These may be regarded as coming under the law of warranty. Principles may be applied to them analogous to those applied to deviation under marine policies, the question being whether there is a change of risk. There is, however, this difference. Deviation is defined only by the law and usage. But these restrictions and exceptions are expressly and precisely stated in life policies.
The most important of these restrictions or limitations apply to place, the life-insured not being permitted to go beyond certain limits, or to certain places, or not to go to them at certain times. Although the language used in expressing these limitations must be subject to a reasonable, and it may be said a liberal, construction, positive departure from a precisely stated limitation, has been held to avoid the policy, although an exact compliance with it was impossible, and the departure from it rather lessened than increased the risk. We give below the leading cases on this restriction. (b)
(w) Trenton Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 4 N. J. 576.
(x) Maynard v. Rhodes, 5 Dowl. & R. 266, 1 Car. & P. 360.
(y) Hockman v. Fernie, 8 M. & W. 506.
(z) Swete v. Fairlie, 6 Car. & P. 1.
(a) Collett v. Morrison, 9 Hare, 162, 12 Eng. L. & Eq. 171.
(b) In Wing v. Harvey, 5 De G. M. & G. 265, 27 Eng. L. & Eq. 140, Bennett, at the instance of Wing, his creditor, proIt is very common in practice, for insurers on application to give liberty to exceed these limits, either for a time or permanently; and they are equally bound by the liberty granted, whether they do or do not receive a further premium therefor. (c) l Where an agent, in disobedience to the rules of cured insurance on his own life, and one condition in the policy was, that "if the party upon whose life the insurance is granted shall go beyond the limits of Europe without the license of the directors, this policy shall become void, the insurance intended to be hereby effected shall cease, and the money paid to the society become forfeited to its use." These policies were duly assigned by Bennett to Wing, and notice given to Lockwood, the general agent of the company at Bury St. Edmunds, through whom the policies had been effected. After the assignments, the premiums were regularly paid by Wing, or his brother in his behalf. In June, 1835, five years after the effecting of the last policy, Bennett infringed on the con-dition of the policies by going to live in Canada, where he resided till his death in 1849. Lockwood, applying to Wing for the premiums afterwards, was informed of Bennett's departure, and being inquired of whether it would be safe to pay the premiums under the circumstances, replied, that the policies would be perfectly good provided the premiums were regularly paid; and Wing thereupon paid them to Lockwood, who transmitted them to the head office of the society. To the successor of Lockwood, who died in 1847, the same inquiries were put, the same reply was received, and the premiums received and transmitted in the same manner. There was some evidence which tended to show, that the officers of the company had incidentally become informed of Bennett's residence in Canada. It was held, that whether the office had express notice of the forfeiture or not, it was waived by the act of the agents in receiving the premiums paid to them in faith of the policies continuing valid and effectual notwithstanding the departure, and transmitting them to the directors, who retained them without objection. Knight Bruce, L. J., said: "If the directors represented by the defendant had themselves personally received the premiums which Mr. Lockwood and Mr. Thompson received with the same knowledge they had, that would certainly have been a waiver of the forfeiture, and the defence would have been ineffectual; but they were their agents for the purpose of receiving the premiums upon subsisting policies, - premiums paid to them upon the faith of the policies continuing valid and effectual, notwithstanding the departure and residence at Canada of the person whose life was insured, - a faith in which Lockwood, and afterwards Thompson, knowingly acquiesced, and expressly sanctioned. Those premiums having been, from time to time, transmitted to the directors, and retained by them without objection, I think, whether Lockwood or Thompson informed, or did not inform them in fact, of the true state of the circumstances in which the premiums were paid to them, the directors became, and are, as between themselves and plaintiffs, as much bound as if those premiums had been paid by the plaintiff directly to themselves, they knowing at the time, on each occasion, the place of Bennett's residence. The directors taking the money, were or are precluded from saying they received it otherwise than for the purpose and on the faith for which and on which Mr. Wing expressly paid it" See also Bouton v. Am. Ins. Co. 25 Conn. 542.
(c) In Hathaway v. Trenton Ins. Co. 11 Cush. 448, a person whose life was insured had permission given him "to make one voyage out and home to California, in a first-rate vessel, round Cape Horn or by Vera Cruz." Being taken sick in California, he returned home by way of Panama and Chagres, and soon after died. It was held, that the policy was thereby avoided, although at the time he left California there was no usually travelled route by way of Vera Cruz, and in his then state of health, a return home by that way would have been attended with great risk and expense, and although the route taken was the shortest and the safest one. In Bevin v. Conn. Ins. Co. 23 Conn. 244, liberty was given "to pass by sea in decked vessels, from any port in the United States to and from any port in North and South America, Chagres exthe company, permitted an insured to reside in a prohibited district, it was held that the insured was not bound to know the rules of the company, although it was a "mutual;" and the company was estopped to deny the authority of the agent. (cc) 1