It has been long settled that a party signing an agreement is prima facie bound by it, although it be not signed by the other party (f): but if only one be bound, he may, it would appear, require the other to signify in writing his assent to or dissent from the contract; and, unless this be acceded to, he may himself rescind it (g).

If rejected, etc, ceases to be binding.

Must be accepted within reasonable time.

Offer by letter binding, if accepted by return of post.

Agreement binding, although sent as Instructions to a solicitor.

Signature by party charged, sufficient.

But party bound may require other party to elect.

(z) Rout ledge v. Grant, 4 Bing. 653; Martin v. Mitchell, 2 Jac. & W. 428; Lucas v. James, 7 Ha. 410.

(a) Sheffield Canal Company v. Sheffield and Rotheram Railway Company, 3 Rail. Ca. 121, R.

(b) Routledge v. Grant, 4 Bing. 653; Hyde v. Wrench, 3 Beav. 334; Thornbury v. Bevill, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 554.

(c) Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Mer. 451; Thornbury v. Bevill, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 554, 563

(d) See Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. of L. Ca. 400; Potter v. Sanders, 6 Ha. 1.

(e) Fowle v. Freeman, 9 Ves. 354; see Gibbins v. N. E. Metropolitan Destitution Asylum, 11 Beav. 1.

(f) Sug. 112; Laythoarp v. Bryant, 2 Bing. N.C. 735; Fowle v. Freeman, 9 Ves. 354; Owen v. Thomas, 3 Myl. & K. 353; infra, Ch. XVIII.

(g) 2 Jac. & W. 428.

A signature printed, or stamped, instead of written, or by initials, may be binding (h); but a mere description, although it satisfactorily identify the party, e. g., " your affectionate mother," subscribed to a letter addressed to the son with his name and address in full, has been held insufficient (i).

And it appears that an agreement is not the less binding by reason of the alterations and signature being in pencil instead of ink (k).

The Ecclesiastical Courts have held a signature to a will by a woman, twice married and then under coverture, in the name of her first husband, sufficient (l).

And a signature in the name of an agent will bind the principal if the agency be established (m): and the alleged agent may be examined either to prove or disprove the agency; but if his evidence go to impeach the validity of the authority under which he has professed to act, it will be received with the most anxious jealousy (n).

The signature to formal agreements is, of course, usually found at the end of the document; it may, however, as in the case of a letter or agreement in the third person, be inserted in the beginning or any other part of the instrument, if inserted so as, in effect, to authenticate the entire document, and not to be exclusively applicable to particular purposes (o): and this, according to some authorities, although, in the case of an agreement in the third person, a place be left for signature at the bottom, in the usual way (p): however, in a recent case, where the agreement contained the names of the parties in the commencement, and concluded with the words, "as witness our hands," without being followed by any name or signature, the Court took a more common-sense view of the question, and held that there was no sufficient signature (q): so, the purchaser's signature, in a column left blank for that purpose in the printed particulars, may be sufficient (r).

What signature sufficient.

In pencil.

By married woman in surname of deceased husband.

Signature by agent sufficient if agency proved.

Agent is a competent witness.

Signature not necessarily placed at end of agreement.

Effect of leaving blank for signature.

(h) Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 Bos. & P. 238; Schneider v. Norris, 2 Mau. & S. 286; Phillimore v. Barry, 1 Camp. Ca. 513; Sweet v. Lee, 3 Man. & Gr. 452; and see Blore v. Sutton, 3 Mer. 245.

(i) Selby v. Selby, 3 Mer. 2.

(k) Lucas v. James, 7 Ha. 410.

(1) Jn the goods of S. Glover, 11 Jur. 1022.

(m) White v. Proctor, 4 Taunt.

209; Kenworthy v. Schofield, 2 Barn. & Cr. 945.

(n) Howard v. Braithwaite, 1 Ves. & B. 202, 209.

(o) Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 Bos. & P. 238; Sug. 127; Western v. Russell, 3 Ves. & B. 187; Propert v. Parker, 1 Russ. & M. 625; Bleak-ley v. Smith, 11 Sim. 150; Lobb v. Stanley, 5 Ad. & El. N. S. 574; Stokes v. Moore, 1 Cox. 219.

And although a principal or his agent sign merely as a witness, he may be bound, if the signature amount to an acknowledgment of the existence of the agreement; e.g., "witness A. B." (s): but where a person, whose formal signature would have bound the vendor, merely attested the execution of the agreement by the purchaser, this was held to be insufficient (t).

The written approval by a professional agent, of a draft agreement, or of the draft conveyance which recites the agreement, will, it would seem, be insufficient (u); this, however, was much questioned in a recent case (v), which was eventually decided on a collateral point: the effect of a similar approval of a draft agreement by one of the parties, is more doubtful (w); the circumstance of the party signing such approval being in the legal profession would, it is conceived, be unfavourable to the sufficiency of the signature; the alteration of the draft conveyance by one of the parties has been held insufficient: about which, upon the case (y) as reported, there could scarcely have been a doubt; as it does not appear that the alterations comprised the name of the party making them: in the case of Ithel v. Potter (z), a similar decision was come to where the entire conveyance had been written by the Defendant; but it does not appear whether the conveyance recited the agreement, although such, probably, was the case: in a case where the draft of a lease had, in pursuance of a parol agreement, been forwarded to the intended lessee for perusal, and he indorsed and signed a memorandum upon it, requesting the lessee to endeavour to relet the premises, as it would be inconvenient for him (the lessee) to perform his agreement, this was held to be sufficient (a).

Party bound by signature as witness: but not as attesting witness.

Approval of draft agreement or conveyance, whether sufficient.

(p) Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 Bos. & P. 239.

(q) Hubert v. Treherne, 3 Man. & Gr. 743; Hubert v. Turner, 4 Sc. N. R. 486.

(r) Emmerson v. Heelis, 2 Taunt. 38.

(s) 9 Ves. 234,251.

(t) Gosbell v. Archer, 2 Ad. & El. 500.

(u) See Sug. 128.

(v) Thornbury v. Bevill, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 554.

(w) See Sug. 129; Doe v. Ped-griph, 4 Car. & P. 312; Parker v. Smith, 1 Coll. 608.

A contract by a Corporation aggregate, should, as a general rule, be under their common seal (b); but, by the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, any contract entered into on behalf of a Company coming within the provisions of the Act, and which, if made between private persons, would require to be in writing, and to be signed by the parties to be charged therewith, may be made, varied, or discharged in writing, signed by any two of the Directors (c).

We may here observe, that any alteration made by either party in a material part of a written contract, without the consent of the other party, destroys the rights under the contract of the party making the alteration (d).

Signature by public companies, etc.

Party altering agreement loses his rights thereunder.

(y) Hawkins v. Holmes, 1 P. Wms. 770; and see Stokes v. Moore, 1 Cox, 219.

(z) 1 P. Wms. 771.

(a) Shippey v. Derrison, 5 Esp. Ca. 190.

(b) See Corporation of Ludlow v.

Charlton, 6 Mee. & W. 815; Cope v. Thames Haven Company, 3 Exch. 841; 6 Rail. Ca. 83.

(c) 8 Vict. c. 16, s. 97.

(d) Powell v. Divett, 15 East, 29; Mollett v. Wackerbarth, 5 C. B. 181.