The classification of contingent remainders most generally used at the present time, is as follows: tion over, of a real estate, whether by way of a particular estate, so as to leave a proper remainder, or to defeat an absolute fee before limited by conditional limitation, but if the precedent limitation, by what means soever, be out of the case, the subsequent limitation should take place. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 361. 3d. As to cases of the third class, it may be observed, that although where a remainder is limited to take effect on a condition annexed to a preceding estate, and that preceding estate fails, it appears, that the remainder shall nevertheless take place; yet, where such preceding particular estate takes place, and the condition is not performed, the remainder, it has been held, will not take effect at the expiration of such preceding estate, unless in those cases where the apparent general intention of the testator calls for it. Fearn.Cont. Rem. 362. It sometimes happens, that a remainder is limited in words which seem to import a contingency, though in fact they mean no more than would have been implied without them; or do not amount to a condition precedent, but only denote the time when the remainder is to vest in possession. Thus, where there was a devise of land to A. and B. for eight years, and after the said term to remain to the testator's executors, till such time as H. should accomplish his age of twenty-one years; and when the said H. should come to his full age of twenty-one years, then the testator willed that H. should enjoy the lands to him and his heirs forever. H. died under twenty-one; and it was contended that the remainder did not vest in H., because he did not live to attain the age of twenty-one years; for that, as he was not to have it until his age of twenty-one, it was contingent on that event, it being uncertain whether he ever would attain that age. But it was held, that the case was nothing else in effect, than a devise to the executors till H. attained the age of twenty-one years, remainder to H. in fee; and that the adverbs of time, when, etc. and then, etc. do not make anything necessary to precede the settling of the remainder, any more than in the common case of a lease for life or years, and after the decease of the lessee or the term ended, remainder to another, in which cases the remainder vests presently. And that these adverbs expressed the time when the remainder to H. should take effect in possession, and not when it should become vested. Boraston's case, 3 Rep. 19. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 367,8. Et vid. 1 P.Wms. 170. Holcroft's case, Moor, 487. Webb v. Herring, Cro. Jac. 416. King v. Rumball, Cro. Jac. 448. Chadock v. Cowley, Cro. Jac. 695. Fortescue v. Abbott, Pollexf. 479. T.Jo. 79. Anon. 2 Ventr. 365. Goodtitle v. Whitby, 1 Burr. 228. Doe v. Lea, 3 T. R. 41. And see the late case of Doe, d. Hunt v. Moore, in which it was held, that, under a devise of real estate in fee to J. M. when he attains the age of twenty-one but in case he dies before twenty-one, then to his brother, when he attains twenty-one; with like remainders over; J. M. the devisee took an immediate vested interest, liable to be divested upon his dying under (f) Here we shall offer some remarks, 1st. With respect to the nature of the event upon which a contingent remainder may be limited. 2d. As to the estate necessary to support a contingent remainder. The doctrine with respect to the time when a contingent remainder must vest, will be explained in a subsequent part of this chapter.

First; Where the contingency consists in the happening or not happening of a certain event, and second; where the remainder is contingent because the twenty-one. 14 East, 601. (Ed.)

1st. With respect to the nature of the contingency upon which a remainder may be limited:- It is to be observed, 1st. That it must be a legal act, "for the law (says Lord Coke, 2 Rep. 51 b.) will never adjudge a grant good by reason of a possibility or expectation of a thing which is against law; for it is potentia remotissima et vana, which by intendment of law nunquam venit in actum." 2d. It must be potentia propin-qua; as death, or death without issue, or coverture. Hence it has been determined, that a remainder to a corporation, which is not in being at the time of the limitation, is void, although it be erected afterwards, during the particular estate. 2 Rep. 51 a. So, although a lease for life, remainder to the right heirs of J. S. is good; yet, if there be no such person as J. S. at the time of the limitation of the remainder, notwithstanding such a person should afterwards be born, and die during the life of the tenant for life, his heir shall not take by virtue of such limitation; because the possibility on which the remainder is to take effect is too remote; for it amounts to the concurrence of two several contingencies, viz. 1st. That such a person as J. S. should be born, which is very uncertain; and 2dly. That he should also die during the particular estate, which is another uncertainty grafted upon the former. This is called a possibility upon a possibility, which Lord Coke observes, is never admitted by intendment of law. Ant. 25 b. vol. 1. p. 541; 184a vol. 1, p. 743. Cholmley's case, 2 Co. 51 b. Upon the same ground arises the distinction between a remainder limited by a general description, as to the right heirs of J. D., who is alive, or primogenito filio of B., who has no son then born, which is good; and one limited by a particular name to a person not in esse, which is void. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 375, 378. 3d. It must not be repugnant to any rule of law. 6 Rep. 40 b. 4 Burr. 1941. 4th. Nor contrari-ant in itself. Jermin v. Arscot, 1 Rep. 85 a. Cholmley v. Humble, 1 Rep. 86 a. Corbet's case, 1 Rep. 83 b. Mildmay's case, 6 Rep. 40. Foy v. Hinde, Cro. Jac. 697. 5th. That it must not operate so as to abridge, defeat, or determine the particular estate. Plowd. 29 b. 2 Leon. 16. Plowd. 24. Sayer v. Hardy Cro. Eliz. 414. This rule not only flows, of necessity, from the nature of a remainder, as exhibited in the above definition of it by Lord Coke, but also follows, as the consequence of a maxim at common law, that none shall take advantage of a condition, but the party from whom the condition moves (i. e. the grantor) and his heirs; for, if he or his heirs take advantage of a condition, by entry or claim, the livery made upon the creation of the estates is defeated; and, of course, every estate then created is thereby annulled and gone. But the remainder ought to vest at the instant of the expiration of the preceding estate, and remainpersons to take in remainder are not ascertained or not in esse.