Anything which defeats the particular estate will defeat the contingent remainder depending upon it.

ders are defeated by the entry of the grantor, therefore such remainder is void. It follows, that a remainder properly so called, cannot be limited to take effect upon a condition, which is to defeat the particular estate, whether such condition be repugnant to the nature of the estate to which it is annexed, or not. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 391. And the same law holds with regard to a subsequent remainder, limited to take effect on a condition, which is to defeat a preceding remainder. Cogan v. Cogan, Cro. Eliz. 360. Where, however, land is leased to one for life, and, if such a thing happen, then to remain to B., this shall not be understood as intended to vest in possession, immediately upon the happening of the condition, and in abridgment of the preceding estate; for then, by the last mentioned rule, the remainder would be void; but it shall be construed to vest in interest upon the happening of the condition, and to remain as a remainder ought to do; that is, so as to await the determination of the preceding estate, before it comes into possession. Colthirst v. Bejushin, Plowd. 23. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 393. It may also happen, that notwithstanding a contingent limitation is expressed to commence from a period eventually anterior to the determination of the particular estate, yet the nature of the case may be such, as not to admit of its taking effect in possession in restraint, abridgment, or exclusion of the particular estate; as if such limitation over were to the grantee or devisee of the particular estate; which, instead of operating in any degree to defeat, exclude, or curtail the particular estate, would in effect remove its limits, and open it into a greater estate. Thus, in the case of a lease to two, with a limitation over, after the death of the first of them, to the survivor, this does not avoid, defeat, or abridge the estate of the survivor, but embraces it under the afflux of a greater, into which it will run under the technical term of merging, instead of being rescinded or nullified. T h e grantor or his heir can have no title to enter and defeat the particular estate, because there is no condition or proviso to make it cease, or carry the estate either expressly or im-plicatively to any body, from the devisee of the particular estate. Nor can the limitation operate to the prejudice of another, viz. the person otherwise entitled to the particular estate; because it is to that very person himself, and the effect would have been precisely the same, if the limitation had been, and from and after the determination of the estate aforesaid, then to the survivor in fee. Nothing, therefore, will, in such case, prevent the limitation over from operating strictly, as a remainder at common law. Goodtitle v. Billington, Dougl. 725. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 397, 8. It is further to be observed, that although no remainder can be limited on a condition; yet, it has been long settled, that, where in a devise a condition is annexed to a preceding estate, and upon the breach or nonperformance thereof, the estate is devised over to another, the condition shall operate as a

The leading case on this point is the case known as Archer's Case.6 The decision in which case was as follows: limitation, circumscribing the measure and continuance of the first estate; and that upon the breach or performance of it, as the case may be, the first estate shall ipso facto determine and expire, without entry or claim; and the limitation over shall thereupon actually commence in possession; and the person claiming under it, whether heir or stranger, shall have an immediate right to the estate. Thus is the testator's intention effectuated, by substantiating the subsequent estate, though limited to a stranger; and enforcing the performance of the condition, by the determination of the preceding estate upon the breach of it, notwithstanding that preceding estate be limited to the heir himself: and limitations of this kind are properly called conditional limitations. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 405 - 9. Thus, where a person devised lands to his mother for life, and after her death to his brother in fee; provided that if his wife (being then enseint) be delivered of a son, that then the land should remain to him in fee; after the testator's death, a son was born; and it was held, that the fee of the brother should cease, and vest in the son upon the happening of the contingency. Dyer, 127 n. Id. 33 n. Cro.Jac. 592. Palm. 135. So, where A. devised lands to his wife for life, and after her death to his grandchild B. and the heirs o f her body; provided always, and upon condition that she married with the consent of D., E., and F., or the major part of them, and in case she should marry without such consent, or die without issue, then he devised the premises to C. (neither B. nor C. being heir at law to the testator). After the testator's death B. married without the consent of any of the persons named for that purpose; and it was clearly held to be an estate to B. till she married without such consent; that here was an estate-tail devised to B. subject to two limitations, the one in law, viz. dying without issue, the other express, and in fact, viz. marrying without consent; which was properly a conditional limitation, and not a condition; for, if it were a condition, it would descend to the heir at law, and he might enter for breach of it, and defeat the limitation over; and it was therefore agreed, that the marriage without consent determined her estate-tail, and cast the possession immediately on C. Lady Ann Fry's case, 1 Ventr. 199. Et vid. Shuttle-worth v. Barber, 2 Mod. 7. But where there is no express limitations over to take effect upon the breach or performance of the condition, annexed to the preceding estate; there, it seems, the condition or proviso is not always construed as a conditional limitation. Gulliver v. Ashhy, Fearn. Ex. Dev. 60. Limitations of this nature may also take effect by way of use; for a use may be limited to cease as to one person upon a future event, and to vest in another Fearn. Cont. Rem. 412. With respect to those cases where particular estate is limited, with a condition, that after the performance of a certain act, or the happening of a certain event, the person to whom the first estate is limited, shall have a larger estate, see the last chapter, ante, p. 18, n. (1). 2d. As to the estate necessary to support a contingent remainder: - Though in the case of a vested remainder it is sufficient.