Either party may make use of the mail or telegraph for the transmission of his offer or acceptance. The party using the mail adopts it as his agent and the contract is completed the moment the acceptance is mailed.20 A party receiving an offer by mail has the Watson vs. Russell, 149 N. Y., 388, 44 N. E., 161; Hamilton vs. Insurance Co., 5 Pa. St., 339. But in Massachusetts the rule is that the contract is not completed until the acceptance has been received right to assume that the offer remains open for a reasonable time, unless he receives notice of its withdrawal, and if he mails his acceptance within such reasonable time the contract is complete, even if a letter withdrawing such offer has been mailed to him.21 If the acceptance is properly mailed the making of the contract is not defeated by the fact that such acceptance is never received.22

16 Columbus, H. V. & T. Ry. Co. vs. Gaffney, 65 Ohio St., 104, 61 N. E., 152.

17 See cases already cited in chapter to effect that offer will be revoked by lapse of time.

18 Smith vs. Ingram 90 Ala., 529,

8 South Rep., 144; Wetmore vs. Mell, 1 Ohio St., 26; Stur-ges vs. Robbins, 7 Mass., 301.

19 Crook vs. Cowan, 64 N. C., 743.

20 Mactier vs. Frith, 6 Wend, 103;

The question of acceptance by mail was discussed in Thomson vs. James23 in a very exhaustive opinion from which the following extracts have been taken.

"This action has been brought by the trustees of Mr. Keir of Renniston against Mr. James of Samies-ton to obtain implement of a contract said to have been completed by certain letters or missives for the purchase and sale of the estate of Renniston.

"The facts as averred are few and simple. On 26th November, 1853, Mr. James wrote, and transmitted by post from the country, a letter addressed to Mr. Thomson (one of the pursuers) making an offer or proposal for the purchase of Renniston at £6,400. The letter was received by Mr. Thomson in Edinburgh on the 28th of November, and was acknowledged on the same day by a letter in which Mr. Thomson said he would communicate with the parties, and give their decision with the least possible delay; and on 1st December, Mr. Thomson posted at Edinburgh a written acceptance of Mr. James' offer. That letter of acceptance was addressed to Mr. James, and was received by him in the country, in due course of post, on 2nd December. There is no question raised as to the formality of these writings, or as to their sufficiency to constitute a binding contract for the purchase and sale of Renniston, if the acceptance had been received by Mr. James before he had done anything to withdraw the offer. But before Mr. James received the letter of acceptance he changed his mind; and on the 1st of December (being the day before the acceptance reached him), he posted at Jedburgh a letter addressed to Mr. Thomson recalling the offer. That letter was received by Mr. Thomson in Edinburgh on the 2nd of December. As to all these facts the parties are agreed. The defender, Mr. James, makes some additional averments which are not admitted by the pursuers, and the relevancy of which is disputed. These additional averments are, - 1st, That the letter of recall was posted at Jedburgh, not only before the letter of acceptance was received, but before the letter of acceptance was posted at Edinburgh; and 2nd, That the letter of recall was delivered to the defender in the country. * * *

21 Wheat vs. Cross, 31 Md., 99; Kempner vs. Cohn, 47 Ark., 519; 1 S. W., 869

22 Bishop vs. Eaton, 161 Mass., 496;

37 N. E., 665; Haas vs. Myers,

I11 111., 426. 23 18 Dunlap, 1.

"The real question in issue between the parties is, whether the offer was recalled before it was accepted. The defense against the action is, that the offer was recalled before it was accepted.

