Dedication.

(n) R. v. Inhabitants of Wandsworth, (1817) 1 B. & Ald. 63; Bourke v. Davis, (1889) 44 Ch. D. 110, 122; it may be a cul de sac: A.-g. v. Richmond Corp., (1903) 89 L. T. 700. See also A.-g. v. Antrobus, 1905, 2 Ch. 188.

(o) Rugby Charity v. Merry weather, (1790) 11 Ea. 375, n., where a period of six years was held sufficient. As to dedication for a promenade, see Abercromby v. Fermoy Town Commrs., (1900) 1 Ir. R. 302; and generally as to dedication, see Pratt on Highways, 17th ed. 18; Simpson v. A.-g., 1904, A. C. 476.

(p) Behrens v. Richards, 1905, 2 Ch. 614, 619.

(q) A.-g. v. Antrobus, 1905, 2 Ch. 207; Whitehouse v. Hugh, 1906, 2 Ch. 285; Kirby v. Paignton U. D. C, 1913, 1 Ch. 337; Vine v. Wenham (1915), 84 L. J. Ch. 913; Kingston-on-hull v. N. E. R., 1915, 1 Ch. 456.

(r) Chinnock v. Hartley Rur. Co., (1899) 63 J. P. 327; and see A.-g. v. Esher Linoleum Co., 1901, 2 Ch. 647; 70 L. J. Ch. 808, where a private carriage-way was laid out adjacent to a public footway. See also Offin v. Rochford R. D. C, 1906, 1 Oh. 342; Tottenham U. D. C. v. Rowley, 1912, 2 Ch. 633.

(s) Robinson v. Cowpen Local Board, (1894) 63 L. J. Q. B. 235.

(t) Trustees of British Museum v. Finnis, (1832) 5 C. & P. 460.

(u) R. v. Petrie, (1855) 4 E. & B. 737; 24 L. J. Q. B. 166; G. W.r. Co. v. Solihull Rur. Co., (1902) 86 L. T. 852; Roberts v. James, (1903) 89 L. T. 282; Sheringham Urban Council v. Holsey, (1904) 2 L, G. R.

The effect of the diversion of an old road and the substitution of a new one under s. 16 of the R. C. C, 1845, seems to be to vest the old road in the original owner freed from the public right of way (z).

Effect of diversion of road.

The soil of a road, whether public or private, usque ad medium flum vice, is presumed to belong to the adjoining owners (a), and to pass by a conveyance of the adjoining land, even where the acreage of the land is stated, and the land is described by reference to a plan containing no portion of the highway (b). This presumption, however, may be rebutted by the special circumstances of the case (c). The presumption is one which applies both in town and country (d); but where a railway is a boundary, it has been held that the presumption in question is not applicable (e).

Presumption of ownership.

744; 68 J. P. 395; Corsellis v. L. C. C, 1908, 1 Ch. 13; cf. Coats v. Herefordshire C. C, 1909, 2 Ch. 579. As to an assent by a remainderman, see Farquhar v. Newbury B. D. C, 1909, 1 Ch. 12. The onus of displacing the presumption lies on the person seeking to deny the inference from the public user; Powers v. Bathurst, (1880) 49 L. J. Ch. 294; A.-g. v. Esher Linoleum Co., sup.; Friern Barnet Urb. Co. v. Bichardson, (1899) 62 J. P. 547; A.-g. v. Richmond (Mayor of), (1903) 89 L. T. 700.

(x) Dawes v. Hawkins, (1860) 8 C. B. N. S. 848; 29 L. J. C. P. 343; Harvey v. Truro Bur. Co., 1903, 2 Ch. 638; 72 L. J. Ch. 705. See St. Ives Corp. v. Wadsworth, (1908) 72 J. P. 73.

(y) lb.; Turner v. Bingwood Highway Board, (1870) 9 Eq. 418; A.-g. v. Watford B. D. C, 1912, 1 Ch. 417.

(z) Marquis of Salisbury v. G. N. B. Co., (1858) 5 C. B. N. S. 174; 28 L. J. C. P. 40; Melksham U. D. C. v. Gay, (1902) 18 T. L. R. 358.

(a) Berridge v. Ward, (1861) 10 C. B. N. S. 400; 30 L. J. C. P. 218; Haynes v. King, 1893, 3 Ch. 439; 63 L. J. Ch. 21. The presumption does not extend to a road not actually existing, but only intended to be made; Leigh v. Jack, (1879) 5 Ex. D. 264; 49 L. J. Ex. 220; Holmes v. Bellingham, (1859) 7 C. B. N. S. 329; 29 L. J. C. P. 132. But see as to highways under an urban sanitary authority, Public Health Act, 1875, ss. 4, 149; Coverdale v. Charlton, (1878) 4 Q. B. D. 104; 48 L. J. Q. B. 128; Mayor of Tunbridge Wells v. Baird, 1896, A. C. 434; 65 L. J. Q. B. 451; under Public Health (London) Act. 1891, s. 44, L. & N. W. B. Co. v. Westminster Corp., 1902, 1 Ch. 269; 71 L. J. Ch. 34; Westminster City Council v. Johnson, 1904, 2 K. B. 737; under a local authority, Metropolis Management Act, 1855, St. Mary Battersea Vestry v. County of London & Brush Prov. L. Co., 1899, 1 Ch. 474; 68 L. J. Ch. 238; under a county council, Local Government Act, 1888, Curtis v. Kesteven County Council, (1890) 45 Ch. D. 504; 63 L. T. 543; and see Copestaks v. W. Sussex C, C., 1911, 2 Ch. 331.

A right of private way is generally claimed by express grant or reservation; but such a grant has been presumed from an uninterrupted enjoyment of twenty years not shown to be merely permissive (f); and the presumption may bo raised, even where the land is in the occupation of a tenant, if the user has been of long duration, or there are other circumstances which prove that such user was with the knowledge of the owner of the inheritance (g), but not in favour of a tenant against his landlord (h).

Private way.

(b) Berridge v. Ward, sup.; Simpson v. Bendy, (1860) 8 C. B. N. S. 433, 472; Micklethwait v. Newlay Bridge Co., (1886) 33 Ch. D. 133. The soil of the road is not boundary, but part of the property sold, and stands on the same footing as to payment; Re Popple and Barratt, (1877) 25 W. E. 248; Central London R. Co. v. City of London Land Tax Commrs., 1911, 2 Ch. 467. As to the soil under a railway, see Thompson v. Hickman, 1907, 1 Ch. 550.

(c) Pryor v. Petre, 1894, 2 Ch. 11; 63 L. J. Ch. 531; Mappin v. Liberty, 1903, 1 Ch. 118; 72 E. J. Ch. 63; and see 1911, 2 Ch. p. 473.

(d) Re White's Charities, 1898,1 Ch. 659; 67 E. J. Oh. 430; University College, Oxford v. Corp. of Oxford, (1904) 68 J. P. 470; but see L. & N. W. R. Co. v. Westminster Corp., 1902, 1 Ch. p. 279.

(e) Thompson v. Hickman, 1907, 1 Ch. 550.

(f) Campbell v. Wilson, (1803) 3 Ea. 294; and as to a private right of way or for boating, see Bourke v. Davis, (1889) 44 Ch. D. 110; 62 L. T. 34; and a grant extends to licensees though not expressly mentioned; Baxendale v. North Lambeth Club, 1902, 2 Ch. 427; 71 E. J. Ch. 806; and see Milner's Safe Co., Ltd. v. G. N. & City R., 1907, 1 Ch. 208.