contract with plaintiff; so that whether the complaint charged defendant individually or as agent for K., the oral agreement with plaintiff for commissions was invalid. Aldis v. Schleicher, 9 Cal. App. 372, 99 P. 526.

The provisions of the statute of frauds which require the authority for selling land as a basis for a broker's commission to be in writing, signed by the owner or his authorized agent, is not complied with, where the person who signed is neither the owner nor his authorized agent. Ryer v. Winter (N. J. Sup. '09), 72 A. 84.

A declaration which sets out that defendant employed plaintiff to sell real estate, and a promise by the defendant to pay for such services, need not set out that the authority for selling and the statement of the rate of commissions were in writing, as a statutory requirement to that effect is a matter of evidence only. Adams v. Grady (N. J. Sup. '09), 72 A. 55.

Burns' Annotated Statutes, 1908, Sec. 7463, provides that no contract for the payment of a commission to a broker for securing a purchaser for real estate shall be valid, unless in writing signed by the owner. Held, that the fact that a broker has fully performed his part of the contract does not take the case out of the statute. Price v. Walker (Ind. App. '09),

88 N. E. 78. Compare Muir v. Kane (Wash. Sup. '09), 104 P. 153.

A contract whereby a broker was to procure a purchaser for real estate and also for personal property was within the statute. Price v. Walker (Ind. App. '09), 88 N. E. 78.

Since the statute renders invalid a contract for the payment of commissions for procuring a purchaser for real estate, unless the contract be in writing, signed by the owner, an oral contract within the statute, though valid in the State where made, can not be enforced in Indiana. Price v. Walker (Ind. App. '09), 88 N. E. 78.

Though the statute provides that any agreement authorizing an employe as an agent or broker to sell or purchase real estate for a commission shall be void unless the agreement or promise, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, where the broker sells the land under an oral agreement authorizing the service, the moral obligation of the owner to pay for the services is sufficient to sustain a subsequent written agreement to pay therefor. Muir v. Kane ("Wash. Sup. '09), 104 P. 153. Compare Price v. Walker (Ind. App. '09), 88 N. E. 78.