For the purpose of conditions, etc, as to time, an abstract is said to be "perfect," if it be as perfect an abstract as the vendor is able to furnish at the time of delivery (k), although the title shown by it may be defective: an abstract is, in the stricter sense of the term, "perfect" or complete, when it shows a perfect title (l); that is, when it shows that the vendor is either himself competent to convey to, or can otherwise procure to be vested in, the purchaser, the legal and equitable estates free from incumbrances (m).

For instance, the non-registration of deeds, which can be registered (n), the existence of incumbrances, when the incumbrancers can be compelled to receive their money and join in the conveyance (o), the legal estate being outstanding in a married woman, whose interest is bound by an order of the Court of Chancery (p), are not imperfections of title.

Except on sales to railway company, etc.

When "perfect," within meaning of conditions of sale.

When " perfect," as showing a sufficient title.

Certain imperfections in, not considered defects of title.

(i) 7 & 8 Vict. c. 18, s. 82.

(j) See In re London and Greenwich Railway Company, 3 Ha. 22.

(k) 2 Ha. 111; and see, at Law, Blackburn v. Smith, 2 Exch. 783.

(l) 2 Ha. 111; Sug. 445.

(m) See and consider, Lord Bray-brooke v. Inskip, 8 Ves. 436, and other cases cited, Sug. 445.

(n) Sug. 446.

(o) Ibid.: Townsend v. Champer-nown, 1 Yo. & J. 449; and see 2 Moll. 583; but not if their concurrence cannot be compelled; see Page v. Adam, 4 Beav. 269.

(p) Jumpson v. Pitchers, 1 Coll. 13.

But, consistently with the terms of the above proposition, where vendors cannot give to or procure for the purchaser, a valid discharge for the purchase money, the title is defective (q).

And the mere statement on the face of the abstract that a party who is not compellable has agreed to join, although usual, is, of course, insufficient; a written agreement to concur should, in strictness, be procured and abstracted; nor is such agreement sufficient, if it do not absolutely bind the interest of the party signing it; e. g., a title dependent on an agreement by a tenant in tail to suffer a recovery, or execute a disentailing deed, would be imperfect (r).

So, if the legal estate be outstanding, the abstract must show in whom it is vested (s); the existence of the rule appears to be recognised in the judgment in Avarne v. Brown (t), although the Court, upon the case before it, came to an apparently contradictory decision; but the reporter's note (u) seems to intimate that there was some misapprehension as to the facts.

The expression used by Lord Eldon (v) is, that the abstract is complete, "whenever it appears that, upon certain acts done, the legal and equitable estates will be in the purchaser:" it is, however, conceived that, at least in a Court of Law, it would not be sufficient for the abstract to show merely a future, (although certain and early,) right to the property; for instance, the existence of an incumbrance which cannot be discharged on or before the time fixed for completion (w), would, it is conceived, amount at Law to a defect of title: in equity, as a general rule, mortgages and other incumbrances are considered merely matters of conveyance (x); and this doctrine has even been extended to cases where the property was mortgaged to an amount considerably exceeding its value (y); they seem, however, to have been decided on the principle that the vendor had the legal power, if he used the necessary means, of procuring a conveyance; and the conclusion would, it is conceived, be different, if, by reason of an agreement for the continuance of the charge, or otherwise, the vendor had no right to call on the incumbrancer to join in the conveyance (z). Lord Langdale observes, on the general question, "Where an interest is vested in a party to secure a right, the satisfaction of which right entitles the party who has sold the estate to call for a conveyance, then the Court considers it a question of conveyance only; but I think it has never gone further than that" (a): in which it seems to be assumed that the right is capable of being satisfied at the time when the question of title or no title arises. At any rate it may be considered that the title is perfect, whenever it appears that under the contract the purchaser either already has, or will necessarily, before the time fixed for completion, be able to acquire an immediate and indisputable right to the legal and equitable estates; even although the absence of parties, or other circumstances, may considerably delay the conveyance.

Should state written consent of parties agreeing to join in sale.

And this is not always sufficient.

Must show where outstanding legal estate is vested.

Showing future right to property, insufficient at law; semble.

As in case of mortgage which cannot be discharged.

(q) Forbes v. Peacock, 12 Sim. 528.

(r) Lewin v. Guest, 1 Russ. 325; 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, s. 47.

(s) Wynne v. Griffith, 1 Russ. 2.

(t) 14 Sim. 303.

(u) See p. 308.

(v) 8 Ves. 436.

(w) See (a case depending on the specialty of the contract) Foster v. Hoggart, 14 Jur. 757. A mortgagee, we may remark, need not receive his money before the day fixed for redemption, although previously tenIt has, in fact, been held, that a good title was deduced, when it appeared by the abstract that the vendor was tenant in tail in possession and able to convey the fee simple by an enrolled conveyance (b): this decision, so far as it may tend to establish that such a vendor is not bound at once to execute a disentailing assurance and limit the fee simple either to his own use or to his appointment, seems open to observation; it is clear that his contract would give to the purchaser no right which he could enforce in the event of the vendor's death before the execution of the conveyance; which sufficiently distinguishes it from the case put by the Plaintiff's counsel, of a contract entered into by a tenant for life with a power of sale: for a contract to exercise such a power, if entered into for valuable consideration, would be enforced in Equity against remaindermen (c); whereas, in the case of the tenant in tail, the jurisdiction of Equity is expressly excluded by Statute (d); and it is evidently unreasonable that a purchaser should be put to the expense of investigating the title and preparing his conveyance, when the death of the vendor would deprive him of the estate, and possibly leave him without available remedy for recovery of his costs, and deposit (if-any has been paid).

Incumbrances; whether a defect in title in equity.

Title good, although immediate conveyance not procurable.

Whether sufficient if abstract merely show that vendor is tenant in tail in possession dered with interest up to such day: Brown v. Cole, 14 Sim. 427.

(x) Townsend v. Champernown, 1 You. & J. 449.

(y) Stephens v. Gappy, and Rate-son v. Tasburgh, cited 1 You. & J.

(z) See 2 Moll. 583, 4 Beav. 269.

(a) Sidebotham v. Barrington, 3 Beav. 528.

(b) Cattell v. Corrall, 4 Y. & C. Ex. 228.