(g) Thus, in an action on a policy of insurance on a voyage "to any port in the Baltic," evidence was admitted to prove, that in mercantile contracts the Gulf of Finland is considered as within the Balstic Uhde v. Walters, 3 Camp. 16. So, also, that Mauritius is considered as an East India Island, although treated by geographers as an African Island. Robertson v. Money, Ryan & M. 75 ■ Robertson v. Clarke, 1 Bing. 445.

Mitchell, 4 Camp. 146. - Where bills or notes are made payable at certain banks, it is to be presumed that the parties intend that demand shall be made and notice given according to the usages of such banks, although the general rules of the law-merchant may be superseded thereby. Thus, by the usage of the banks of the city of Washington, four days' grace may be allowed. Demand made and notice given in accordance with such usage will be binding on the indorser, even when ignorant of the usage. Mills v. Bank of United States, 11 Wheat 431. See also Renner v. Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 581; Bank of Washington v. Triplet, 1 Pet. 25; Adams v. Otterback, 15 How. 539; Chicopee Bank v. Eager, 9 Met. 588; Planters Bank v. Markham, 6 How. Miss. 897; Lincoln and Kennebec Bank v. Page, 9 Mass. 155; Bank of Columbia v. Fitshugh, 1 Harris & G. 239; Blanchard v. Hilliard, 11 Mass. 85. In the case of The Bridgeport Bank v. Dyer, 19 Conn. 186, the Bridgeport Bank on Monday, the 1st of June, cashed for D a check drawn on the Manhattan Co. in New York city. On Thursday the 4th, in accordance with the established usage of the Bridgeport Bank, it was sent by the captain of a steamboat to New York. In an action brought by the Bridgeport Bank against D, as indorser of such check, it was held, that such usage was sufficient evidence of an agreement between the parties not to insist upon the rule of law regarding the transmission of checks. See also Kilgore v. Bulkley, 14 Conn. 863; and generally as to the usages of banks, and their binding force upon parties, Jones v. Fales, 4 Mass. 245; Pierce v. Butler, 14 Mass. 303; City Bank v. Cutter, 3 Pick. 414; Dorchester and Milton Bank v. New Eng. Bank, 1 Cash. 177; Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns. 230; Cookendorfer v. Preston, 4 How. 317. - In the case of Pollock v. Stables, 12 Q. B. 765, it was held, that if a party authorizes a broker to buy shares for him in a particular market, where the usage is, that when a purchaser does not pay for his shares within a given time, the vendor giving the purchaser notice, may sell, and charge him with the difference; and the broker, acting under the authority, buys at such market in his own name; such broker, if compelled to pay a difference on the shares through neglect of his principal to supply funds, may sue the principal for money paid to his use. And it is not necessary, in such action, to show that the principal knew of the custom.

they commonly bear, * and which indeed by the rules of language, and in ordinary cases, would be expressed by another word. (h)

This influence of custom was first admitted in reference to mercantile contracts. And indeed almost the whole of the law-merchant, if it has not grown out of custom sanctioned by courts and thus made law, has been very greatly modified in that way. For illustration of this, we may refer to the law of bills and notes, insurance, and contracts of shipping generally. And although doubts have been expressed whether it was wise * or safe to permit express contracts to be controlled, or, if not controlled, affected by custom in the degree in which it seems now to be established that they may be; (i) this operation of custom

See Bayliffe v. Butterworth, 1 Exch. 426; Sutton v. Tatham, 10 A. & E. 27; Mitchell v. Newhall, 16 M. & W. 308: Moon v. Guardians of Whitney Union, 8 Bing. N. C. 814; Stewart v. Aberdein, 4 M. & W. 211. And oral evidence has been admitted to show that, according to mercantile usage, a written contract to deliver 50 tons "best palm oil," with inferior oil if any at a fair allowance, is satisfied if the oil delivered contains a substantial portion of "best" oil. Lucas v. Bristow, 96 Eng. C. L. 907.

(h) Thus, in the case of Smith v. Wilson, 3 B. & Ad. 728, where the lessee of a rabbit-warren covenanted to leave on the warren 10,000 rabbits, the lessor paying for them £60 per thousand, it was held, that parol evidence was admissible to show, that by the custom of the country where the lease was made, the word thousand, as applied to rabbits, denoted one hundred dozen, or twelve hundred. In Hinton v. Locke, 6 Hill, 487, Branson, J., said, that he should have great difficulty in subscribing to this case, on the ground that the custom sought to be incorporated into the contract was "a plain contradiction of the express contract of the parties." But the usage admitted in Hinton v. Locke, and sanctioned by Branson, J., seems to be nearly in equal opposition to the terms of the contract affected by it. The defendant, in that case, had promised to pay the plaintiff, who was a carpenter, twelve shillings per day for every man employed by him in repairing the defendant's house. Evidence was held admissible to show, that by a universal usage among carpenters, ten hours' labor constituted a day's work. So that the plaintiff was entitled to charge one and one fourth day, for every twenty-four hours within which the men worked twelve hours and one half. Bronson, J., said: "Usage can never be set up in contravention of the contract; but when there is nothing in the agreement to exclude the inference, the parties are always presumed to contract in reference to the usage or custom which prevails in the particular trade or business to which the contract relates; and the usage is admissible for the purpose of ascertaining with greater certainty what was intended by the parties. The evidence often serves to explain or give the true meaning of some word or phrase of doubtful import, or which may be understood in more than one sense, according to the subject-matter to which it is applied. Now here, the plaintiff was to be paid for his workmen at the rate of twelve shillings per day; but the parties have not told us by their contract what they meant by a day's work. It has not been pretended that it necessarily means the labor of twenty-four hours. How much, then, does it mean? Evidence of the usage or custom was let in to answer that question." (i) Per Lord Eldon, in Anderson v. Pitcher, 2 B. & P. 168; per Lord Denman, Trueman v. Loder, 11 A. 6 E. 589, 597; Hutton v. Warren, 1 M. & W. 466. In Rogers v. Mechanics Ins. Co. 1 Story, 608, 606, Mr. Justice Story uses the following language: "I own myself no friend to the indiscriminate admission of evidence of supposed usages and customs in a peculiar trade and business, and of the understanding of witnesses relative thereto, which has been in former times so freely resorted to; but which is now subjected by our courts to more exact and well-defined restrictions. Such evidence is often, very often, of a loose and indeterminate nature, founded upon very vague and imis now fixed by law, and extended to a vast variety of contracts; and indeed to all to which its privileges properly apply. And qualified and guarded as it is, it seems to be no more than reasonable. In fact, it may be doubted whether a large portion of the common law of England and of this country rests upon any other basis than that of custom. The theory has been held, that the actual foundation of most ancient usages was statute law, which the lapse of time has hidden out of sight. This is not very probable as a fact. The common law is every day adopting as rules and principles the mere usages of the community, or of those classes of the community who are most conversant with the matters to which these rules relate; and it is certain that a large proportion of the existing law first acquired force in this way. At all events, even as to all law, whether common or statute, that rule must be admitted which is as sound as it is ancient, and which Lord Coke emphatically declares: optimus interpres legum consuetudo. (j)