In the case of domestic animals the rule is materially different; domestic animals are not ordinarily dangerous, and knowledge of the dangerous propensities of such animals has to be brought home to the owner, before he can be held liable for injury which the animal may cause.8 In Klenberg vs. Russell,9 this question is fully discussed in the following language: "It is the duty of the owner of domestic animals to fence them in, where they are such as can be fenced against, and not the duty of his neighbors to fence them out; but it does not necessarily follow that the owner of domestic animals suffered to run at large or to trespass upon the lands of others are thereby rendered responsible for all injurious acts committed by such animals while away from the premises of the owner. In Fletcher vs. Rylands, an English case, found in Thompson on the Law of negligence, beginning on page 2 (but see page 26), it is said: The law, as to them (speaking of cattle), seems to be perfectly settled from early times. The owner must keep them in at his peril or he will be answerable for the natural consequences of their escape, that is, with regard to tame beasts, for the grass they eat and trample upon, though not for any injury to the person of others, for our ancestors have settled that it is not the general nature of horses to kick or bulls to gore.' And all of the authorities seem to agree that the owner of a domestic animal is not liable because of a negligent failure to keep it confined on his own premises, except for the consequences which may be anticipated because of its well-known disposition and habits, unless it is possessed of a vicious disposition of which he has notice. In Losee vs. Buckanan, 51 N. Y., 476 (but see Thompson on the Law of Negligence, at page 52), it is said: 'As to the former (speaking of domestic animals), the owner is not responsible for such injuries as they are not accustomed to do by the exercise of vicious propensities which they do not usually have, unless it can be shown that he had knowledge of the vicious habit and propensity. As to all animals, the owner can usually restrain and keep them under control; and if he will keep them, he must do so. If he does not, he is responsible for any damage which their well-known disposition leads them to commit. I believe the liability to be based upon the fault which the law attributes to him; and no further actual negligence need be proved than the fact that they are at large unrestrained.' We believe the foregoing to be a correct statement of the law in such cases. Earl vs. Van Alstine, 8 Barb., 630; Van Leuven vs. Lyke, 1 N. Y., 515; Vrooman vs. Lawyer, 13 Johns, 339; Thomp., Neg. S., 15; p. 201; Id. Sec. 26, p. 209; Durham vs. Musselman, 2 Blackf. 96; Thomp. vs. Nev., p. 389, Sec. 10; Sinram vs. Railway Co., 28 Ind., 244; Smith vs. Causey, 22 Ala., 468; Wormley vs. Gregg, 65 111., 251; Dearth vs. Baker, 22 Wis., 73. In Sheraman vs. Redfield on the Law of Negligence (section 629), it is said: 'But the owners of creatures which as a species, are harmless and domesticated, and are kept for convenience or use, such as dogs, cattle, horses, and even bees, are not liable for injuries willfully committed by them, unless he is proved to have had notice of the inclination of the particular animals complained of to commit such injuries. If, having had such notice, he neglects to keep them confined where no one can suffer from them while using ordinary care, he is liable for all injuries committed by them. And the owner, even of a wild beast, is not liable for injuries caused by it in a manner which no acquaintance with its nature would have led him to expect, except upon similar evidence of notice.' As the complaint fails to allege that the cow had an evil disposition, such as would lead her to attack human beings, necessarily there is no charge that the appellant had notice of any such evil disposition; and as the willful conduct of the animal in attacking the appellee was not such as the appellant had a right to expect or might anticipate, he is not responsible for the injury caused by such unexpected and willful conduct."

7 Filfurn vs. People's Palace, etc.,

Co., 25 A. B. D., 258.

8 Reed vs. Southern Express Co.,

95 Ga., 108; 22 S. E., 183;

Mareau vs. Vanatta, 88 111., 132; Murray vs. Young, 12 Bush. (Ky.), 357. 9 125 Ind. 531; 25 N. E., 596.

There is no general propensity on the part of horses to bite persons who come near them, and, if done at all, it is done by one that is exceptionally vicious. No such disposition having been discovered in a horse, the owner is under no obligation to anticipate that it will suddenly bite a passer-by, and is not bound to guard against such an occurrence; and if the horse bites somebody, and is not wrongfully in the place where this happens, the owner will not be held liable for the injury.10 Servants put in charge of a bull to drive him to a certain place, who, on the way, learn that he is vicious, render the owner liable to one thereafter injured by him on the trip, by continuing to drive him without taking precautions against accidents.11 The owner of bees is not liable for any accidental injury they may do.12

10 Reed vs. Southern Express Co., 95 Ga., 108; 22 S. E., 133;

Am. St. Rep., 62.

Under the common law, the rule as to the liability for damages by dogs was the same as that for injury by any other domestic animal.13 But this rule has been changed by statute in many jurisdictions, and the owners of dogs declared liable for damage done by these animals regardless of the knowledge by the owners of the vicious character of the dog.14

These statutes have been upheld by the courts, . it being held that dogs are properly subjected to special and peculiar regulations, for the purpose of repressing the mischief likely to be done by them to more valuable property and to persons.15 In Briscoe vs. Alfrey,16 the Court said: "The status of the dog before the law is sui generis.

"The vicious dog, in general, and the odious sheep-killer in particular, are under the laws' special condemnation. Without entering upon a discussion of the reasons therefor, it suffices to say that no legislation or decision with reference to injuries by dogs do we regard as analogous to that of the other purely domestic animals of the kind enumerated in our statute."17

11 Clowdis vs. Fresno Flume, etc., Co., 118 Col., 315; So. Pac, 373.

12 Earl vs. Van Alstine, 8 Barb. (N. Y.), 630.

13 Mareau vs. Vanatta, 88 111., 132; Goode vs. Martin, 57 Md., 606; Cuney vs. Campbell, 76 Minn., 59; 78 N. W., 878; Kittredge vs. Elliott, 16 N. H., 77; Am. St 717

14 Woo'lf vs. Chalker, 31 Conn., 121;

81 Am. Dec, 175; Presey vs.

Wirth, 3 Allen (Mass.), 191;

Newton vs. Gordon, 72 Mich.,

642; 40 N. W., 921. 15 Van Horn vs. People, 46 Mich.,

183; 9N. W., 246; 41 Am.

Rep., 159. 16 61 Ark., 196, 199; 32 S. W., 505. 17 The statutes of the several States should be consulted as to the liability of owners or keepers of dogs.