(o) Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273; Allcard v. Skinner, 36 Ch. D. 145, 171, 181 sq.; and cases cited above, pp. 757, 758.

(p) Hindson v. Weatherill, 5 De G. M. & G. 301; Boyse v. Rossborough, 6 H. L. C. 2, 49; Walker v. Smith, 29 Beav. 394; Hall v. Hall, L. B. 1 P. & M. 481; Parfitt v. Lawless, L. E. 2 P. & M. 462, 469, 470.

(q) Above, p. 758, nn. (e), (l).

It includes the duty of communicating facts material to the value.

Non-disclosure of these avoids the sale.

Purchase by trustee from cestui-quetrust.

(r) Above, p. 758, n. (e).

(s) See Popham v. Brooke, 5 Russ. 8; Edwards v. Meyrick, 2 Hare, 60, 68 - 70, 74. 75; Holman v. Loynes, 4 De G. M. & G. 270. It was held in Edwards v. Mey-rich that a purchase by a solicitor from his client was not avoided by the mere fact that he had not pointed out to his client, that it was possible that a railway might at some future time be made near the land sold, which would increase its value, no project for making such railway being then actually on foot. It is conceived that a solicitor purchasing from his client would not be justified in concealing from him any fact known to himself which would certainly tend to increase the value of the property, as that a project was actually on foot for making railway through or near it; and it seems immaterial that the information was not acquired in the course of his employment as that client's solicitor, but from an entirely distinct source.

(t) Tate v. Williamson, L. R. 2 Ch. 55.

(u) Above, p. 758.

(x) Cane v. Allen, 2 Dow. 289, 291, 299; Molony v. Kernan, 2 Dr. & War. 31.

(y) Selsey v. Rhoades, 2 S. & S. 41, 49, 1 Bligh, N. S. 1.

(z) Tate v. Williamson, L. R. 2 Ch. 55.

(a) Expte. Lacey, 6 Ves. 625, 626; Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234, 247; Denton v. Bonner, 23 Beav. 285, 290; Luff v. Lord, 34 Beav. 220, 227; Cairns, C, Thomson v. Eastwood, 2 App. Cas. 215, 236; Plowright v. Lambert, 52 L. T. 646; Dougan v. Mac-pherson, 1902, A. C. 197, 204.

How far a solicitor buying: from his client must see that the client has independent advice.

Solicitor or adviser buying from client after the relation has been severed.

Trustee so buying from cestui-que-trust.

The following further examples may be given of the exercise of undue influence as a ground for setting aside a sale. They appear to fall principally within the first of the above-mentioned classes of cases (g); but in some of them we shall observe the like presumption of undue influence and shifting of the burthen of proof as occurs in the second class. They all illustrate the generality of the rule, that a contract or conveyance is voidable in equity whenever such pressure has been used by one party to induce the other to make it that the other was not a free agent in giving his consent. It will be noticed that in some instances the conduct of the party in fault amounted or approximated to fraud. A contract has been avoided where it was procured by giving the contractor to understand that, unless he made it, his son would be prosecuted for forgery (h). A conveyance was set aside, which had been made under pressure of the threat of preventing the grantor from being accepted as tenant of a farm; this being a necessary condition of taking a benefit under his father's will (i). A sale of land was rescinded where it had been obtained by three brothers from their eldest brother without adequate consideration, when he was under pressure for want of money, ignorant of his rights, and either without legal advice, or with advice meant to promote the interests of those with whom he was dealing. The eldest brother was in fact entitled to the whole of the land as tenant in tail, but supposed that he was only entitled to one-fourth of it; the others were aware of the true facts (k). So a sale will be set aside where there were such circumstances of inequality in the contracting parties' position and unfairness in the terms of the bargain that the only reasonable inference is that the one took advantage of the other's position to influence his will (l). Thus a sale of land obtained at a great undervalue from an aged, illiterate and weak-minded man was avoided by his heir after his death (m); and so was a sale made by a poor and illiterate man on terms very disadvantageous to him in his last illness and without any independent advice (n). And in several other cases Courts of Equity have set aside sales made at an undervalue by persons in a humble condition of life unacquainted or imperfectly acquainted with their rights or with the value of the property and acting without independent advice (o). So sales of an equity of redemption made by the mortgagor to the mortgagee have been avoided where there was pressure put upon the mortgagor to sell and inequality of position, coupled with undervalue (p); although there is no general rule, which prohibits a mortgagee from buying the equity of redemption (q). Where such circumstances as above mentioned of inequality of position and absence of independent advice are shown, the burthen of proof is shifted, as in the case of the establishment of a confidential relation (r); and it then lies on the person, who took the benefit of the sale, to make out that the terms of the transaction were in fact fair and reasonable and the other party acted freely in accepting them (s).

Examples of the exercise of undue influence.

(b) Edwards v. Meyrick, 2 Hare, 60; Spencer v. Topham, 23 Beav. 573; Pisani v. A.-G. for Gibraltar, L. R. 5 P. C. 516; and see cases cited above, p. 758, n. (f), and Cane v. Allen, 2 Dow, 289.

(c) See Harrison v. Guest, 6 De G. M. & G. 424, 432; Barnard v. Hunter, 2 Jur. N. S. 1213; Denton v. Bonner, 23 Beav. 285, 291; Pisani v. A.-G. for Gibraltar, L. R. 5 P. C. 516, 540.

(d) Rhodes v. Bate, L. R. 1 Ch.

252; Liles v. Terry, 1895, 2 Q. B. 679; Barron v. Willis, 1900, 2 Ch. 121, affirmed, 1902, A. C. 271; Wright v. Carter, 1903, 1 Ch. 27.