The carrier may also be a factor to sell for the owner; and this by express instructions, or by usage of trade. (n) When this is the case, after the carrier has transported the goods, and is engaged in his duty as a factor for sales, he is responsible only as a factor, or for his negligence or default, and not as a carrier. But after he has sold the property, and has received the price which he is to return to the owner, his responsibility as a carrier revives, and in that capacity he is liable for any loss of the money. (o) full of cases, many of them hard and distressing cases, where honest and innocent persons have purchased goods of others, apparently the owners, and often with strong evidence of ownership, but who yet were not the owners, and the purchasers have been obliged to surrender the goods to the true owners, though wholly without remedy for the money paid. There are other hard and distressing cases of advances made honestly and fairly by auctioneers and commission merchants, upon a pledge of goods by persons apparently having the right to pledge, but who in fact had not any such right, and the pledgees hare been subjected to the loss of them by the claim of the rightful owner. These are hazards to which persons in business are continually exposed by the operation of this universal principle, that a man's property cannot be taken from him without his consent. Why should the carrier be exempt from the operation of this universal principle? Why should not the principle of caveat emptor apply to him? The reason, and the only reason given, is, that he is obliged to receive goods to carry, and should therefore have a right to detain the goods for his pay. But he is not bound to receive goods from a wrong-doer. He is bound only to receive goods from one who may rightfully deliver them to him, and he can look to the title, as well as persons in other pursuits and situations in life. Nor is a carrier bound to receive goods, unless the freight or pay for the carriage is first paid to him; and he may in all cases secure the payment of the carriage in advance. In the case of King v. Richards, 6 Whart. 418, it was decided that a carrier may defend himself from a claim for goods "by the person who delivered them to him, on the ground that the bailor was not the true owner, and therefore not entitled to the goods. The common carrier is responsible for the wrong delivery of goods, though innocently done, upon a forged order. Why should not his obligation to receive goods exempt him from the necessity of determining the right of the person to whom he delivers the goods, as well as from the necessity of determining the right of the persons from whom he receives the goods?"

(k) Stevenson v. Hart, 4 Bing. 476; Duff v. Budd, 3 Br. & B. 177.

(l) Crouch v. G. W. R. Co. 2 Hurl, ft N. 491.

(m) Hudson v. Baxendale, 2 Hurl, & N. 575.

(n) Stone v. Waitt, 31 Me. 409; Williams v. Nichols, 13 Wend. 58; The Waldo, Daveis, 161.

(o) Thus, where the owners of a steamboat, which ran upon the Ohio River, took produce to be carried and sold by them for a certain freight, and were bringing back in the same vessel the money which they obtained on the sale of the produce, when the vessel and the money were accidentally consumed by fire; it was held, that under the usage of trade in the western waters, they were acting as common carriers in going, as factors in selling the produce, and as common carriers in bringing back the money, and thorizes to act for him. But a party may contract with the servant alone, and then can hold him only. (p)

* The common principles of agency apply to the carrier; he is liable for the acts of those whom he employs and auwere liable for its loss, notwithstanding the accident. Harrington v. McShane, S Watte, 443. And per Sergeant, J.: "The question of the defendants' responsibility in the present case depends on the character in which they held this money when the loss occurred. If they were merely factors they are not responsible; if they were carriers the reverse most be the case. Had the floor been lost in the descending voyage, by a similar accident, there could be no doubt whatever of the defendants' liability; they were certainly transporting it in the character of carriers. On their arrival at the port of destination, and landing the flour there, this character ceased, and the duty of factor commenced. When the flour was sold, and the specific money, the proceeds of sale, separated from other moneys in the defendants' hands, and set apart for the plaintiffs, was on its return to them by the same boat, the character of carrier reattached. The return of the proceeds by the same vessel is within the scope of the receipt and of the usage of trade, as proved, and the freight paid may be deemed to have been fixed with a view to the whole course of the trade, embracing a reward for all the duties of transportation, sale, and return. If the defendants, instead of bringing the money home in their own vessel, had sent it on freight by another, there would have been to the plaintiffs the responsibility of a carrier, and there ought not to be less if they chose to bring it themselves. If they had mixed the money with their own, they would have no excuse for non-payment. The defendants can be relieved from responsibility only by holding that the character of carrier never existed between these parties at all, or that if it existed, on the descending voyage, it ceased at its termination, and that of factor began and continued during the ascending voyage. Bui if the defendants bring back in the same vessel other property, the proceeds of the shipment, whether specific money or goods, they do so as carriers, and not merely as factors." So where a master of a vessel, employed in the transportation of roods between the cities of Albany and New York, received on board a quantity of flour to be carried to New York, and there sold in the usual course of such business for the ordinary freight; and the flour was sold by the master at New York for cash, and while the vessel was lying at the dock, the cabin was broken open and the money stolen out of the master's trunk, while he and the crew were absent; it was held, that the owners of the vessel were answerable for the money to the shippers of the flour, though no commissions, or a distinct compensation, beyond the freight, were allowed for the sale of the goods and bringing back the money, such being the duty of the master, in the usual course of the employment, where no special instructions were given. Kemp v. Cough-try, 11 Johns. 107. And, per curiam: "Had the property which was put on board this vessel for transportation been stolen before it was converted into money, there could be no doubt the defendants would have been responsible. But the character of common carrier does not cease upon the sale of the property. According to the testimony in this case, the sale of the goods and return of the proceeds to the owner is a part of the duty attached to the employment, where no special instructions are given. The contract between the parties is entire, and is not fulfilled on the part of the carrier, until he has complied with his orders, or has accounted with the owner for the proceeds, or brought himself within one of the excepted cases. The sale in this case was actually made, and the money received ; and had it been invested in other property, to be transported from New York to Albany, there would be no question but the character of common carrier would have continued. It can make no difference whether the return cargo is in money or goods. A person may be a common carrier of money, as well as of other property. Carth. 485. Although no commission or distinct compensation was to be received upon the money, yet according to the evidence, it appears to be a part of the duty attached to the employment, and in the usual and ordinary course of the business, to bring back the money when the cargo is sola for cash. The freight of the cargo is the compensation for the whole; it is one entire concern. And the suit may be brought against the owners of the vessel. The master is considered their agent or servant, and they are responsible for the faithful discharge of his trust." See also, Taylor v. Wells, 3 Watts, 65; Emery v. Hersey, 4 Greenl. 407. - It should be observed, however, that Mr. Justice Story has made some strictures upon the case of Kemp p. Coughtry, for which see Story on Bailm. 547, 548.