An entry upon the lands of another can be justified in one of the three ways - (1) that the entry was by the express invitation or consent of the owner of the property; (2) that it was by his implied invitation or consent, or (3) that it was by license of the law.

The first class requires no explanation. The second class includes all those cases where a person enters the property of another for ordinary business,37 on social purposes. Implied consent will be presumed in such cases in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

The third class requires more extended treatment. The law licenses an entry upon the land of another in a large number of different classes of cases, as follows:

(a) A sheriff or other proper officer may enter on property to serve any legal process;38 it is sufficient protection for the officer if the process be legal on its face.39 A collector's warrant is designed to perform the same office, and confers the same authority as an execution, and when regular and fair on its face will protect the officer executing it.40

32 Morgan vs. Hudnell, 52 Ohio St., 552, 49 Am. St. Rep., 741.

33 Woodruff vs. Halsey, 8 Pick.

(Mass.), 333, 19 Am. Dec, 329.

34 Cox vs. Walker, 26 Me., 504.

35 Richards vs. Gauffret, 145 Mass.,

486. 36 Weston vs. Granlin, 49 Vt., 507. 37 In a few cases one who enters upon the property of another for business purposes does so by license of the law.

38 Wilmarth vs. Burt, 7 Met.

(Mass.), 257; Henderson vs. Brown, I Cal. (N.Y.), 92.

39 Mower vs. Stickney, 5 Minn. 397;

Turner vs. Franklin, 29 Mo., 285 40 Hill vs. Figley, 25 111., 143.

(b) A creditor of the owner of the land may enter to demand payment of the debt;41 unless perhaps the debt is expressly made payable in another place.

(c) Any person in proper condition has the right to enter upon the premises of those engaged in the business of a common carrier in any of its various branches.42 This same principle would also apply in the case of certain other forms of business of a quasi-public character.

(d) The owner of property leased to another may enter to see if the tenant is using the property in a proper manner.43

(e) If personal property which has been sold remain on the land of the vendor, the vendee will generally be authorized to enter and remove the goods.44

(f) If a person's goods without his fault have got upon the land on another he may enter to remove them.45

(g) If the owner of land has unlawfully put his goods upon the land of another, the latter may replace them on the land of their owner's.46

(h) The owner of land may enter adjoining land to abate a nuisance.47

(i) A person may lawfully enter the premises of another to extinguish a fire, or rescue an animal from death. The early decisions limit this right to cases where the danger is from some natural force, and exclude cases where the danger is from some act of man.

41 3 Blackstone's Commentaries, 212. Bigelow on Torts, p. 176.

42 See subject of Carriers, Volume V, Subject 13.

43 Newkirk vs. Sabler, 9 Barb., 652.

44 McLeod vs. Jones, 105 Mass., 403. 45 Miller vs. Fowdry Latch, 120, where the wind had blown the defendant's apples upon the plaintiff's land.

46 Cole vs. Maundy, Viner's Abr. Trespass, 516.

47 Penruddocks Case, 5 Cake, 100 b. For a discussion nuisances see subject of Equity Jurisprudence Volume VII, Subject 20.

(j) Necessity may also excuse an entry upon land, as where one is pursued by a dangerous animal, or where the highway is flooded and one is therefore obliged to deviate from it.48

(k) Where land is taken under the right of eminent domain there is of course no trespass, but where the trespasser might have evoked the right of eminent domain but fails to take the proper proceedings, he is not protected.49

(1) Military necessity authorizes entry upon property,50 but will not excuse indiscriminate plundering.51