"William Barnicoat, called as a witness by the defendants, testified that he was chief engineer of the Fire Department in Boston, in 1837, and for several years after; that alarms of fire were frequent before the said advertisement in May, 1837; but that from that time till the close of the year 1841 there were but few fires in the city.

"As the only question in the case was, whether said offer of reward continued to be in force when the Armory House was burnt, the case was taken from the jury, by consent of the parties, under an agreement that the defendants should be defaulted, or the plaintiffs become nonsuit, as the full Court should decide."

The decision of the Court was in part as follows: "The ground of defence is, that the advertisement, offering the reward of $1,000 for the detection and conviction of persons setting fire to buildings in the city, was issued almost four years before the time at which the plaintiffs arrested Marriott and prosecuted him to conviction; that this reward was so offered, in reference to a special emergency in consequence of several alarming fires; that the advertisement was withdrawn and discontinued, that the recollection of it had passed away; that it was obsolete, and by most persons forgotten; and that it could not be regarded as a perpetually continuing offer on the part of the city.

"We are then first to look at the terms of the advertisement, to see what the offer was. It is competent to the party offering such reward to propose his own terms; and no person can entitle himself to the promised reward without a compliance with all its terms. The first advertisement offering the reward demanded in this action was published March 26, 1837, offering a reward of $500; and another on the day following, increasing it to $1,000. No time is inserted, in the notice, within which the service is to be done for which the reward is claimed. It is therefore relied on as an unlimited and continuing offer.

"In the first place, it is to be considered that this is not an ordinance of the city government, of standing force and effect; it is an act temporary in its nature, emanating from the executive branch of the city government, done under the exigency of a special occasion indicated by its terms, and continued to be published but a short time. Although not limited in its terms, it is manifest, we think, that it could not have been intended to be perpetual, or to last ten or twenty years, or more; and therefore must have been understood to have some limit. It was insisted, in the argument, that it had no limit but the Statute of Limitations. But it is obvious that the Statute of Limitations would not operate so as to make six years from the date of the offer a bar. The offer of a reward is a proposal made by one party, and does not become a contract, until acted upon by the performance of the sendee by the other, which is the acceptance of such offer, and constitutes the agreement of minds essential to a contract. The six years, therefore, would begin to run only from the time of the service performed and the cause of action accrued, which might be ten, or twenty, or fifty years from the time of the offer, . and would in fact leave the offer itself unlimited by time.

"Supposing then, that, by fair implication, there must be some limit to this offer, and there being no limit in terms, then by a general rule of law it must be limited to a reasonable time - that is - the service must be done within a reasonable time after the offer made.

"What is a reasonable time, when all the facts and circumstances are proved on which it depends, is a question of law. To determine it, we are first to consider the objects and purposes for which such reward is offered. The principal object obviously must be, to awaken the attention of the public, to excite the vigilance and stimulate the exertions of police officers, watchmen and citizens generally, to the detection and punishment of offenders. Possibly, too, it may operate to prevent offences, by alarming the fears of those who are under temptation to commit them, by inspiring the belief that the public are awake, that any suspicious movement is watched, and that the crime cannot be committed with impunity. To accomplish either of these objects, such offer of a reward must be notorious, known and kept in mind by the public at large; and, for that purpose, the publication of the offer, if not actually continued in newspapers, and placarded at conspicuous places, must have been recent. After the lapse of years, and after the publication of the offer has been long discontinued, it must be presumed to be forgotten by the public generally, and if known at all, known only to a few individuals who may happen to meet with it in an old newspaper. The expectation of benefit, then, from such a promise of reward, must in a great measure have ceased. Indeed, every consideration arising from the nature of the case confirms the belief that such offer of reward, for a special service of this nature, is not unlimited and perpetual in its duration, but must be limited to some reasonable time. The difficulty is in fixing it. One circumstance, perhaps a slight one, is, that the act is done by a board of officers, who themselves are annual officers. But as they act for the city, which is a permanent body, and exercise its authority for the time being, and as such a reward might be offered near the end of the year, we cannot necessarily limit it to the time for which the same board of mayor and alderman have to serve; though it tends to mark the distinction between a temporary act of one branch and a permanent act of the whole city government.

