Where the decree directs a reconveyance, and an account and payment of the balance to the purchaser, but does not in terms give him a lien for such balance upon the estate, the reconveyance must be made at once, without waiting for the accounts (h).

The estate, if put up for resale, will be put up at the amount of balance due to the purchaser, ascertained as just mentioned (i), and, if there be no advance, he must keep the estate: in a modern case, where permanent improvements had been made, it was put up at its improved value, subject to the question whether he should be allowed the amount of such improvements (j).

Similarly liable.

Terms upon which a reconveyance will be decreed.

What expenses allowed.

Profits to be accounted for.

If nothing due to him he must at once reconvey.

What allowances for buildings pulled down.

Must re-convey at once unless decree gives him a lien for balance due.

Terms on which estate will be resold.

(z) Sug. 899.

(a) Baugh v. Price, 1 Wils. 320; see Howell v. Howell, 2 Myl. & Cr. 478; and Turner v. Trelawny, 12 Sim. 49.

(b) York Buildings Company v. Mackenzie, 8 Bro. P. C.; see pp. 56 and 71.

(c) Necessary repairs are allowed for, even in cases of fraud; 1 Wils. 322.

(d) Ex parte James, 8 Ves. 351.

(e) Ex parte Bennett, 10 Ves.; see p. 401.

(f) Greenlaw v. King, 3 Beav. 63.

(g) Robinson v. Ridley, 6 Madd. 2. (h) Trevelyan v. Charter, 9 Beav. 140

In the case of a resale, the cestuis que trust cannot, if the estate were bought in one lot, insist on its being put up in several lots (k), nor, it is conceived, allotted otherwise than as it was bought; to effect the change they must take it off the purchaser's hands on the terms we have already mentioned (l).

The third rule would extend to a purchaser who, by sale of wood, minerals, etc, had more than repaid himself his purchase money, expences, and interest (m); or who had made a similar profit by merely letting the property, (which in the case of unexpected public improvements might often easily happen in the course of a few years, although the original price were perfectly fair;) it is apprehended, that, in either of these cases, he would have, not only to re-convey, but also to pay the balance found due from him (n).

If, in any of the above cases, the purchaser has paid purchase-money into Court, and it has been invested, he will neither gain nor suffer by a rise or fall in the funds (o).

And, as a general rule, a trustee, though free from fraud, must pay the costs of a suit occasioned by his improper dealing with the estate (p): such is the almost invariable practice where the cestuis que trust are infants (q); in other cases, however, the rule is sometimes relaxed where the trustee is free from all moral blame (r); and in one instance it would seem that he was even allowed to receive a sum on account of costs (s).

If no advance, purchaser must keep it.

At what amount put up.

Cannot be re-allotted for sale.

Purchaser having more than repaid himself must account for the balance,

Purchaser paying money into Court not affected by variation in funds.

General rule as to costs.

(i) Vide supra, p. 23; Ex parte Hughes, 6 Ves. 617.

(j) Williamson v. Seaber, 3 Y. & C. 717.

(k) 8 Ves. 351.

(l) Supra, p. 23.

(m) York Buildings Company v. Mackenzie, 8 Bro. P. C. see p. 71.

(n) S. C., and see 6 Ves. 622; and the decree in Neesom v. Clarkson, 2 Ha. 176; 4 Ha. 97.

(o) 8 Ves. 351.

(p) Sug. 898.

(q) See Sanderson v. Walker, 13 Ves. 601.

But a cestui que trust wishing to impeach a sale must do so within a reasonable time (t); which generally is less than the time allowed by the Statute of Limitations: a delay of eighteen years has been held to amount to an implied confirmation of the transaction (u); ten years have been allowed in the case of an individual (v); and twelve in the case of creditors (w); but the general tendency of modern decisions is still further to discourage stale demands; a longer time, however, is allowed a class of persons, as creditors, than would be allowed an individual (x).

And time will not run against a cestui que trust until he be sui juris (y), and aware that the trustee was improperly the purchaser (z); nor will it, in general, run against him, so long as his interest is contingent, or reversionary (a), or (in particular) dependent on the will of the purchasing trustee, or of a party implicated in the breach of trust (b): it does not appear that the poverty of the cestui que trust is in itself an excuse for laches (c), although it would, probably, have an effect upon the Court if united with other circumstances (d).

Time allowed for impeaching sale.

Classes more favoured than individuals.

From what period time begins to run.

(r) Baker v. Carter, 1 Y. & C. Ex. 250.

(s) See Bournes v. Grazebrook, 3 Mer. 209.

(t) 1 Jac. & W. 59; Lord Selsey v. Rhoades, 1 Bli. N. S. 1; Rudd v. Sewell, 4 Jur. 882, C.

(u) Gregory v. Gregory, G. Coop. 201; Jac. 631.

(v) Hall v. Noyes, cited 3 Ves. 748.

(to) Anon. cited 6 Ves. 632.

(x) Whichcote v. Lawrence, 3 Ves. 740.

(y) Lewin on Trusts, 371; Campbell v. Walker, 5 Ves. 678, 682.

(z) Chalmer v. Bradley, 1 Jac. & W. 51; Charter v. Trevelyan, 11 Cl. & Fin. 714.

(a) Duke of Leeds v. Lord Amherst, 2 Ph. 117; Bennett v. Colley,

5 Sim. 181; Bower v. Evans, 1 Jo.

& L. 178; Roberts v. Tunstall, 4 Ha. 257.

(b) Roberts v. Tunstall, 4 Ha. 257.

(c) S. C.

(d) Gregory v. Gregory, G. Cooper, 201; and see Oliver v. Court, 8 Pri. 168.

Lastly, a cestui que trust may confirm a voidable purchase by his trustee, etc.; but, to make his confirmation binding, he must be sui juris (e) fully aware of the material facts (f), and that he can, if he please, impeach the transaction (g); he must be under no undue influence (h), the confirmation must be a solemn and deliberate act (i), free from any pressure resulting from the original transaction (j), and, in the case of a plurality of cestuis que trust, it must, to be effectual, be the act of all (k), as a majority cannot bind the minority.

And we may here remark, that conduct, or language, on the part of a cestui que trust who is sui juris, and which, if it had occurred upon or previously to the commission of the breach of trust might have amounted to acquiescence, and have precluded him from all right of complaint, may, if it occur subsequently to the breach of trust, be wholly insufficient to confirm the transaction, or to release the trustee from liability (I).

Confirmation of voidable purchase, requisites to.

Distinctions between prior acquiescence and subsequent confirmation.

(e) Campbell v. Walker, 5 Ves. 678, 682.

(f) Chalmer v. Bradley, 1 Jac. & W. 51; see Wedderburn v. Wedder-burn, 4 Myl. & Cr. 41.

(g) 1 P. Wms. 727.

(h) Lewin on Trusts, 374.

(i) Carpenter v. Heriot, 1 Ed. 338; see Be Montmorency v. Deve-reux, 7 Cl. & Fin. 188.

(j) Wood v. Bournes, 18 Ves. 128.

(k) 6 Ves. 628.

(l) 5 Myl. & Cr. 218; and see 2 Ph. 123.