"I hold that a simple unconditional offer may be recalled at any time before acceptance, and that it may be so recalled by a letter transmitted by post; but I hold that the mere posting of a letter of recall does not make that letter effectual as a recall, so as from the moment of posting to prevent the completion of the contract by acceptance. An offer is nothing until it is communicated to the party to whom it is made, and who is to decide whether he will or will not accept the offer. In like manner I think the recall or withdrawal of an offer that has been communicated can have no effect until the recall or withdrawal has been communicated, or may be assumed to have been communicated, to the party holding the offer. An offer, pure and unconditional, puts it in the power of the party to whom it is addressed to accept the offer, until the lapse of a reasonable time he has lost the right, or until the party who has made the offer gives notice, - that is, makes known that he withdraws it. The purpose of the recall is to prevent the party to whom the offer was made from acting upon the offer by accepting it. This necessarily implies precommuni-cation to the party who is to be so prevented. * * * "Upon the grounds now indicated, I hold that the mere putting of the letter of recall into a distant post office before the acceptance was sent off did not put an end to the offer and exclude the power of the offeree to bind the offerer by accepting the offer. I hold that a letter of recall has no effect till the recall has become known to the offeree, or should in due course, have become known to him. In the present case the letter of recall reached its destination on 2d December, and on that day became known to the pursuers. The letter of acceptance had been posted on the preceding day, the 1st of December; but it is averred that it has not reached its destination when the recall was received on the morning of the 2d. I hold, that, in the circumstances averred, the delivery and receipt of the letter of recall did not interrupt or prevent the completion of the contract. I do not think the principle to which I have referred, as that applicable to the recall of an offer, applies equally to the acceptance of an offer; or that everything which must be done, in order to effectuate the recall of an offer, must, in like manner, be done in order to give effect to the acceptance of an offer. The two things are in their nature different. The one consists in effectually undoing something that the party himself has already done, and which binds him unless it is effectually undone; the other consists in merely acceding to a proposal made. What it is that the acceptor must do in order to make his acceptance effectual, and to put it out of the power of the offerer to recall his offer, depends on circumstances. Some things he must do. He must make his acceptance in writing, and he must send forth or give up that writing to or for behoof of the offerer. It is not enough that he commits his acceptance to writing and locks it in his own repositories; and, on the other hand it is not necessary that he shall deliver it personally to the offerer. When an offer is made by letter from a distance through the medium of the post, the offeree selecting that medium of transmission authorizes and invites the offerer to communicate his acceptance through the same medium. If the offeree avails himself of that medium of communication, and transmits his acceptance, properly addressed, through the post-office, and if the acceptance reaches its destination in the due and regular course of that medium of transmission, I am of opinion that the act of acceptance was completed by the putting of the letter into the post-office; and that a letter of recall, which did not arrive till after that act, cannot be held to have interrupted the completion of the contract. By putting the letter of acceptance into the post-office, the offeree did just what he was invited to do, and all that it was incumbent on him or possible for him to do in the way of •acceptance, by the mode of communication which he was authorized, if not invited, by the offerer to adopt. This appears to me to be the general rule, and it is so laid down by Mr. Bell in his Commentaries, i. 327, and by the House of Lords in the case of Higgins. Mr. Bell says: 'It is the act of acceptance that binds the bargain, and in the common case it is not necessary that the acceptance should have reached the person who makes the offer.' In the case of Higgins, 6 Bell, 195, the Lord Chancellor laid down the same law, and held that the contract was completed by the posting of the acceptance. If the contract was completed by the posting of the acceptance, a letter of recall received afterwards could not annul the contract so completed. I think that the fair import of these authorities, is, that an offer imports an obligation on the offeree conditional on acceptance; and that in the general case, if the offer has been sent by post, the offeree effectually avails himself of it, purifies the condition, and makes the bargain binding on the offerer by posting his acceptance. There may be extreme or extraordinary cases in which the offerer might not be bound by the fact that the letter of acceptance had been put into the post-office, as, for instance, if the mail was totally lost, and the letter never reached its destination; and the offerer, after waiting a reasonable time, and believing that the offer had not been accepted, sold the goods or property in bona-fide to another. These are extraordinary occurrences, over which neither party has any control, and which neither of them was bound to anticipate or contemplate. Reasonable time may be given to cover such casualties or contingencies, but more cannot be required. The general rule, as laid down in the case of Higgins, is, that the writing and posting of the acceptance completes the contract so as to make it obligatory, and I think that the rule so laid down rests on principle."