"We have already alluded to the fact of the discontinuance of the advertisement, as one of some weight. It is some notice to the public that the exigency has passed, for which such offer of a reward was particularly intended. And though such discontinuance is not a revocation of the offer, it proves that those who made it no longer hold it forth conspicuously as a continuing offer for any considerable term of time afterward.

"But it is not necessary, perhaps not proper, to undertake to fix a precise time, as reasonable time; it must depend on many circumstances. It is somewhat analogous to the case of notes payable on demand, where the question formerly was, within what time such note must be presented, and, in case of dishonor, notice be given, in order to charge the indorser. In the earliest reported case on the subject Field vs. Nicker-son, 13 Mass., 131, the Court went no farther than to decide that eight months was not a reasonable time for that purpose.

"Under the circumstances of the present case, the Court are of opinion, that three years and eight months is not a reasonable time within which, or rather to the extent of which, the offer in question can be considered as a continuing offer on the part of the city. In that length of time, the exigency under which it was made having passed, it must be presumed to have been forgotten by most of the officers and citizens of the community, and cannot be presumed to have been before the public as an actuating motive to vigilance and exertion of this subject; nor could it justly and reasonably have been so understood by the plaintiffs. We are therefore of opinion, that the offer of the city had ceased before the plaintiffs accepted and acted upon it as such, and that consequently no contract existed upon which this action, founded on an alleged express promise, can be maintained. Plaintiffs nonsuit."

(3) An offer will also be held to be terminated by a counter offer or a modified acceptance on the part of the person to whom the offer is made on the theory that such counter offer or modified acceptance is a rejection of the original offer; it being a well settled principle that if a party once rejects an offer he cannot afterwards accept it so as to render the party making the offer bound. On this point, the Supreme Court of the United States says, in Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. vs. Columbus Rolling Mill:13 "The rules of law which govern this case are well settled. As no contract is complete without the mutual assent of the parties, an offer to sell imposes no obligation until it is accepted according to its terms. So long as the offer has been neither accepted nor rejected, the negotiation remains open, and imposes no obligation upon either party. The one may decline to accept, or the other may withdraw his offer; and either rejection or withdrawal leaves the matter as if no offer had ever been made. A proposal to accept, or an acceptance, upon terms varying from those offered, is a rejection of the offer, and puts an end to the negotiation, unless the party who made the original offer renews it, or assents to the modification suggested. The other party, having once rejected the offer, cannot afterward revive it by tendering an acceptance of it. Eliason vs. Henshaw, 4 Whea-ton, 225; Carr vs. Duval, 14 Pet., 77; National Bank vs. Hall, 101 U. S., 43, 50; Hyde vs. Wrench, 3 Beavan, 334; Fox vs. Turner, 1 Bradwell, 153."

13 119 U. S., 149.

(4) Finally an offer may be terminated by the death or the insanity of the party.14 In Pratt vs. Trustees of the Baptist Society of Elgin:15 "The promise, in such case, stands as a mere offer, and may, by necessary implication, be revoked at any time before it is acted upon. It is the expending of money, etc., or incurring of legal liability on the faith of a promise, which gives the right of action, and without which there is no right of action. Until acted upon, there is no mutuality, and being only an offer, and susceptible of revocation at any time before being acted upon, it follows that the death of the promisor, before the offer is acted upon, is a revocation of the offer. . . . The continuance of an offer is in the nature of its constant repetition, which, of course, necessarily requires some one capable of making a repetition. Obviously this can no more be done by a dead man than a contract can, in the first instance, be made by a dead man."

14 Busher vs. Ins. Co., 72 N. H., 551. 58 A., 413; Pratt vs. Trustees, 93 I11., 425.

15 93 Ill., 475.