A common carrier is not liable for losses caused by the act of God, but the extent of this exception has always been carefully restricted. No loss which might have been prevented by the loss of ordinary care on the part of the carrier, can be excused as being caused by an act of God.2 The burden of proof is on the carrier to show that it used every reasonable effort to avoid the effects of the inevitable accident.3

Some cases hold that a carrier of goods is liable for their loss or injury in the course of transportation by reason of a casualty which in itself constitutes an act of God, where the damage would not have occurred but for the negligent delay of the goods. This holding is supported by a number of cases; but on the other hand, a contrary rule is laid down in a large number of cases. The authorities are so conflicting that it is difficult to say which rule is the sounder one, but it may be remarked that the one holding that the carrier is not liable has received the approval of the leading recent writer on this branch of the law.4

1 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. V.

2 Smith vs. Western R. Co., 91 Ala., 455, 24 Am. St. Rep., 9293; Lang vs. Pennsylvania R. Co., 2 Pa. Dist. Rep., 125, 154

Pa. St., 342, 32 W. N. C, (Pa.), 205. 3 Columbus, etc., R. Co. vs. Kennedy, 78 Ga., 646.

The two following cases will serve as illustrations of cases where the damage has been held to have been caused by the act of God and not due to the negligence of the carrier: "A canal company which as common carrier, had undertaken to convey plaintiff's goods negligently started the boat on its voyage with a lame horse, by reason of which the transportation of the goods was considerably delayed. It so happened that when the boat thus delayed was at a particular point on its way, an extraordinary flood occurred by which the boat was wrecked and plaintiff's goods lost. But for the delay which was caused by the lameness of the horse as aforesaid, the boat would have escaped the disaster. It was held that the damage in this could not be attributed to the starting of the boat with the lame horse as its proximate or legal cause." 5

'The defendant company received wool of the plaintiff for transportation from N. to B. By reason of a failure on the part of the company to exercise reasonable diligence the wool in question was detained at station S for several days. It was then dispatched to station A and there to a connecting carrier to be conveyed to B. While so stored the wool was damaged by an extraordinary rise in a river. It was held that the negligent delay in forwarding the wool could not be considered the proximate, or legal, cause of the damage." 6

4 See American and Eng. Annotated Cases, Vol. VIII, p. 48.

5 20 Pa. St., 374, 375. This and the following illustrations are taken from Street's Foundations of Legal Liability, Vol. I, p. 118.