That promisor is under influence of promisee does not invalidate promise, sec 157.

Nor does great mental superiority of promisee over promisor, sec 158.

Otherwise when position of superiority is used to extort unfair advantage, sec 159.

Courts of equity take peculiar cognizance of such breaches of trust, sec 160.

Rule applies wherever there are authoritative or fiduciary relations, sec 161.

Influence when established presumed to continue, sec 162.

Question one of burden of proof, sec 163.

When voluntary donation is set up, burden is on party claiming, sec 164.

Gross inadequacy of price may lead to inference of fraud, sec 165.

In such cases specific performance will be refused, sec 166.

Party's representatives may contest, sec 167.

Such contracts may be ratified, sec 168.

Necessity of heir expectant may conduce to unfair dealing, sec 169.

Extortionate contracts made more open to revision by repeal of usury laws, sec 170.

Sec 157

We have already seen that in the Roman law metus reverentialis, or reverential awe, does not invalidate a contract made under its influence.1 A father, for instance, may use his influence over a son to induce the latter to make a settlement of his estate in trust; a brother may use his influence over a dependent and weak-minded sister to induce her to make stable and judicious investments of her estate; and such exercises of authority, when equitable in their results, will be regarded not only as unobjectionable but as laudable.2 Even gifts from child to parent, from interior to superior, will be sustained, when these gifts are free, and suitable to the circumstances of the parties. "This court," so it was said in an English case of this class, "does not interfere to prevent an act even of bounty between parent and child, but it will take care (under the circumstances in which the parent and child are placed before the emancipation of the child), that such child is placed in such a position as will enable him to form an entirely free and unfettered judgment, independent altogether of any sort of control."1 And reasonable dispositions of property, conducive to fair family settlements, will be upheld as between parent and child.2 But the excuse of family convenience will not justify a conveyance by which a son improvidently gives up, without consideration, a valuable estate to his father,3 or a conveyance in fraud of creditors.4

That the promisor is under the influence of the promisee does not invalidate promise.

1 Supra, sec 145 et seq.

2 As to limitation in cases of fraud see infra, sec 376.

Sec 158

Should mental disparity between the parties avoid a contract, there are few contracts that would stand, and few men of great business capacity that would be capable of doing business. Whenever a man of this class should make a bargain, unless in the very rare cases of bargains among his intellectual equals, it would be the duty of the courts to set it aside; and the men most capable of advancing the interests of the community by their far-sightedness and their sagacity would be under an interdict. But such a restraint on superior intelligence would be not only unwise but impracticable; and the courts, supposing there be no fraud, and no abuse of authority or of trust, have refused to set aside bargains merely because one party, by means of superior intelligence, obtained an advantage over the other.5 The converse also is true, that the mental inferiority of a party to a contract is by itself no ground for setting such contract aside. Were it otherwise, persons with intellectual gifts below the average would be incapable of any business whatsoever;1 At the same time, when there is fraud or undue influence exerted by a party obtaining a contract in his favor, proof of a comparatively slight degree of mental imbecility is required to set aside a contract induced by such influence.2

Nor does great mental superiority of promisee over promisor.

1 Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 560 ; see Jenkins v. Pye, 12 Pet. 253; Hawkins' App., 32 Penn. St. 263 ; Millican v. Mil-lican, 24 Tex. 426.

2 Jenner v. Jenner, 2 Giff. 232, 2 De G. F. & J. 359 ; Harlopp v. Hartopp, 21 Beav. 259 ; Williams v. Williams, L. R. 2 Ch. 294.

3 Savery v. King, 5 H. L. C. 627, cited Pollock, 534.

4 Infra, sec 376 et sea.

5 Bispham's Eq. sec 230 ; Osmond v. Fitzroy, 3 P. Wms. 129 ; Mann v. Bet-terly, 31 Vt. 326 ; Allen ex parte, 15 Mass. 58; Hallenbeck v. Dewitt, 2.

Johns. 404 ; Stiner v. Stiner, 58 Barb. 643; Graham p. Pancoast, 30 Penn. St. 89; Nace v. Boyer, 30 Penn. St. 79 ; Aiman v. Stout, 42 Penn. St. 114 ; Hyer v. Little, 5 C. E. Green, 443 ; Losear v. Shields, 8 C. E. Green, 509; Mulock v. Mulock, 31 N. J. Eq. 594; Thornton v. Ogden, 32 N. J. Eq. 723; Darnell v. Rowland, 30 Ind. 342; Rogers v. Higgins, 57 111. 247 ; Beverley v. Waldon, 20 Grat. 147; Hadley v. Latimer, 3 Yerg. 537; Rippy v. Gant, 4 Ired. Eq. 443; Paine v. Roberts, 82 N. C. 451; Thomas v. Shep-pard, 2 McCord Eq. 36; Kilhan v.