6 Reported I Coke, 66 B., 159-7.

"Between Baldwin and Smith, in the Common Pleas, which began Trin. 39, Eliz. rot., 1676, in a replevin, upon a special verdict, the case was such; Francis Archer was seized of land in fee, and held it in socage, if the particular estate be for years (for a lease at will is of too slender and precarious a nature to support a remainder over. 8 Rep. 75.), it is a general rule, that wherever an estate in contingent remainder amounts to a freehold, some vested estate of freehold must precede it. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 423. Thus, if land be granted to A. for ten years, with remainder in fee to the right heirs of B., this remainder is void: but if granted to A. for life, with a like remainder, it is good. 1 Rep. 130. For unless the freehold passes out of the grantor at the time when the remainder is created, such freehold remainder is void; it cannot pass out of him without vesting somewhere; and in the case of a contingent remainder, it must vest in the particular tenant, else it can vest nowhere: unless, therefore, the estate of such particular tenant be of a freehold nature, the freehold cannot vest in him; and consequently the remainder is void. 2 Bl. Com. 171. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 423, 24, 25. 3 Rep. 20. But a contingent remainder for years does not require a preceding freehold to support it; for the remainder not being freehold, no such estate appears requisite to pass out of the grantor, in order to give due effect to a remainder of that sort. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 429, 43. Although every contingent freehold remainder must be supported by a preceding freehold, yet it is not necessary that such preceding estate continue in the actual seisin of its rightful tenant; it is sufficient, if there subsists a right to such preceding estate, at the time the remainder should vest; provided such right be a right of entry, and not a right of action only; for, whilst a right of entry remains, there can be no doubt that the same estate continues; since the right of entry can exist only in consequence of the subsistence of the estate; but when the right of entry is gone, and nothing but a right of action remains, it then becomes a question of law, whether the same estate continues or not; for the action is nothing more than the means of deciding the question. Another estate is, in the mean time, acknowledged and protected by the law, till such question be solemnly determined in a court of justice, upon the action brought. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 430, 431. Therefore, if A. be tenant for life, with a contingent remainder over, and tenant for life be disseised, all the estates are divested; but the right of entry of the tenant for life will support the contingent remainders; but in this case if the contingent remainder does not vest, before such a descent be cast as will take away the entry of tenant for life within the stat. 32 H. 8. c. 33, and drive him to his action, then is the contingent remainder gone; because there no longer subsists any right of entry to support it, that right being turned into a right of action. Thomson v. Leach, 12 Mod. 174. And for the same reason, where a contingent remainder is limited after an estate-tail, and the tenant in tail creates a discontinuance, the contingent remainder will be destroyed. 1 Rep. 135 b. This right of entry, however, to support a contingent remainder must be a present right; a fuand by his will in writing devised the land to Robert Archer the father, for his life, and afterwards to the next heir male of Robert, and to the heirs male of the body of next such heir male: Robert had issue, John, Francis died, Robert enfeoffed Kent with warranty upon whom John entered, and Kent re-entered, and afterwards Robert died, etc. At first, it was agreed by Anderson, Walmsley et totum cur\ that Robert had but an estate for life because Robert had an express estate for life devised to him, and the remainder is limited to the next male heir of Robert in the singular number; and the right heir male of Robert cannot enter for the forfeiture in the life of Robert, for he cannot be heir as long as Robert lives. Secondly, that the remainder to the right heir male of Robert is good, although he cannot have a right heir during his life; but it is sufficient that the remainder vests eo instanti, that the particular estate determines. And so it is agreed in 7 Hen. 4, 6b, and Cranner's Case 14 Eliz., ture one will not do: it must also precede the contingency, and be actually existing when that happens; for if it only commences at the same instant with it, the remainder, it seems, will not vest. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 433. And where the estates are limited by way of use, and are afterwards divested and turned to a right, it has been held that there must be an actual entry, in order to revert the estates. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 435. In regard to the estate requisite to support a contingent remainder, it is further to be observed, that the estate supporting, and the remainder supported, should both be created by one and the same deed or instrument: therefore an estate for life given by one deed, will not support a remainder given by another; nor an estate for life settled by A. on B. by deed, enure to support a contingent remainder given by the will of A. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 446,447. Et vid. Snow v. Cutler, Raym. 162. Moor v. Parker, 4 Mod. 316. Weale v. Lower, Pollexf. 66. Doe v. Fon-nereau, Dougl. 486. It seems, however, that where the legal estate is in trustees, there is no necessity for any preceding particular estate of freehold, to support contingent remainders; for the legal estate in the general trustees will be sufficient for the purpose; and consequently, in such cases, it is not necessary, that a contingent remainder should vest by the time the preceding trust limitation expires. Fearn. Cont. Rem. 449, 450. Et vid. Chapman v. Bli8sett, Cas. Temp. Talb. 145. Hopkins v. Hopkins Forrest. 44. 1 Ves. 268. 1 Atk. 581. - Note to Thomas' Edition of Coke's Institutes.