1. As to the general necessity for a written agreement.

2. The preparation of formal agreements.

3. What informal documents may constitute an agreement.

4. The signature.

5. The stamps.

6. As to illegal agreements.

(1.) Under the Statute of Frauds (a), a written agreement, signed by the party to be charged, or his agent, is generally necessary to the validity of any contract for the sale or purchase of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any estate or interest in or concerning them; whether such estate or interest be subsisting, or be proposed to be created de novo; and the Act extends to sales by auction (b), and in Bankruptcy (c); but not to sales before a Master, or to purchases under the Order of the Court, if the owner of the estate make no opposition to the confirmation of the report approving of the purchase (d).

And although an actual demise by parol for any term not exceeding three years, at a rent not less than two thirds of the improved value, is valid under the 2nd section of the Statute, an executory agreement for such a demise is void unless in writing (e): so, a parol agreement by a lessee for an assignment of the residue of his term (being less than three years), is void, and cannot, it would seem, operate as an underlease (f).

Written agreement generally necessary under Statute of Frauds.

What sales not within the statute.

Parol executory agreement for lease,or for assignment of term less than three years, void.

(a) 29 Car. II. c. 3, see s. 4; Sug. 98.

(b) Sug. 135; see Att.-Gen. v. Day, 1 Ves. 218; and 12 Ves. 472.

(c) Ex parte Cutts, 3 Dea. 267, Lord Cottenham.

(d) See note (b).

The first section of the Act, which renders a writing necessary for the creation of "all leases, estates, interests of freehold, or terms of years, or any uncertain interest, of, in or out of any lands, etc," has been held not to extend to a license; e. g., a license to A., in consideration of a yearly payment, to stack coals on a piece of ground for seven years, with the sole use of the land so employed (g): this decision, however, Sir E. Sugden observes (h), appears to be in the very teeth of the Statute; and, although it has been often followed (i), its authority seems to be destroyed by subsequent cases which decide that an casement cannot be granted without deed (j); it is also conceived that a parol executory agreement for such a license would probably he invalid; the words, "in or concerning," in the 1th section, being, apparently, more comprehensive than the words, "of, in, or out of," in the 1st section.

Any arrangement which is substantially, although not professedly, a sale of an interest in land, is within the 1th section, and requires a written contract: e.g., an agreement by a person possessed of a term for years, to give up possession to another, and allow him to become tenant for the remainder of the term, in consideration of his paying in part for certain repairs (k); or an agreement by the • termor to quit possession on a certain day, and pay all outgoings up to that time, in consideration of a sum of money to be paid to him by a party who has agreed with the landchapter VI.

Whether parol license is valid.

Semble, not.

Any agreement substantially for a Bale, is within the statute.

(e) Sug. 95.

(f) Barrett v. Rolph, 14 Mee. & W. 348.

(g) Wood v. Lake, Say. 3. (h) Sug. 97. (i) Ibid.

(j) See 1 Jarm. Conv. by S. 289, and cases there cited; and, in particular, Bird v. Higginson, 4 Nov. & M. 505.

(k) Buttemer v. Hages, 3 Jur. 704. lord for a lease of the premises on the termination of the subsisting term (l); or an agreement by a termor, under similar circumstances, that he will part with the land, and that the intended lessee shall take it (l).

So, a parol agreement by A. with an occupying tenant to pay him 100l., upon the tenant surrendering his lease, and procuring the landlord to accept A. as tenant, is void (m): nor can the tenant sue for the consideration, upon the contract, although he have performed his part of it; but he may sue upon an account stated, if, after such performance, A. have admitted that he is indebted to him in the amount of the consideration (m).

An agreement void under the 4th section, may, until countermanded, operate as a license, so as to excuse what would otherwise be trespass (n).

And the transfer in writing of a parol, and therefore void, agreement for purchase of an estate, will be a good consideration as between transferror and transferree, if the latter actually obtain a conveyance from the vendor (o): so, also, if an agent for purchase enter into a parol agreement, and pay the purchase-money, and procure a conveyance, he can sue his principal for the amount (p).

The 4th section has been held to extend to agreements for sale of shares in a Mining Company (q): but not of shares in a Railway Company; at least if the Act of Incorporation makes them personal estate (r).

Questions frequently arise as to the necessity for a written agreement for the sale of growing crops; the law upon the subject can hardly be considered as settled (s); but the following appears to be the general result of the authorities.

Void agreement may as a license excuse trespass.

Written transfer of parol agreement.

Mining but not Railway shares within the 4th sect.

Sale of growing crops.

(l) Smith v. Tombs, 3 Jur. 72.

(m) Cocking v. Ward, 1 C. B. R. 358.

(n) Carrington v. Roofs, 2 Mee. &. W. 248.

(o) Seaman v. Price, 1 Ry. & Moo. 195.

