1 Bispham's Eq. sec 189 ; Story's Eq. Jur. 12th ed. sec 112; Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 40 ; Gibbons v. Caunt, 4 Ves. 849 ; Naylor v. Winch, 1 Sim. & St. 555 ; Stevens v. Lynch, 12 East, 38; Perrott v. Perrott, 14 East, 429 ; Stewart v. Stewart, 6 CI. & F. 966; Rogers v. Ingham, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 351;.

Eaglesfield v. Londonderry, L. R. 4 C. D. 693 ; Bank U. S. v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32 ; Lamborn v. Commis., 97 U. S. 181 ; Freeman v. Curtis, 51 Me. 140; Pink-ham v. Gear, 3 N. H. 163 ; Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. 112 ; Northrop v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548; Clarke v. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674 ; Ege v. Koontz, 3 Barr. 102 ; Real Est. Inst. v. Linder, 74 Penn. St. 371.

2 Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick. 112; Wh. on Ev. sec 288.

3 Story's Eq. Jur. 12th ed. sec 113 ; Stockley v. Stockley, 1 Ves. & B. 23 ; Powell v. Smith, L. R. 14 Eq. 85; Mildmay v. Hungerford, 7 Vern. 243 : Shotwell v. Murray, 1 Johns. Ch. 512; Lyon v. Richmond, 2 Johns. Ch. 51 ; Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. 169; Loaning v. Carpenter, 48 N. Y. 408 ; Garwood v. Eldridge, 1 Green Ch. 145 ; Moorman v. Collier, 32 lowa, 138; Montgomery v. Shockey, 37 Iowa, 107 ; Martin v. Hamlin, 18 Mich. 354. As to fraud in misstatement of legal meaning of document, see infra, sec 259. That a party is presumed to know what he signs, see supra, sec 196.

4 Powell v. Smith, L. R. 14 Eq. 85 ; Sawyer v. Hovey, 3 Allen, 331; Pitcher v. Hennessy, 48 N. Y. 415 ; Phillip v. Gallant, 62 N. Y. 256; Strohecker v. Farmers' Bk., 6 Barr, 41. See as to limitations, infra, sec 199.

construction of the contract, in a matter not going to its essence, neither of them communicating to the other his distinctive construction, each is bound by the construction ultimately imposed upon it by the courts; although equity may relieve in cases where there was a bona fide non-negligent mistake of rights under an ambiguous document.1 And a compromise of litigated rights, where there is no fraud, will not be subsequently disturbed by the courts, though it turn out that the right surrendered by the party subsequently complaining is valid, and is held to be so by the court to whom the appeal for the revision of the compromise is made.2 The mere fact that one of the parties has misapprehended his legal rights will not by itself shake such a compromise,3 though it is otherwise with a gratuitous surrender of unquestionable rights under a mistaken view of the application of the law to a particular state of facts.1-The whole law of compromise rests on this basis. It is greatly for the good of society that litigated questions should be amicably settled by reciprocal surrenders of rights; for not only in this way is the peace of families and of the community promoted, and business relieved from the paralysis of protracted contests, but the courts are released from a burden of litigation under which they would be crushed. Yet there are few compromises in which one of the parties at least cannot maintain that he acted in ignorance of the law. A point he considered doubtful had to be decided one way or the other; but at the time of the compromise he was ignorant of what the decision would be. If this ignorance would set aside a compromise, there is scarcely a compromise that would not be set aside.2

1 Ibid. ; infra, sec 199, 654. In Hunt v. Rousmaniere, 8 Wheat. 174, as stated by Judge Story (Eq. Jur. 12th ed. sec 114), "upon the loan of money, for which security was to be given, the parties deliberately took, after consultation with counsel, a letter of attorney, with a power to sell the property (ships) in case of non-payment of the money, instead of a mortgage upon the property itself, upon the mistake of law that the security by the former instrument would, in case of death or other accident, bind the property to the same extent as a mortgage. The debtor died, and his estate being insolvent, a bill in equity was brought by the creditor against the administrators to reform the instrument, or to give him a priority by way of lien on the property, in exclusion of the general creditors. The court finally, after the most deliberate examination of the case at three successive stages of the cause, denied relief upon the ground that the agreement was for a particular security selected by the parties, and not for security generally ; and that the court were asked to substitute another security for that selected by the parties, not upon any mistake of fact, but upon a mistake of law, when such security was not within the scope of their agreement." S. C. 1 Pet. S. C. 1, 13, 14 ; 2 Mason, 342; 3 Mason, 294.

2 Infra, sec 533 ; Bispham's Eq. sec 189 ; Kerr on Fraud and Mist. 403 ; Stewart v. Stewart, 6 Cl. & F. 911 ; Rogers v. Ingham, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 351; Clifton v. Cockburn, 3 My. & K. 76 ; Freeman v. Curtis, 51 Me. 140 ; Holcomb v. Stimp-son, 8 Vt. 141; Good v. Herr, 7 W. & S. 253; Cumberland Co. v. Sherman, 20 Md. 117 ; Stover v. Mitchell, 45 111. 213; Trigg v. Reed, 5 Humph. 529 ; Brandon v. Medley, 1 Jones's Eq. 313 ; Durham v. Wadlington, 2 Strob. Eq. 258; Morris v. Munroe, 30 Ga. 630; Haden v. Ware, 15 Ala. 149 ; Bell v. Laurence, 51 Ala. 160; Beall v. Mc-Gehee, 57 Ala. 438. That forbearance is a good consideration, see infra, sec 532 ; and so of compromise of doubtful claims, infra, sec 533; and so of giving up litigated document. Infra, sec 534.

3 Union Bank v. Geary, 5 Pet. 99; infra, sec 533.