A revocable license to be exercised on the grantor's land may be granted by parol.51 A license is a permission or authority to enter the land and do certain acts or series of acts, the parties not intending to convey any interest in the land; and it is well settled that such a license need not be in writing, under the statute of frauds. Thus a license to enter land to and cut timber, or to gather the growing crops, is valid, though not in writing.52 So an agreement for a seat in a theater or other place of amusement, is a license merely.53 So, ordinarily, an agreement for lodgings in a hotel or boarding-house, though the rooms the boarder is to occupy are designated, does not create an interest in land, but is merely a license.54 Again an oral agreement to permit the use of a hall for dancing parties on the afternoons of four specified holidays, at a stipulated price for each afternoon, where the key is retained by the owner, who opens, lights and closes the hall on the dates mentioned, constitutes a license to use the hall, and not a contract for the sale of an interest in land, within the statute of frauds.55 If however, the license is an irrevocable one for a period of more than one year it must be in writing.56

45 E. G., Illinois.

46 Smalley vs. Mitchell, 110 Mich., 660.

47 Brown vs. Kayser, 60 Wis., 1;

18 N. W. 523.

48 Ridgley vs.Stillwell, 28 Mo., 400;

Bluementhal vs. Blooming-dale, 100 N. Y., 658; 3 N. E, 292. 49 Condert vs. Conn, 118 N. Y., 309; 23 N. E., 298, 7 L. A., 69.

50 Plunkett vs. Meredith, 77 S. W., 600; Dillon vs. Croak, 11 Bush., 321; Cook vs. Stearns, 11 Mass., 533.

51 Collins Co. vs. Marcy, 25 Conn., 242; Sovereign vs. Ortmann, 47 Mich., 181, 10 N. W., 191; Miller vs. Auburn, etc., R. Co., 6 Hill, 61.

The transfer of mere possessory rights may be carried out by mere change of possession without writing; and it has been held that the possession of successive adverse holders can be connected so as to make up the statutory period necessary to bar the true owner even though no deed passed between them.57

Equitable interests can neither be assigned,58 nor surrendered by parol.59

A voidable or unenforceable deed is not made valid by an oral confirmation or ratification.60 A contract entered into between a person desiring to purchase land and one who claims ownership of the same, which recites that title to such land is in a third person, and in which contract such claimant does not assume to act as agent for such third person, but agrees only to procure from him a deed to such land, is not under the statute of frauds, a sufficient contract of sale by such third person, even though he knew of and orally assented to the making of the same.61

52 Whitmareh vs. Walker, 1 Metc,

313. 53 McCrea vs. Marsh, 12 Gray, 211;

Burton vs. Scherpf, 1 Allen,

133. 54 White vs. Maynard, I11 Mass.,

250. 55 Johnson vs. Wilkinson, 139 Mass.,

3, 29 N. E., 62.

56 De Montagne vs. Bacharach, 183

Mass., 256, 63 N. E., 435. 57 20 Cyc, 221; Thompason vs.

Ditton, 69 S. W., 641. 58 Darling vs. Butler, 45 Fed., 332;

10 L. R. A., 469; Hogg vs.

Wilkins, 1 Grant, 67. 59 Millard vs. Hathaway, 27 Cal.,

119. 60 Price vs. Hart, 29 Mo., 171.

Resulting and constructive trusts are expressly excepted from the operation of the statute,62 but any other trust must be created by writing.63 In Godschalck vs. Fulner,64 the Court said on this point: "Section 9 of the statute of frauds (Rev. St., c. 59) provides 'that all declarations or creations of trusts or confidence of any lands, tenements or hereditaments shall be manifested and proved by some writing signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust * * * or else they shall be utterly void and of no effect.' We have uniformly held that agreements like that set up in this bill are, under that section, null and void, unless manifested or proved by some writing signed by the trustee. There is no such proof in this record. It is true resulting trusts, or those created by construction, implication, or operation of law, need not be in writing, but may be proved by parol. But we have also held that, where there is an express trust, there cannot be a resulting or implied trust. Stevenson vs. Crappnell, 114 I11., 19, 28, N. E. 379; Kingsbury vs. Burnside, 58 I11., 310.

"It is said by counsel for appellant that if one procures a conveyance to himself, and promises to recovery to another, and afterwards refuses to do so, he cannot set up the statute of frauds. This proposition is true, the reason being that the title in such case is obtained by fraud and imposition. But here the bill expressly states that the title was taken in the name of Ruben H. Fulmer, by and with the complainant's consent, to be held by him until she paid off the $1,500 lien.

61 Deiderick vs. Alexander, 58 Kan.,

56, 48 O. ac, 594. 62 See text of Statute in Appendix O, Volume I.

63 Gallagher vs. Mars, 50 Cal., 23;

Thompson vs. Elliott, 28 Ind.,

55. 64 176 ill., 64, 51 N. E., 852.

"The case is reargued with much earnestness upon the theory that the bill is one to enforce the specific performance of a contract, and the well-known rule that courts of equity will enforce a specific performance within the statute of frauds, when the parol agreement has been partly carried into execution, is quoted and relied upon. The doctrine is not only firmly established, but rests upon sound reason and justice. That principle, however, has no application to an action to compel the execution of an express trust."

The following agreements have been held valid although not in writing; not to make a certain use of land;65 not to sell land for less that a certain sum;66 to act as agent for another in buying 67 or selling68 land, or to devise real estate.69