The mortgagee in possession is required to account for rents and profits when the person seeking to redeem is a junior mortgagee as well as when he is the mortgagor himself, the junior mortgagee representing the mortgagor for this purpose.77 And this has been held to be the case even though the mortgagee.

73. Hodges v. Verner, 100 Ala. 6l2, .13 So. 679; Ray v. Pitman, 119 Ga. 678. 46 S. B. 849; Way v. Muliett, 143 Mass. 49, 8 N. E. 881; Hoopes v. Bailey, 28 Miss. 328; Jopling v. Walton, 138 Mo. 48",, 40 S. W. 99; Eastman v. Thayer, 60 N. H. 408; Berkman v. Frost, 18 Johns.. (N. Y.) 544, 9 Am. Dec. 246; Marshall v. Stewart, 17 Ohio, 356; Jones v. Porter. 29 Tex. 456; American Bean & Trust Co v. Atlanta Elec. R. Co., 99 Fed. 313. But see contra, Nye v. Swan, 49 Minn. 431. 52 N. W. 39; Beach v. Cooke, 28 N. Y. 508, 86 Am. Dec.. 260; Casserly v. Withevbee. 119 N. Y. 522,' 23 N. E. 1000.

74. Horn v. Indianapolis Nat. Bank, 125 Ind. 381, 9 L. R. A. 676,

21 Am. St. Rep. 231, 25 N, E. 558; De Leonis v. Walsh, 140 Cal. 175. 73. Pac. 813; Smith v. Conner, 65 Ala. 371.

75. See Williams v. Norton 139 Ala. 402, 36 So. 11; Bartlett v. Fellows, 47 Me. 53; Doody v. Pierce, 9 Allen (Mass.) 141; Mer-riam v. Goss, 139 Mass. 77. 28 N. E. 449; Shouler v. Bonander, SO Mich. 531, 45 N. W. 487; Bellows v. Stone, 18 N. H. 465; Ross v. Eoardman, 22 Hun. (N. Y.) 527; McDonald v. McBeod, 36 N. C. 221; Reeder v. Trullinger, 151 Pa. St. 2S7, 24 Atl. 1104; Feamster v. Withrow, 9 W. Va. 296.

76. into, Sec. 613(C).

77. Long v Richards, 170 mass 120, 64 Aim. St. Rep. 281, 48 N. E 1083; Clark v. paquette. 67 Vl.

One in possession under an absolute deed intended as a mortgage is regarded as a mortgagee in possession and as such required to account for rents and profits.82

A purchaser at foreclosure sale is, if the mortgagor or the mortgagor's transferee was not a party to the proceeding, in the position of a mortgagee in possession, and as such is bound to account for rents and profits.83 But if the mortgagor or his successor in interest was made a party, the purchaser at the sale acquires the mortgagor's interest and will be regarded as taking possession on the strength of such title, and consequently will not ordinarily be required to account as a mortgagee in possession upon a proceeding to redeem by a junior lienor, who was not a party to the foreclosure proceeding,84 unless the foreclosure was for some other reason invalid.85

681, 32 Atl. 812; Gaskell v. Vi-quesney, 122 Ind. 244, 17 Am. St. Rep. 364, 23 N. E. 791.

78. Harrison v. Wyse, 24 Conn. 1 63 Am. Dec. 151; Clark v. Paquette, 67 Vt. 681, 32 Atl. 812.

79. Hart v. Chase, 46 Conn. 207.

80. Adler-Goldman Commission Co v. Herren, 65 Ark. 229, 45 S. W. 543; Rogers v. Herren, 92 111. 583; Gray v. Nelson, 77 Iowa, 63, 41 N. W. 566.

81. Anderson v. Lauterman. 27

Ohio St. 104; Moore v. Degraw, 5 N. J. Eq. 346.

82. Harrill v. Stapleton, 55 Ark. 1, 16 S. W. 474; Clark v. Finlon, 90 111. 245; Miller v. Peter, 158 Mich. 336, 122 N. W. 780; Cookes v. Culbertson, 9 Nev. 199.

83. Gaskell v. Viquesney, 122 Ind. 244, 17 Am. St. Rep. 364, 23 N. E. 791; Sloane v. Lucas, 37 Wash. 348, 79 Pac. 949.

The decree in a proceeding to redeem is framed in such a manner as finally to fix and adjust the rights of the parties with reference to the mortgaged land and the debt secured by the mortgage, ordinarily providing in effect for the satisfaction or release of the mortgage on the records, or the reconveyance of the legal title, upon the payment of the amount found to be due,86 a time being named in the decree within which the payment must be made.87 The time thus to be allowed is usually a matter within the sound discretion of the court,88 a reasonable time being allowed, having regard to the circumstances and justice of the case.89 A failure to pay the amount found due within the time named in the decree, resulting in a dismissal the surety is, on paying it, entitled to the benefit of such mortgage, being in equity regarded as the assignee thereof.92 And payment is, for this purpose, to be regarded as made by the person from whose funds it is made, although another is the actual agent in the transaction.93

84. Longino v. Ball-Warren Commission Co., 84 Ark. 521, 106 S. W. 682; Gaskell v. Viquesney, 122 Ind. 244, 17 Am. St. Rep 364, 23 N. E. 791; Gault v. Equitable Trust Co., 100 Ky. 578, 38 S. W. 1065; Penard v. Brown, 7 Neb. 449. Contra, Ten Eyck v. Casad, 15 Iowa, 524.

85. Hannon v. Hilliard, 83 Ind. 363; Long v. Richards, 170 Mass. 120, 64 Am. St. Rep. 281, 48 N. E 1083.

86. Bremer v. Calumet & C Canal & Dock Co., 127 111. 464, 18 N. E. 321; Dennett v. Codman, 158 Mass. 371, 33 N. E. 574; Mc-Kenna v. Kirkwood, 50 Mich. 544, 15 N. W. 898; Perine v. Dunn, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 140; Martin v. Ratcliff, 101 Mo. 254, 20 Am. St. Rep. 605, 13 S. W. 1051.

87. Cline v. Robbins, 112 Cal. 581, 44 Pac. 1023; Collins v. Gregg, 109 Iowa, 506, 80 N. W. 562; Pitman v. Thornton, 66 Me. 469;

Dennett v. Codman, 158 Mass. 371, 33 N. E. 574; Sloane v. Lucas, 37 Wash. 348, 79 Pac. 949.

88. Perine v. Dunn, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 140; Clark v. Rey-burn, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 318, 19 L. Ed. 354. .

89. In Taylor v. Dillenburg, 168 111. 235, 48 N. E. 41, the period of thirty days, allowed by the lower court, was regarded as insufficient, the sum to be paid being over six thousand dollars. In Murphy v. New Hampshire Sav. Bank, 63 N. H. 362, a year was decided to be the proper period, in analogy to certain periods fixed by statute as to the redemption and discharge of mortgages. And in Lindsey v. Delano, 78 Iowa, 350, 43 N. W. 218, it was held that if a junior mortgagee was, though a nominal party to a foreclosure proceeding, not served until after the sale, he should be allowed only nine months to redeem, by analogy to of the proceeding to redeem, involves in effect a foreclosure.90