(p) Pawle v. Gunn, 4 Bing. N. S. 445.

(q) Boyce v. Greene, Batty, 608.

(r) Bradley v. Holdsworth, 3 Mee. & W. 422; Duncuft v. Albrecht, 12 Sim. 189; Aff. 199.

(s) Rug. 101.

The point to be determined in such cases is, whether the interest contracted for be an interest in land within the meaning of the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds; - in which case a written agreement is necessary; - or whether the contract be merely for the sale of chattels; in which case, however, unless the price be under 10l., there must, under the 17th section, be a written agreement or memorandum, or part payment of the price, or part acceptance of the goods.

An agreement for sale of the exclusive right to the vesture of land, or for sale of crops which would not go as emblements to the executor (t), as mowing grass (u), standing underwood, poles, or timber, is within the 4th section; nor, in the case of grass, does it appear to be material whether it is to be mowed or fed off by the purchaser; that is, if, in the latter case, he is to have the exclusive right to it (v): so, also, an agreement for the sale of growing fruit, (e.g., pears) (x), is within the 4th section.

But if the agreement be for sale of the crop after the seller shall have reduced it to a chattel by severance from the freehold, as where standing timber is to be felled by the vendor, the 4th section does not seem to apply (y): and the same distinction would, it is conceived, exist in agreements for the sale of gravel (z), stone, or other minerals: nor does the 4th section seem to affect sales of crops which would go as emblements (a): such as hops (b), wheat, potatoes, turnips, etc.: nor does it appear material in such cases whether the crop at the time of sale be ma-toe or otherwise, or whether it is to be removed by the buyer or seller, or to be paid for by the quantity, or by the acre; and even in the case of grass, if the vendor retain possession of the land, and the right of turning on his own cattle, and the purchaser have no right of severance, but only to feed it off along with the vendor, the agreement is merely for agistment, and is not within the 4th section (w): but in none of these cases is it prudent to dispense with a written contract.

Cases within the 4th sect.

Cases not within the 4th sect.

(t) See judgment in Evans v. Roberts, 5 B. & C. 829; Sug. 99.

(u) Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East, C02.

(v) See Jones v. Flint, 10 Ad. & E. 760.

(x) Rodwell v. Phillips, 9 Mee. & W. 501; sed qu. Whether so, if the crop is mature at the time of sale?

(y) Smith v. Surman, 9 B. & C. 561; and see 1 Cromp. & Mee. 105.

(z) See Coulton v. Ambler, 13 Mee. & W. 403.

(a) Sug. 100; but see Wadding-ton v. Bristow, 2 Bos. & P. 452.

(b) Evans v. Roberts, 5 B. & C. 829; see judgment; and Sug. 99.

And a parol agreement, for the sale of growing crops, which would otherwise be void under the 4th section, may be good as between outgoing and incoming tenants (x): but where a farm is let by parol, a sale of the growing crops by the lessor to the incoming tenant, seems to require a written contract under the 4th section (y).

And although an agreement be void under the 4th section, the seller, (except perhaps the parties be lessor and tenant,) can recover the value of the crop if it be taken or received by the purchaser: but he cannot recover on the terms of the agreement, but only on a quantum meruit (z).

A sale of tenant's fixtures by the tenant to the landlord, has been held not to be within the 4th section, although they be sold while attached to the freehold (a).

An agreement by a tenant to pay an increased sum by way of rent, in consideration of improvements to be made by the landlord, has been held not to be within the Act; and therefore to be valid although by parol (b): but a different rule has been laid down as respects an agreement for abatement of rent (d).

Parol agree ment good between tenants; but not as between lessor and incoming tenant;

Vendor's remedy if purchaser take the crop.

Parol agreement for sale of tenant's fixtures sufficient.

Agreement for increase, or abatement, of rent.

(to) Jones v. Flint, 10 Ad. & E. 7G0.

(x) Mayfield v. Wadsley, 3 B. & C. 357; and see Sug. 100.

(y) Lord Falmouth v. Thomas, 1 Cromp. & Mees. 89.

(z) 1 Cromp. & Mees. 109.

(a) Halter v. Runder, 1 Cr. M. & R. 266.

(b) Donnellan v. Reade, 3 B. & A. 899, 904; Holy v. Roebuck, 7 Taunt. 157.

If an agreement relating to the sale of land be void under the 4th section, it will also be void as respects any other matters which are either inseparably mixed up with, or are dependent upon, the principal agreement: e.g.; where a tenant agreed to rent a furnished house, and the landlord was to supply additional furniture after the tenant had taken possession, it was held, that the want of a written contract was a bar to an action for non-delivery of the furniture (e); so, upon a parol agreement to let a house, and to make certain repairs, which the tenant was to pay for, it was held that the landlord could not sue him for the cost of such repairs (f).