Not only does the common law, by the general principles of contract, require the owner to supply the ship with provisions of due quality and in due quantity, (v) but statutes of the United States (w) intervene, securing this supply by a penalty of a day's wages extra to every seaman, for every day on which he is on short allowance. (x) But for this purpose, the necessity of short
(q) The Two Catherines, 2 Mason, 819; Cartwell v. Ship John Taylor, 1 Newb. Adm. 841; The Niphon, U. S. C. C. Mats. 18 Law Rep. 266. The better opinion seems to be that the right of the seaman in such a case rests upon his contract, and not upon salvage, or a quantum meruit. The Neptune, 1 Hagg. Adm. 227; The Massasoit, Sprague, 97.
(r) The Two Catherines, 2 Mason, 819; Adams v. Brig Sophia, Gilpin, 77; Jurgenson v. The Snow Catharina Maria, 2 Pet Adm. 424; The Dawn, Daveis, 121; Taylor v. Ship Cato, 1 Pet Adm. 48; Brackett v. The Hercules, Gilpin, 184; Lewis v. The Elisabeth & Jane, Ware, 41.
(s) The Massasoit, Sprague, 97; The Reliance, 2 W. Rob. 119; The Lady Durham, 8 Hagg. Adm. 196. The law seems now to be settled by the authorities that a seaman cannot be a salvor unless his contract as a seaman can be considered as at an end. See ante, p. ♦317, n. (t). The practical distinctions between compensating a seaman as such or as a salvor are these. If as a salvor, he must aid in preserving the property, and is entitled to compensation from the proceeds of the cargo as well as from the ship and freight. If as a seaman, he has no claim on the cargo for wages, and is not entitled to compensation although he saves some of it But he is entitled to compensation if any part of the ship and freight is preserved, although he took no part in the preservation, if he was not in fault See ante, note (g).
(t) Eaken v. Thorn, 6 Esp. 6. See the remarks of Kent, C. J., on this case in Hoyt v. Wildfire, 8 Johns. 618.
(u) See Hindman v. Shaw, 2 Pet Adm. 264, 266.
(v) The Madonna D'Idra, 1 Dods. 37; Dixon v. The Cyrus, 2 Pet. Adm. 407, 411.
(w) Act of 1790, c. § 9, 1 U. S. Stats. at Large, 131, 135. See Gardner v. The New Jersey, 1 Pet. Adm. 228.
(x) It has been held, that if less than allowance must spring from an insufficiency of the original supply, and not from any accident of the voyage, or its extraordinary length, or the delivery of part of the provisions to another vessel in greater want. (y) The statute also prescribes the quantity. Every vessel bound on a voyage across the Atlantic Ocean, must at the time of leaving the last port from which she sails, (z) have on board, well secured under deck, at least sixty gallons of water, one hundred pounds of salted flesh meat, and one hundred pounds of wholesome ship bread, for every person on board, and in like proportion for shorter or longer voyages. (a) It has been determined by admiralty, that a deficiency in any one kind of provisions is not compensated by an excess in any other, (b) nor is it any defence for a deficiency in bread that flour is given. (c) Perhaps the master has in every port, a certain discretion in substituting for the provisions required by law, where they cannot be obtained by reasonable exertions, or at reasonable cost, other wholesome and abundant food, fully equivalent in quantity and in quality to that which the law requires. (d) But this is not certain; and it may even be doubtful whether it is any excuse for the want of the provisions required by the statute that the article in which the deficiency occurred could not be procured. (e) What is a proper allowance is determined by the navy ration. (f)