Where a crime has been committed the party especially injured has no right to agree to drop the prosecution, or to refuse to testify against the criminal, in consideration of receiving satisfaction for his private injuries. Such an act is called compounding a felony, and not only is the contract void,44 but this act of compounding is itself a crime. A quasi criminal action, however, such as a bastardy proceeding may be settled by an agreement between the parties themselves.45 What will and what will not constitute compounding a felony, is discussed by the New York Court of Appeals in the case of Nickelson vs. Wilson,46 in the following words: "The statutes against compounding felonies and misdemeanors point out very distinctly the character of that offense. 2 R. S., 689, Sec. 17, 18; 692, Sec. 12. They prohibit the taking of any money, property, gratuity, or reward, or any engagement or promise therefor, upon any agreement or understanding to compound or conceal a crime, abstain from prosecuting, or withhold evidence. These are the acts by which the course of justice may be interfered with and prosecutions may be stifled or embarrassed. And in all the cases which have been cited, some of these vicious elements existed and appeared. In the often cited case of Collins vs. Blantern 2 Wilson, 343, 349, a promissory note was given by a friend of the accused in consideration of the agreement of the prosecutor not to appear and give evidence on a charge of perjury, and a bond of indemnity against the note was held void. In the Steuben County Bank vs. Mathewson, 5 Hill, 249, 251, the bond sued upon had been given upon an agreement that the bank should surrender up a note alleged to be forged, and should not make a criminal charge for forging the note or obtaining the money thereon. In Porter vs. Havens, 37 Barb., 343, the notes in suit were executed by one Havens, against whom criminal proceedings were pending, and were placed in the hands of a third party to be delivered to Barron, the payee, when the criminal proceedings against Havens should be 'discontinued and ended;' and upon the further condition that Barron, the payee, should not arrest Havens, or cause him to be arrested on any process whatever, but should cease all proceedings against him. The plain intent of this agreement was to suppress the criminal prosecutions. In Conder-man vs. Hicks, 3 Lans., 108, the note was given to obtain the release of the maker, and the termination of criminal proceedings for false pretenses, pending against him, but without the approval of the court or magistrate, as provided in 2 Revised Statutes, page 730, section 66, etc.

43 Clark on Contracts, p. 433. 44 Crowder vs. Reed, 80 Ind., 1; Bank vs. Moore, 2 Southard

470; Bailey vs. Back, 11 Att., 252. 48 Seaman vs. Colby, 178 Mass., 478, 59 N. E., 1017.

46 2 60 N. Y., 36.

"But the present case exhibits no such elements; the agreement looked not to an abandonment of the prosecution, but to bringing the indictment to trial; not to the withholding of evidence, but to the procuring it; not to any secret effort to shield the plaintiff, but to an open application to receive him as State's evidence, with the consequences which usually follow.

"A further ground for sustaining the validity of the agreement is to be found in the provisions of the revised statutes which permit the compounding, by leave of the Court, of misdemeanors for which the injured party has a remedy by civil action. 2 R. S., 730, Sec. 66, 67, 68. These provisions permit the Court before whom the indictment is pending to exercise, in its discretion, the power of ordering a perpetual stay of the prosecution, on the injured party appearing and acknowledging satisfaction, and on the payment of costs. In the present case the charge was false pretenses, by which the prosecutor has sustained pecuniary damages. This offense has been held to amount, not to a felony, but merely to a misdemeanor (Fassett vs. Smith, 23 N. Y., 252), and therefore falls within the provisions of the statute. The prosecutor might, therefore, lawfully have agreed to appear before the Court and invoke its action under the statute referred to. That course was not pursued, and therefore the statute cited has not, perhaps, a direct bearing on this case, but it affords some indication of the policy of the law upon the subject under consideration.

"The whole point of the case lies in this: An agreement to cripple, stifle, or embarrass a prosecution for a criminal offense, by destroying or withholding evidence, suppressing facts, or other acts of that character, is against public policy, and void. In such cases the parties take the responsibility of interfering with, and by secret or indirect means, frustrating the administration of justice. But an agreement to lay the whole facts before the Court, and to leave it to the free exercise of the discretionary powers vested in it by law, is not in itself wrong, and' is not rendered illegal even by a stipulation on the part of a prosecutor to exert such legitimate influence as his position gives him in favor of the extension of mercy to a guilty party.

"Some other points have been suggested on the part of the defense which merit observation. The argument that the plaintiff's agreement to testify was not a sufficient consideration for the defendant's engagement has been already met. The plaintiff was privileged against criminating himself, and the waiver of this privilege constituted a consideration.

"But it is further urged that any agreement to give testimony in consideration of a reward is against public policy, having a tendency to induce the commission of the crime of perjury; and in a well considered case (Pollock vs. Gregory, 9 Bosw., 116), it was held that an agreement to pay a witness for testifying, on condition that his evidence should lead to a result favorable to the party calling him was illegal and void. But the evil of such an agreement consists in the condition, which holds out to the witness the temptation of falsifying his testimony, so as to produce the result upon which his compensation is to depend. Where the witness simply consents to make a disclosure of the truth, and, as in the present case, he has no inducement to produce any special result, the mischief is not apparent. In Yeatman vs. Dempsey, 7 C. B. (N. S.), 628, an agreement to testify, divested of such a condition, was sustained, and also in Webb vs. Page, I. C. & K., 23, in the case of an expert.

"The defendant deemed the testimony of the plaintiff essential to enable him to recover the judgment in question. It is conceded and found that the plaintiff performed his part of the agreement; and it is fairly presumable that the judgment was obtained by means of his testimony. It would be exceedingly unjust to enforce that judgment against him under the circumstances."