5 Kujek vs. Goldman, 150 N. J.,

176;44 N.E.,773. 6 Peabody vs. Phelps, 9 Cal. 213. 7 Haight vs. Hayt, 19 N. Y., 464;

Atwood vs. Chapman, 68 Me.,

38; 28 Am. Rep., 5.

8 Barnard vs. Duncan, 38 Mo. 170;

90 Am. Dec, 426; Andrus vs. St. Louis Smelting, etc., Co., 130 U. S., 643.

9 Young vs. Hall, 4 Ga., 95.

10 197 EL, 532; 64 N. E., 299.

Inducing plaintiff to cash defendant's check, when the latter had no money in the bank, constitutes a sufficient ground for an action of deceit; 11 as does signing as a witness a forged assignment of a stock certificate, knowing that it was to be used in obtaining a loan.12

(c) In the absence of any duty to speak, mere silence even as to material facts, will not amount to misrepresentation.13 The vendee is not bound to communicate to the vendor of goods the knowledge of extrinsic circumstances, which might influence the price of the commodity, and which is exclusively within the knowledge of the vendee, particularly where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties.14

11Sieling vs. Clark, 41 N. Y.

Suppl., 982. 12 New York City Second National Bank vs. Curtie, 2 N. Y., App.

Div., 508; 37 N. Y. Suppl., 1028.

13 Littlejohn vs. Drennon, 95 Ga., 743; 22 S. E., 657; Stewart vs. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128; U. S., 383; 9 Sup. Ct., 101.

A suppression of truth, however, with the intent to deceive may be equivalent to positive misrepresentation.15 This principle is carefully stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Smith vs. Richards:16 "It is an ancient and well established principle, that whenever suppressio veri or suggestio falsi occur, and more especially both together, they afford a sufficient ground to set aside any release or conveyance. This ancient principle, thus expressed with so much sententious brevity, is laid down in terms somewhat more comprehensive and having a direct bearing on the present case, by a modern text writer on equity.

"In 1 Maddock's Chancery, 208, it is thus stated: If indeed, a man upon a treaty for any contract, make a false representation, whether knowingly or not, by means of which he puts the party bargaining under a mistake upon the terms of bargain, it is a fraud and relievable in equity. The doctrine thus laid down is almost in the very words used by the Chancellor, in the case of Neville vs. Wilkingson (1 Brown's Chan. Cases, 546), with the exception of the words, whether knowingly or not; and the part of the proposition embraced by these words, is founded upon the case of Ainslie vs. Medicot (Vesey, 21) which fully sustains Mr. Maddock. In this latter case the following strong language is used, 'No doubt, by a representation a party may bind himself just as much as by an express covenant. If, knowingly, he represents what is not true, no doubt he is bound. If, without knowing that it is not true, he takes upon himself to make a representation to another, upon the faith of which that other acts, no doubt he is bound, though his mistake was perfectly innocent.'

14 Lardlaw vs. Organ, 2 Wheaton,

178. 15 Faulkner vs. Klamp, 16 Nebr.,

174; 20 N. W., 220; Lunn vs. Sherner, 93 N. C, 164. 16 13 Peters, 26.

"But the doctrine is laid down with more comprehensiveness and precision by a still more modern writer on equity, who gives us, in the form of distinct propositions, what he considers the result of the various cases on the subject, and marks, with particularity, the modifications which belong to it.

"In 1 Story's Equity, 201, 202, it is thus stated: 'Where the party intentionally or by design, misrepre-' sents a material fact, or produces a false impression, in order to mislead another, or to entrap or cheat him or to obtain an undue advantage of him, in every such case there is a positive fraud, in the truest sense of the terms: there is an evil act, with an evil intent - dolum malum, ad circumveniendum. And the misrepresentation may be as well by deeds or acts, as by words, - by artifices to mislead, as by positive assertions."

If the two parties to a contract have not the same knowledge, or the means of obtaining it, it is the duty of the person having the superior knowledge to make it known to the other.17