It may be laid down as a general rule, that mere expressions of praise or affirmations of value, such as, that an estate, sold as a renewable leasehold, is "nearly equal to freehold (e);" or that land, in fact imperfectly watered, is "uncommonly rich water meadow land (f);" that a house of mean character, is "a desirable residence for a family of distinction (g);" will not, however objectionable they may be in point of morality, avoid the contract in Equity.

And the rule, perhaps, extends to any statement by a vendor, which is, in effect, a mere expression of his own opinion, and does not amount to an assertion of an independent and ascertainable fact: such as, a statement, on the sale of an advowson, that an avoidance is "likely to occur soon (h);" or, on the sale of renewable leaseholds, that the fine payable is "small (i);" if a purchaser choose to rely on the vendor's opinion as to what is a small fine, or a probability of speedy avoidance, he does so at his peril.

C. C. 388; and see 6 Ves. 183, and 4 70.

Purchaser should inquire of Trustees on purchase of equitable estate, and give notice.

But notice does not give priority in case of real estate.

Trustee giving false information is liable.

As to commendatory statements by vendor.

Vendor not prejudiced by mere puffing statements.

If amounting to mere expression of opinion, and not to statement of facts.

3 Ves. & B. 111.

(b) See 2 Y. & C. C. C. 390, Bug. den v. Bignold.

(c) Vide infra.

(d) Burrowes v. Lock, 10 Ves.

(e) Fenton v. Browne, 14 Ves. 144. (f) Scott v. Hanson, 1 Sim. 13. (g) Magennis v. Fallon, 2 Moll. 587.

And in the strong case of the vendor of an annuity stating that the grantor, (then in prison for debt and insolvent,) " was a man of large property," he was held not liable to an action of deceit at Law (j).

Where, however, on the sale of a life interest, the particulars described the tenant for life as a very healthy gentleman aged forty-eight, whose life was insurable, and an insurance was guaranteed at five guineas per cent., and it turned out that the vendors had recently insured the life at a rate less than five guineas per cent., but exceeding the rate usually charged on healthy lives, their bill was dismissed with costs, although the purchaser 'admitted that he knew five guineas to be more than the usual premium (k).

And a false statement, by a vendor, of an independent fact, - as, that the property has been valued by a surveyor at a specified sum, - will, if relied on by the purchaser (I), avoid the contract at law and in equity (m); and might, perhaps, sustain an action at Law: but a vendor is not liable to such action for the false assertion that a third person has offered a specified sum for the estate (n).

There would seem to be a clear ground of distinction between the two last cases; for a purchaser might naturally consider the opinion of a surveyor to indicate something like the market value of the property, although he might attach little importance to the bare offer by an individual, possibly made hastily and soon repented of: though certainly, in the reported case, the purchaser seems to have been directly influenced by the mis-statement.

What misrepresentation will at law avoid the contract, or sustain an action.

Mis-statement that a life is a healthy one, not qualified by guarantee that it is insurable at specified rate.

Valuation of estate by surveyor.

Offer for purchase of estate by third person.

Difference between the two last cases.

(h) Trower v. Newcome, 3 Mer. 704.

(i) Fenton v. Browne, 14 Ves. 144. (j) Dawes v. King, 1 Stark. 75. (k) Brealey v. Collins, You. 317. (l) See Clapham v. Shillito, 7

Beav. 146.

(m) Buxton v. Lister, 3 Atk. 386; Small v. Attwood, 1 You. 407; Sug. 4; Lord Brooke v. Rounthwaite, 5 Hare, 298.

(n) Sug. 3.

And a false statement that a specified rent is paid for the premises (o), has been held to subject the vendor to an action at law, although the purchaser did not rely on his statement, but made inquiries of other persons; who, it is presumed, also deceived him.

And the same liability is incurred by a stranger, who, even from mere wantonness, intending to deceive, although without any view to gain, makes a false representation to a purchaser as to the value or rent of the property; nor is it material that the sale is by auction instead of private contract (p); Sir E. Sugden says (q), citing Sir W. Grant, "In cases of this nature it will be sufficient to show, 1st, that the fact as represented is false; 2ndly, that the person making the representation had a knowledge of a fact contrary to it (r)." The rule is otherwise laid down by Mansfield, C. J., who says, that "it signifies nothing whether a man represents a thing to be different from what he knows it to be, or whether he makes a representation which he does not know at the time to be true or false, if in point of fact it turns out to be false (s)": the better opinion, however, seems to be, that, in order to sustain an action at Law, there must be actual fraud; that is, either an assertion, (with or without motive,) of what the party knows to be untrue (t), or a communication, for a deceitful and fraudulent purpose, of that which is in fact untrue, although he may not know it to be so (u).

Purchaser when liable although statement not relied on.

Stranger when liable for misstatement.

There must be actual fraud; semble.

(o) Lysney v. Selby, Ld. Raymond, 1118.

(p) Bardell v. Spinks, 2 Car. & K. 646.

(q) Sug. 5.

(r) Burrowes v. Lock, 10 Ves. 476.

(s) Schneider v. Heath, 3 Camp.

506; and see 1 Bro. C. C. 546; 3 Ves. &B. 111, and Pearson v. Morgan, 2 Bro. C.C. 388.

(t) See Lord Campbell's judgment in Wilde v. Gibson, 1 H. L. C. 633; and cases cited infra, n. (u).

A representation that a man is able to answer an obligation is not binding unless in writing (v).