In 1821 the Supreme Court by a decision rendered in the case of Anderson v. Dunn23 recognized the existence in Congress of a general power to punish for contempt persons disobeying its orders, especially those with reference to the giving of testimony and the production of papers before its committees and commissions of inquiry. In the case of Kilbourn v. Thompson,24 however, decided in 1881, the court very much narrowed this power, holding that Congress had the power to compel information only with reference to matters over which it had legislative power, and that, therefore, it might not punish for contempt a refusal to testify or produce papers bearing upon other subjects. In this respect, being a legislature of limited powers, Congress could not measure its powers by those exercised by the English Parliament. Applying the foregoing principles the court in its opinion said: "In looking to the Preamble and Resolution under which the committee acted, before which Mr. Kilbourn refused to testify, we are of the opinion that the House of Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its own authority but assumed a power which could only be properly exercised by another branch of the government, because the power was in its nature clearly judicial."

That Congress has the power to punish its own members for disorderly behavior, that it may punish by imprisonment a refusal to obey a rule made by it for the preservation of its own order, and inflict penalties in order to compel the attendance of absent members has not to be questioned. In the case Re Chapman,25 however, decided in 1897, was raised the question whether it had the authority to punish a refusal to testify before a committee which was inquiring not with regard to proposed legislation, but with reference to the truth of charges which had been made reflecting upon the integrity of certain of its members. This power the court upheld.26

23 6 Wh. 204; 5 L. ed. 242.

24 103 U. S. 168; 26 L. ed. 377.

25 166 U. S. 661; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 677; 41 L. ed. 1154.

26 The court say: "In Kilbourn v. Thompson (103 U. S. 168; 26 L. ed. 377), among other important rulings, it was held that there existed no general power in Congress, or in either House, to make inquiry into the private The court, furthermore, held in this case that having the power, Congress might, instead of or in addition to itself punishing for contempt, provide by law that a contumacious witness be indicted and punished in the courts for a misdemeanor.

With reference to the authority of the state legislatures to punish for contempt it may be observed that their powers are much affairs of a citizen; that neither House could, on the allegation that an insolvent debtor of the United States was interested in a private business partnership, investigate the affairs of that partnership, as a mere matter of private concern; and that consequently there was no authority in either House to compel a witness to testify on the subject. The case at bar is wholly different. Specific charges publicly made against senators had been brought to the attention of the Senate, and the Senate had determined that investigation was necessary. The subject-matter as affecting the Senate was within the jurisdiction of the Senate. The questions were not intrusions into the affairs of the citizen; they did not seek to ascertain any facts as to the conduct, methods, extent or details of the business of the firm in question, but only whether that firm, confessedly engaged in buying and selling stocks, and the particular stock named, was employed by any senator to buy or sell for him any of that stock, whose market price might be affected by the Senate's action. We cannot regard these questions as amounting to an unreasonable search into the private affairs of the witness pimply because he may have been in some degree connected with the alleged transactions, and as investigations of this sort are within the power of either of the two Houses they cannot be deflated on purely sentimental grounds.

"The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject-matter of the inquiry. The resolutions directed the committee to inquire 'whether any senator has been, or is, speculating in what are known as sugar stocks during the consideration of the tariff bill now before the Senate.' What the Senate might or might not do upon the facts when ascertained, we cannot say, nor are we called upon to inquire whether such ventures might be defensible, as contended in argument, but it is plain that negative answers would have cleared that body of what the Senate regarded as offensive imputations, while affirmative answers might have led to further action on the part of the Senate within its constitutional powers.

"Nor will it do to hold that the Senate had no jurisdiction to pursue the particular inquiry because the preamble and resolutions did not specify that the proceedings were taken for the purpose of censure or expulsion. if certain facts were disclosed by the investigation. The matter was within the range of the constitutional powers of the Senate. The resolutions adequately indicated that the transactions referred to were deemed by the Senate reprehensible and deserving of condemnation and punishment. The right to expel extends to all cases where the offense is such as in the judgment of the Senate is inconsistent with the trust and duty of a member." broader than those of Congress. Possessing all powers not expressly or impliedly refused them, they have a general inquisitorial power and a corresponding general authority to punish a refusal to testify or to produce papers.