If the contract does not expressly or impliedly require the seller to send the goods to the buyer, the buyer need only put the goods in a deliverable state and permit the buyer to take possession at the place of delivery as defined by s. 29 of the Sale of Goods Act (62).
The Sale of Goods Act (Ont, s. 32; U.K. s. 32) provides:
32. - (1) Where, in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller is authorized or required to send the goods to the buyer, the delivery of the goods to a common carrier whether named by the buyer or not, for the purpose of transmission to the buyer, is prima facie deemed to be a delivery of the goods to the buyer.
(2) Unless otherwise authorized by the buyer, the seller must make such contract with the common carrier on behalf of the buyer as may be reasonable, having regard to the nature of the goods and the other circumstances of the case. If the seller omits to do so, and the goods are lost or damaged in course of transit, the buyer may decline to treat the delivery to the carrier as a delivery to himself or may hold the seller responsible in damages.
The word "common" inserted before the word "carrier" in sub-ss. 1 and 2 in the Ontario statute does not appear in the statute as enacted in the United Kingdom or in the other provinces of Canada.
In Dunlop v. Lambert, 1839, 6 Ci. & F. 603, at pp. 620-1, Lord Cottenham said:
It is no doubt true as a general rule that the delivery by the consignor to the carrier is delivery to the consignee, and that the risk is after such delivery the risk of the consignee. That is so if, without designating the particular carrier, the consignee directs that the goods shall be sent by the ordinary conveyance. And it is still more strongly so if the goods are sent by a carrier specially pointed out by the consigne himself, for such carrier then becomes his special agent.
But though the authorities all establish the general inference I have stated, yet the general inference is capable of being varied by the circumstances of any special arrangement between the parties, or of any particular mode of dealing between them. See also Calcutta Co. v. DeMattos, 1863, 32 L.J.Q.B. 322, at p. 328, quoted in note in Chalmers, Sale of Goods, 7th ed. 1910, pp. 213-4; Graham v. Laird, 1909, 20 O.L.R. 11. As to the passing of the property, and as to reservation of the right of disposal, see chapter 3, 37 and 38; as to the risk of loss, see chapter 1, 15.
A carrier, though he is presumed to receive the goods in the character of agent for the consignee, is not necessarily his agent for the purpose of actual receipt, still less his agent to accept the goods, within the Statute of Frauds; but the consignee may so act as to constitute the carrier his agent for both these purposes.
Bushel v. Wheeler, 1844, 15 Q.B. 442, 23 R.C. 213; Meredith v. Meigh, 1853, 2 E. & B. 364, 23 R.C. 217; as to acceptance and actual receipt, see chapter 2, 26. In the United Kingdom the corresponding section further provides:
32- (3) Unless otherwise agreed, where goods are sent by the seller to the buyer by a route involving sea transit, under circumstances in which it is usual to insure, the seller must give such notice to the buyer as may enable him to insure them during their sea transit, and, if the seller fails to do so, the goods shall be deemed to be at his risk during such sea transit. In the provinces other than Ontario this sub-section is retained. In Manitoba the words "lake or river" are inserted after the word " sea."
The section is discussed and analyzed in Wimble, Sons & Co. v. Rosenberg,  3 K.B. 743, in which it was held, by a majority of the court, that sub-s. 3 applies to an f.o.b. contract, and, by one judge, that if before the goods are shipped the buyer has all information necessary to enable him to insure, the seller is not obliged to give notice to the buyer of the shipment of the goods on a particular ship. See also Northern Steel and Hardware Co. v. Batt, 1917, 33 Times L.R. 516.
Sub-s. 3 does not apply to a c.i.f. contract entered into in time of peace, inasmuch as the contract itself provides for all the insurance that is contemplated or usual at the time when it is made, and the sub-section does not impose on the seller any new obligation to give notice to the buyer so as to enable him to insure against war risks, if, after the date of the contract, war becomes imminent.
Law & Bonar v. British American Tobacco Co.  2 K.B. 605; as to c.i.f. contracts, see 61.
The Sale of Goods Act (Ont. s. 33; U.K. s. 33) provides: 33. Where the seller of goods agrees to deliver them at his own risk at a place other than that where they are when sold, the buyer must, nevertheless, unless otherwise agreed, take any risk of deterioration in the goods necessarily incident to the course of transit.
To this statutory rule is added in 25 Halsbury, Laws of England, p. 223, the statement that the seller must bear the risk of any extraordinary or unusual deterioration during transit.
In the case of perishable goods, even if the seller has not agreed to deliver them at his own risk, it is said that he is deemed to take the risk of the goods not arriving in the ordinary course of transit and of their not remaining in a merchantable condition for a reasonable time after arrival.
See 25 Halsbury, Laws of England, p. 224, citing Beer v. Walker, 1877, 46 L.J.Q.B. 677; but cf. Mayhew v. Scott, 1915, 8 Alta. L.E. 66, 21 D.L.K. 54. As to risk of loss generally, see chapter 1, 5.