"In support of the contention that the acceptance was not complete till the letter of acceptance reached its destination, it was urged that until that event the acceptor might have interrupted or prevented the completion of the contract by recalling or revoking his acceptance, - that he might have sent the recall by the same or a more rapid conveyance, so that it would be received as soon as, or sooner than, the acceptance; and upon the authority of the case of Lady Dunmore, it was argued that if this had been done the acceptance would not have been binding. Then, combining that proposition with the general rule that in matters of contract both must be bound or neither, it was argued that, as the acceptor, was not irrevocably bound till his acceptance was received, neither could the offerer be bound. I think that here the argument for the defender partook of ingenious subtleties, and a straining of general rules to extremes. In the first place, the authorities we have on the subject of the power of an acceptor to revoke or recall his acceptance are very scanty, if indeed the doctrine of revocation or recall is at all applicable to an acceptance, which I much doubt. In strict language recall or revocation, which applies to an act already complete, but which the party is entitled to annul, cannot be applicable to an acceptance, which, once it is fully made by the acceptor, completes the contract, and leaves nothing more to be done or agreed to by either party. In the second place, I think there is a manifest distinction in principle between the mere abstaining from doing a thing which would be necessary to be done before you could be held to have completed your act, and that conduct which consists in a subsequent active interference set on foot for the purpose of undoing or counteracting the legal consequences of a thing you have already done, to the full extent that was required of you. When the letter of acceptance was put into the post office there was nothing more to be done by the acceptor personally; whether he could interfere so as to counteract or annul the legal consequences that would have followed from what he had already done if he had thenceforth remained inactive, may be a question, and may depend on the circumstances, and on the character of the interference; - we have no such question here. But in the case of Lady Dunmore effect is said to have been given to something of that kind as sufficient to prevent the completion of the contract ; that was a very peculiar case. In the first place, the correspondence there was not between the principals directly; there was an interposed person acting in some respects for both. In the second place, the two letters from the same party were received at the same time, the second undoing what the first proposed to do; and it appears to have been held that both were to be regarded as one writing, - the second letter as a postscript to the first, - and that so regarding them, the construction of the writing, taken as a whole, was hostile to the idea of a contract. But where there is no such postscript, no question as to the writing which is to be taken as the answer to the offer, no interference by the acceptor to undo or explain what he has already done, - when he has given away his written acceptance to that messenger to whom he was invited or authorized to intrust it, and has done so not for the purpose of being retained as for himself, but for the opposite purpose of being held for the offerer until given into his own hands, when that purpose has never been departed from, I think that we are out of the case of Lady Dunmore, and of any principle on which that decision can be held to have proceeded.

"These are the grounds on which I think that if the offer of 26th November is to be regarded as free from any condition except the implied condition of accepting, the acceptance posted on 1st December, must be held to have completed the contract, and that the letter of recall, which was in due course received the day after the acceptance had been posted, did not interrupt the completion of the contract, although the recall may have been posted before the acceptance was posted, or may have been received before the acceptance was received."

The question of a contract made by telegraph was considered by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Brauer vs. Shaw.24 In this case, an offer by the defendant to let cattle space in a steamship, subject to prompt reply was wired at 11:30 a. m. and received by plaintiff at 12:16 p. m. At 12:28 p. m. plaintiff telegraphed an acceptance, which did not reach defendant till 1:20 p. m. and in the meantime at 1 p. m., the latter wired a revocation, which plaintiff received at 1:43 p. m. It was held that the defendants were bound, the court saying in part: "If, then, the offer was outstanding when it was accepted the contract was made. But the offer was outstanding. At the time when the acceptance was received, even the revocation of the offer had not been received. It seems to us a reasonable requirement that, to disable the plaintiffs from accepting their offer, the defendants should bring home to them the actual notice that it had been revoked. By their choice and act, they brought about a relation between themselves and the plaintiffs, which the plaintiffs could turn into a contract by an act on their part, and authorized the plaintiffs to understand and to assume that that relation existed. When the plaintiffs acted in good faith on the assumption the defendants could not complain. Knowingly to lead a person reasonably to suppose that you offer, and to offer, are the same thing. The offer must be made before the acceptance, and it does not matter whether it is made a longer or a shorter time before, if, by its express or implied terms, it is outstanding at the time of the acceptance. Whether much or little time has intervened, it reaches forward to the moment of the acceptance and speaks then. It would be monstrous to allow an inconsistent act of the offerer, not known or brought to the notice of the offeree, to affect the making of the contract."

24 46 N. E., 617.