At common law every person was a minor (or infant) until he or she had attained the age of twenty-one years. In a little more than half of the states of this country at the present time, by statutory provisions, women become of age upon completing their eighteenth year.

1 See Section 6.

2 See Section 7.

3 See Section 8.

4 See Section 9.

5 See Section 10.

6 See Section 11.

7 See Section 12.

8 See Section 13.

The law does not take notice of fractions of a day (except in a few cases) and therefore a person becomes of age on the day preceding his twenty-first birthday. A person might thus be legally of age nearly forty-eight hours before completing his full twenty-one years.9 The power of an infant to contract is very limited. The contracts which an infant may make, are as follows: (1) Contracts created by law; (2) contracts for necessaries; (3) contracts made in the fulfillment of something he was legally bound to do, and could have been compelled to do; (4) contracts which he is authorized to make by statute.

These four classes will now be considered more in detail. (1) This class comprises what is known as quasi contracts, which will be considered in Chapter XIII (Quasi Contracts. Section 103. What Are Quasi Contracts?).

(2) The most important class of valid contracts of an infant are those for necessaries. An infant is liable for necessaries furnished to him at his request. This principle works to the advantage of the infant himself, as otherwise an infant might be unable to secure the means of subsistence. An infant's contract for necessaries, however, varies from that of an adult for the same purpose. A minor only binds himself to pay the reasonable value of the necessaries furnished him.10 This is true even although he has made an express promise to pay a higher price, or given a promissory note.11 The term "necessaries" includes all such articles, uses, and services as are reasonably necessary to supply the personal wants of a person in the particular circumstances and conditions of life of the minor.12 Necessaries include food, clothing and lodging; 13 the services of a doctor or dentist; 14 or instruction in elementary schools, or while learning a trade.15 The extent of the infant's liability for necessaries will be discussed more in detail under the head of Domestic Relations, but the following set of rules limiting this liability are given here:

9 Wells vs. Wells, 6 Ind., 447;

Ross vs. Morron, 85 Tex., 172;

19 S. W. 1090. 10 Gay vs. Ballam, 4 Wench, 403

Johnston vs. Maples 49 I11., 101. 11 11 Earle vs. Reed, 10 Met., 387; Locke vs. Smith, 41 N. H., 346.

"The articles must be for use, and not for ornament, nor for pleasure merely. The quality and quantity furnished must be reasonable. Things which an infant is already supplied with are not necessaries. He is not liable even for things needed if he lives at home, and is supported by his father; and it seems that the poverty of the father makes no difference. The things furnished must concern his person, and not his estate. He is not liable for money borrowed, and expended for necessaries, unless the lender sees that it is so expended." 16

(3) If an infant has already incurred a liability through his torts, or otherwise, he can make a binding contract in settlement of such liability. He is not injured by being allowed to put such a liability into another form. In a Vermont case, the Court held as follows on this point: "The law makes him liable for his torts and where he elects to settle such liability by giving his note, as long as the consideration for his note is open to inquiry, we see no reason why he should not be held liable in an action upon the note to the same extent that he would be if the action had been brought upon the cause of action which formed the consideration for his note. The note in suit having been given in settlement for a claim for which the defendant was liable, and no fraud or imposition having been practiced in obtaining it, the plea of infancy is not available to defeat it."17 Again, an infant is liable on a contract made in settlement of a bastardy proceeding against him.18

12 Benjamin on Contracts, p. 152.

13 McKanna vs. Merry, 61 I11., 179; Lynch vs. Johnson, 109 Mich., 640; Wallin vs. Park Co., 127 Iowa, 131.

14 Strong vs. Foote, 42 Com., 203.

15 Middlebury College vs. Chandler, 16 Vt., 686; Pardey vs. Ship Windlass Co., 20 R. I., 147.

16 Clark on Contracts, p. 231.

(4) Whenever a statute expressly authorizes infants to make certain contracts, such contracts are, of course, binding upon them. For example, an infant is bound by his contract of enlistment in the army.19

It was formerly held that any contract of an infant for the sale of real estate, or one which was manifestly injurious to him, was void. This doctrine is now generally abandoned. It gives infants no greater protection to consider these contracts void than it does to consider them merely voidable.

The better rule, then, is that all of an infant's contracts, with the exception of the few valid ones already considered, are voidable.20 By this is meant, that such contracts are binding on the other party but that the infant may abide by them or disaffirm them at his pleasure. A contract may be disaffirmed by a minor either before he becomes of age,21 or within a reasonable time after reaching his majority. A minor may avoid his contract even if it was made upon his representation that he was of full age.22 Under such circumstances, however, he will, in some states, be liable on an action of tort for his deceit, and relief in certain cases may be obtained against him in equity under such circumstances.23 A person not a party to the contract cannot take advantage of his minority except that in the case of the infant's death or insanity, his heirs, personal representative, or conservator, succeed to the right of disaffirming such contract. A contract may be affirmed by the infant 24 any time after he becomes of age. Either disaffirmance or ratification may be either by express words or actions showing this intention.25

17 Ray vs. Tubbs, 50 Vt., 688.

18 Stowers vs. Hollis, 83 Ky., 544.

19 In re Morrissey, 137 U. S., 157.

20 Tucker vs. Moreland, 1 Met., 559; Mansfield vs. Gordon, 144 Mass., 169; N. E. 773.

21 Carr vs. Clough, 26 N. H., 280; Bradford vs. French, 110 Mass.,

366. 22 Stud well vs. Shopter, 54 N. J.,

252. 23 Kilgore vs. Jordan, 17 Tex., 341; Hoyes vs. Parker, 41 N. J. Eq., 630.